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Educational Choice and Educational Space 
Kathleen Sonia Thomson 
This dissertation entitled “Educational choice and educational space” aims to explore the 
confluence of constructed space and geographic space using a supply-side context for New 
Zealand’s public school system of quasi-open enrollment. In Part I, New Zealand’s state and 
state-integrated school system across four urban areas is analyzed spatially and analytically in an 
attempt to learn about supply-side motivations of individual schools for selecting students. Since 
1999 there has been a gradual encroachment on the open enrollment initiative due to excess 
demand for certain schools altering the landscape of choice. Most studies of school choice 
examine household motivations to choose schools- what is referred to as the demand-side 
dynamic of the education market. The contribution of this study to educational choice literature 
is provided by the opportunity presented by New Zealand’s public education system to examine 
the supply-side dynamic. School motivation for choosing students is warranted by the fact that 
individual schools are funded on a per-pupil basis and they are able make operational decisions 
that include defining their own catchment areas (home zones) when oversubscribed. In order to 
test the hypothesis that schools are behaving selectively, I leverage boundary discontinuity 
design (BDD) (Bayer, Ferreira, & McMillan, 2007) and meta-analysis techniques and use census 
data that reflects neighborhood composition closely linked to the time at which the home zone 
was drawn. Household characteristics as represented by 2006 census data are within 5 years old 
at the time the home zone was drawn in 53-percent of cases, and range to a maximum of 7 years 
for the full sample of schools used in the analysis. The result is a truly unique opportunity to 
examine evidence of school selective behavior while accounting for logistical, geographic and 
market features. Across a sample of 886 publicly funded state and state-integrated schools in 
Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin I evaluate 372 schools that implemented 
enrollment schemes with geographically defined home zones as of the 2009 school year. I find 
that schools are engaging in selective behavior across one or more household socioeconomic or 
demographic characteristics – with indicators of deprivation and minority status consistently 
maintaining significance in boundary and zone discontinuity.  Between 37 and 52-percent of 
schools sample-wide are estimated to be participating in gerrymandering in small to large ways 
(discontinuities were greater than 0.2 standard deviations, favoring households with affluence 
and non-minority status).  Cases of medium to large discrimination (standardized mean 
differences of >0.5) are evident in 12 to 26-percent of schools. Schools are zoning out 
households that contain higher proportions of minorities with an emphasis on non-indigenous 
(Māori) minorities, in particular the Pasifika group. When examining schools separately by city, 
sector, gender and school student body socioeconomic status I find heterogeneity in school 
behavior. Findings corroborate and expand upon previous work regarding New Zealand’s 
policies of enrollment schemes and their adverse effects. 
Part II expands the implications of school-level selective behaviors to the macro setting 
of the metropolitan area education market. Because school zones are not mandated to be 
mutually exclusive or completely exhaustive of the metro area they serve, it is possible that home 
zones overlap in some areas and provide no coverage in others. School choice is modeled using 
an ordered probit approach where the number of home zones claiming the household (census 
meshblock) is the dependent variable. I also calculate meshblock-level schooling opportunity 
sets (SOS) for the primary and secondary sectors using methods developed by (Gibson & Boe-
Gibson, 2014). The SOS factors household-school proximity with school performance into a 
summary estimate of educational opportunity for each meshblock.  The determinants of each 
meshblock’s choice set and SOS are modeled as a function of household characteristics, with 
controls for geographic and market influences. I find evidence that both the size and quality of  
household educational opportunities are statistically significantly associated with socioeconomic 
status and racial composition. Affluence is a strong predictor of additional choices and higher 
quality school access while racial composition continues to be negatively associated with both.  
The “lay of the education landscape” is then considered for each metro area using the Index of 
Dissimilarity and mapping techniques. The exercise reveals helpful insight into each of the four 
education markets.  The dissertation concludes with a discussion on the implications and 
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This work is dedicated to the idea that public policies and processes that contribute to disparate 
impact can be identified and their adverse consequences rectified. In addition, this work is 









CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
 
New Zealand is an OECD developed country of 4.6 million
1
 located in the South Pacific 
consisting of two main islands (the south and north islands) and is approximately two-thirds the 
size of the state of California or comparable in geographic size to the United Kingdom. 
Originally settled by Māori peoples in 1300 AD, New Zealand was colonized by the British in 
the mid 1800’s, and has evolved to become a demographically and ethnically diverse population 
that resides largely in urban areas.
2
 The demographic breakdown consists of 74.6-percent 
European
3
 descent, 15.6-percent indigenous Māori, 12.2- percent Asian, 7.8- percent Pacific 
peoples and 1.2- percent ‘other.’
4
 Life expectancy at birth is the age of 81 years in 2013.
5
 The 
country has three official languages, including English, Māori and NZ Sign Language, and is a 
parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. New Zealand is ranked as a high 
income OECD country with GDP estimated at 188.4 billion and GNI per capita of $39,300 USD 
                                                 
1




 In New Zealand, the white racial category is most commonly referred to as “European” or Pākehā (the indigenous 
Māori name for those New Zealanders of European descent) 
4
Percentages do not sum to 100, individuals self-identifying in more than one ethnic group are counted in each 









 New Zealand’s main trading partners include the United States, China, Japan and 
Australia. The main labor force sectors include personal and community services; financial, 
insurance and business services; retail trade; manufacturing; construction and agriculture, 
mining, water and electricity.
7 
Areas of the greatest economic growth between 2007 and 2013 
included mining; agriculture, forestry and fishing; financial services; health care and social 




 The New Zealand public education system is a largely decentralized system where 
school governance and control is carried out at the school-level and guided by the national 
Ministry of Education. The majority of school-aged children (85-percent) attend state (public) 
schools; 10-percent of students attend what are known as ‘state-integrated’ schools (special-
character/ religious) and the remaining five percent attend private schools.
9
 Both state and state-
integrated schools follow the national curriculum and are funded publicly. The system consists of 
43 local, district and regional offices throughout New Zealand serving approximately 194,000 
students in early childhood education services; 707,400 students in 2,500 primary and secondary 
schools; 432,000 students in the tertiary sector and 195,000 students in industry-training 












programs as of 2012.
10
  New Zealand’s system of primary and secondary schools serve children 
aged 5 to 19 years in 13 year levels with the primary sector spanning Years 1-8 (ages 5 – 12 
years) and the secondary sector spanning Years 9-13 (ages 13-17).
11
 A full breakdown of the 
education system by school year and sector is provided in Appendix 2. Education expenditures in 
2012/2013 comprised $12,425M NZL of which $1,402M  were used in early childhood, 
$8,203M in primary/secondary education and $2,820M in tertiary education.
12
 Students 
attending state schools can expect to contribute an average of NZ$250-$500 per year in fees; 
state-integrated pupils can expect approximately $1,500 in additional fees and private tuition is 
approximately NZL$20,000 per year.
13
  
What is special about New Zealand and the focus of this dissertation is fact the country 
has been internationally recognized as implementing market-based educational reforms well 
ahead of other education systems. In 1989 New Zealand ushered in the Education Act- otherwise 
known as ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ which included devolving several aspects of governance and 
management to schools through decentralization while maintaining centralized funding in the 
state and state-integrated sectors. School competition was enabled through the inclusion of per-
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pupil funding structures and open enrollment policy (Pearce & Gordon, 2005). The reform called 
for the creation of a locally-elected Board of Trustees (BoT) composed of school officials, 
parents, community representatives and in some cases, students. By the decision to decentralize 
many aspects of education decision-making, the New Zealand Ministry of Education afforded 
schools enough latitude over governance to act strategically in what was designed to become a 
competitive marketplace. Schools in common local areas were not to be bound by a school 
district or local authority in a daily sense, as would be the case in a typical developed country’s 
public education system (Wylie, 2007). Instead- schools could react to the dynamics of the 
market and compete with the expectation that improved educational quality would result. The 
reforms of Tomorrow’s Schools were remarkable enough that scholars and experts of 
educational policy and educational choice worldwide began to take notice. By the late 1990’s 
New Zealand became the focus of much scholarly attention for the simple fact that this country 
was leading the way; “The reform agenda was driven by ideas that are part of a global 
marketplace of ideas about school reform and are the object of experimentation, debate, and 
controversy in the United States and most other developed countries,” according to (Edward B 
Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 2000, p. 4) 
Tomorrow’s Schools came to produce what was termed a ‘democratic dilemma’ –
characterized by the trade-off that came with open enrollment. School choice removed the rights 
of access to local schools by local students in the presence of school popularity and excess 
demand (Pearce & Gordon, 2005). In response to the dilemma, the Ministry of Education and the 




being over-subscribed in order to appease the electorate. The current remedy- known as 
‘enrollment scheme policy’ was introduced and abolished a number of times due to politics and 
since 1999 has become a stable policy to protect and prioritize the right of school access to local 
residents living near such schools. New Zealand experienced four shifts regarding the policy’s 
design between 1989 and 2000 as the country wavered on an ideological and moral debate 
surrounding the public-private trade-off produced by the reform. Between 1989 and 1991, home 
zones were established, and school access was prioritized to local students, with excess demand 
to be decided by lottery.  By 1991, home zones were abolished, and with that the guarantee of 
access afforded local students to their neighborhood schools in cases of excess demand. In 1998 
home zones were restored and enrollment schemes were permitted only by approval of the 
ministry. In 2000, the left-leaning Labor government set entrance priorities by immediate 
location, followed by a second set of admissions criteria.  
As local parents were successful in persuading the Ministry to re-establish enrollment 
scheme policy, those students living outside of home zones for the most sought after schools- 
were more likely to be of minority status (Edward B Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 2000; LaRocque, 
2004; Pearce & Gordon, 2005). Political discourse regarding rights of enrollment when schools 
were over-subscribed illuminates both the tension and the consequence of enrollment scheme 
policy for school choice: 
“Is the Minister aware of the findings of the Smithfield project in the 1990s that the 
biggest beneficiaries of the removal of zoning were Māori and Pasifika families, and 




ethnic mix in many schools in New Zealand?” (Te Ururoa Flavell,  Māori  Party 
Hansard Transcripts, July 17, 2007) 
In response to Te Ururoa Flavell the Education Minister responded: 
“Yes, I am aware of those findings, but I say to the member that since then quite a lot of 
effort has been made to ensure that the enrollment scheme process is one that maintains 
choice—that is, that people can take their children to their local schools. It is only when 
that school reaches the point where capacity is being threatened—that is, the quality of 
the school is being threatened by overcapacity—that the enrollment scheme is put in. We 
are saying that in those circumstances we have the best possible arrangement we can 
have. Now it is about ensuring that communities do not fulfil the fear that the member has 
that we are seeing the winnowing out of people from one school to the other as we see the 
white flight that he is concerned about.” (Honorable Steve Maharey, Hansard 
Transcripts, July 17, 2007) 
Since 1999, the policy has been stable and enrollment schemes have crept back into the 
landscape that mediates open enrollment whenever schools are in high demand. By 2010, 43-
percent of state and state-integrated schools had adopted enrollment schemes in order to preserve 
local students rights of enrollment for the cities of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and 
Dunedin. Because schools in New Zealand have the power to draw their own enrollment zones 
(in consultation with parents and by strategizing with neighboring schools) there is an inherent 




community composition (Ladd & Fiske, 2001; Lubienski, Lee, & Gordon, 2013; Pearce & 
Gordon, 2005; Thomson, 2010; Wylie, 2006). This potential to act upon ‘self-interest’ is the 
focus of Part I. 
 
Research Question 
Twenty years after New Zealand’s Education Reform Act, researchers have found 
evidence of adverse student body sorting in addition to a relatively homogenous landscape of 
school-level innovative practice and programming (Edward B Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 2000; 
Ladd & Fiske, 2001, 2003; Lubienski et al., 2013; Pearce & Gordon, 2005; Stubbs & Strathdee, 
2012). Preliminary consensus is that school composition has become more polarized since 
Tomorrow’s Schools was implemented. Schools are responding to parental preferences for 
advantaged student bodies- and this response is conveniently couched with the school’s own 
preference for profit maximization and reputation building (Edward B Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 
2000; Lubienski et al., 2013). Strategic behavior is operationalized through school-controlled 
zoning practice and this allows for an inherent self-interest to drive the design of school 
boundaries vis. a vis. community composition (Edward B Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 2000; 
Lubienski et al., 2013; Thomson, 2010; Wylie, 2006). By taking on more advantaged student 
bodies, schools seek to educate the least costly pupils while positioning themselves to get the 
most out of voluntary fees (Wylie & King, 2005). For a school without an enrollment scheme, 




scheme…(the) formal plans that guide schools with a surplus of applicants in determining which 
students they will accept and which they will reject.”(E. B. Fiske & H. F. Ladd, 2000, p. 216). 
Essentially, to have an enrollment scheme is to be “removed” from obligation to serve the full 
market. 
The following questions will be explored:  What are the relevant supply and demand-side 
structural features of New Zealand’s primary and secondary education market to school strategic 
behavior? What types of discontinuities arise as a consequence of the latitude granted to schools 
by the Education Act, 1989 to draw home zones? Which socioeconomic status characteristics are 
associated with households that are selected for inclusion into home zones by schools operating 
enrollment schemes? Are there nuances in school selective behaviors by school sector, gender, 
socioeconomic status and authority? How are schools behaving in different metropolitan areas?  
Finally, what are the combined results of school zoning behaviors?  Are schools demonstrating 
small, medium or large degrees of selective behavior? 
Scope of Analysis 
The analysis begins with an overview of New Zealand’s education market components 
within the context of the literature. Topics of school governance, over-subscription and 
enrollment policy, school funding, parental preferences and market information are covered. This 
is followed by an in-depth analysis of school zone boundaries as of 2010 using a sample of 886 
publicly-funded state and state-integrated schools in the regions of Auckland, Wellington, 




which included geographically–defined home zones that were smaller in size than the 
metropolitan area. The remainder of schools (n=514) did not have enrollment schemes in place 
as of 2010 and were open to students across the metropolitan area. I employ a series of straight 
forward tests of the hypothesis that schools are drawing home zone boundaries with a bias for 
advantaged households using a comprehensive strategy.School zones as drawn are examined for 
two forms of discontinuity: 
1. Discontinuity at the border (boundary discontinuity) 
2. Discontinuity in zone composition as compared to the surrounding community  (zone 
discontinuity) 
First, boundary discontinuity is tested for and validated using the boundary discontinuity design 
(BDD) approach (Bayer et al., 2007). BDD operates under the basic question of whether or not 
there is a statistically significant difference in household characteristics on one side of a school 
zone boundary versus the other. This section uses a data subset of households that directly flank 
both sides of school zone boundaries as proxied by census meshblocks (which average 
populations of 110 people and a typical geography that encompasses one city block). Logistic 
regression is employed to model membership inside (outside) the school zone at the boundary as 
a function of household characteristics and geographical/supply-side constraints.  Significance 
and effect size differences between household characteristics at the boundary are reported. Next, 
I estimate standardized mean differences (SMD) in meshblock composition at the boundary 




meta-analysis provides a means by which each school can be judged for gerrymandering activity 
while enabling an estimate of between-school variability for further insight into market behavior.  
The next step in the analysis considers zone discontinuity. Expanding upon previous work 
done by Lubienski et al. (2013) in New Zealand, and in reference to methods employed by 
Richards (2014), I compare the composition of school home zones as they are drawn to the 
composition of the neighborhoods that directly surround these same schools using areas 
populated with school-aged children. The New Zealand Deprivation Index (NZDep 2006) as 
well as racial composition and income are among the indicators used to test for discontinuity 
between zones and areas immediately local to schools. Meta-analysis techniques are employed to 
estimate SMD’s in school-level zone discontinuity and provide estimates of between-school 
variability in behavior. Part I concludes with compiled results and illustrative examples of 
schools exhibiting both boundary and zone discontinuity (or both) for policy discussion. 
CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND POLICY CONTEXT 





The Education Act of 1989, Section 65H establishes that the Board of Trustees (BoT) be the 
Crown entity that provides both the governance and control of the school’s management as 
mandated in Part 7. 
14
 As written, the Education Act 1989, Section 75 as at 2013 stated: 
“Except to the extent that any enactment or the general law of New Zealand provides 
otherwise, a school’s board has complete discretion to control the management of the 
school as it thinks fit.” 
Quite literally, the BoT has a vast scope of authority over school governance. 
Responsibilities include  exercising latitude in hiring and firing school staff and the principal; 
overseeing school management/ administration, finance/budget and property; ensuring board 
turnover and training needs are met; school roll management including enrollment and home 
zone implementation; curriculum and planning activities and the provision of strategic direction 
for the school which now includes improving educational achievement.
15
 In a survey of 1130 
BoT’s conducted in April of 1997, Cathy Wylie of the New Zealand Council for Educational 
Research (NZCER) surveyed trustee members for insight into local governance. Main areas of 
activity reported upon by BoT members surveyed in 2003 and 2006 were for strategic planning, 
student achievement and finances (Wylie, 2007, p. 21).  




 The role of the BoT in providing a means for the school to increase student achievement is a recent change in the 




With genuine latitude to govern school operation in place- questions about the “quality” 
or “ability” of the BoT to perform its duties are often posed in the education literature and 
discourse.  BoT composition is directly influenced by the local community being served because 
it is sourced locally. Wylie found a theme among BoT’s that was dependent upon the school type 
and/or composition, where disparity in the “quality of trustees” was found between state and 
state-integrated schools (with integrated schools being mentioned as having higher quality 
trustees); in BoT’s of schools with fewer  Māori  students (quality is negatively related to 
percent- Māori  students at the school); and in higher decile schools (quality of trustees goes up 
with higher school socioeconomic status composition) (Wylie, 1997, p. 4). BoT respondents 
mentioned different needs as a result. For example, low decile school and high  Māori -
concentration school BoT’s were most likely to report a staffing shortages, a need for more skills 
and an interest in BoT’s to become larger and composed of greater proportions of non-parents in 
hopes that this would increase BoT ability (p. 10). Results from later surveys indicate concerns 
over quality are still an issue but not nearly as much an issue as problems of inadequate funding,  
student achievement, property development and workload (Wylie, 2007). Sentiments over BoT 
ability and quality have re-surfaced in today’s literature however: In a 2014 taskforce review of 
education regulation that is meant to provide a framework for a 2015 review of the Education 
Act itself, both BoT capability and availability are highlighted as determining factors in success 
of school governance. “A skilled board will include members with experience in the areas of 
human resources, finance, law, governance and education…consultation has indicated that some 
boards struggle to find experience in these skill areas” (Taskforce on Regulations Affecting 




As a result of the position of the school in the market, and as a consequence of the BoT’s 
(in)ability to react- the question of whether or not BoT’s are motivated to behave differently in 
the market naturally follow. Gordon (1994) in her review of school choice in New Zealand 
provided an articulation of Tomorrow’s Schools using the concept of the “spiral of decline” - 
where school choice and competition could be expected to lead to vertical drifts or polarization 
in student body socioeconomic composition over time causing schools (hence BoT’s) with the 
most disadvantaged students to become less equipped to compensate for overwhelming needs 
under a model of self- governance. “As boards of trustees in poorer schools tend to have fewer 
qualifications than those in wealthy schools, the decline in roll numbers and associated effects 
may easily be blamed on poor governance” (p.16). Wylie (1997) reported similar findings in her 
survey. Lower decile schools were found to share concerns about “site-based bargaining, having 
total responsibility for school property, extra staff workloads, the erosion of a national system of 
education, and reported a lack of support for bulk funding in the community (p.16).  BoT’s of 
wealthy schools therefore may have different behaviors or motivations than the BoT’s of schools 
at risk of losing students.  Given a school’s incentive to respond to parental preferences for 
student bodies that are more affluent, schools “may be able to improve their position at the 
expense of other similar schools,” rendering enrollment schemes an “irresistible bargain” 
(Gordon, 1994, p. 14). Enrollment schemes enable schools to select students, to protect or 
enhance social hierarchy and to boost school reputation in conditions where “exclusivity 
apparently equates with desirability in education markets,” according to Gordon (p.18).The 
question, is whether or not this irresistible bargain is of interest to schools characterized as being 




or maintain market status or position. The following section provides a summary of current 
enrollment policy scheme legislation in place in New Zealand, as outlined by the New Zealand 
Education Ministry.
16
   
Enrollment Schemes- State (Public) Schools 
In New Zealand, public schools may either choose to adopt enrollment schemes, or they 
may be directed to do so by the Ministry of Education in response to increases in local 
population growth. In either case, school enrollment policy is a matter of “clear guidance” to 
school boards on the part of the Ministry of Education for the development of enrollment 
schemes (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2011). The legislation comprises a set of non-
negotiable requirements which must be demonstrated by schools planning to adopt enrollment 
schemes, and the Secretary of education takes a specific role in the approval/ arbitration process 
surrounding each scheme. Enrollment schemes are ‘governed’ by express purpose guidelines, 
which center on the main priority of including local students and avoiding over-crowding while 
‘ensuring the selection of applicants for enrollment at the school is carried out in a fair and 
transparent manner’(p. 2). Schools are mandated to define their own ‘home zone’ which must be 
a clearly delineated geographic boundary within which students should ‘find it reasonably 
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 Ministry of Education, Enrolment Scheme Guidelines for non-integrated schools, 2008: Section 11G (3) of the 






 ‘Reasonable convenience’ for these purposes is defined by student travel 
distance/time
18
, age and unique population served by the school- such as single-sex schools or 
special needs schools and school sector.   
Once a school defines its home zone, students residing within the zone are given the 
absolute right to enroll at the school. Schools are required to provide a set of ‘basic information’ 
about the scheme to the parents seeking admission through local press- including an estimate of 
the number of out-of-zone places that are anticipated to be available.
19
 The Ministry requires 
under-subscribed enrollment scheme schools to accept non-home zone students in the following 
order of priority
20
: 1) special program students; 2) siblings of current students; 3) siblings of 
former students; 4) applicants who are the child of a former student of the school; 5) children of 
board employees or board members, and, lastly 6) all other students- with the stipulation that 
ballot (lottery) method of selection is employed when waitlists exist for these portions of the 
enrollment. Balloting continues to be a contentious issue in New Zealand (although, arguably it 
applies to a very small number of left-over 6
th
 priority places for out of zone students if any 
places exist). Mandated by legislation from 1989 to 1991 and again since 2000, the idea behind 
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 The guidelines leave exact distance to the discretion of the school and provide instead a set of suggested 
considerations such as the age of the student and proximity of public transit.  
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balloting was to remove any source of cream-skimming or selective processes when selecting 
students from non-home areas (Pearce & Gordon, 2005, p. 152). In the  event that schools hold a 
ballot because they project being under-subscribed- they must still hold some places vacant in 
case there are any last-minute local students who request admission (p. 4).  
Regarding the drawing of school home zones, the Ministry provides pro forma 
enrollment scheme guidelines by which most schools abide, making the criteria relatively 
homogeneous across  schools operating with schemes (The New Zealand Ministry of Education, 
2011). Amongst these guidelines is the requirement that schools work in concert with adjacent 
schools in order to provide a network of state schools in a given area that accommodate all 
students. Schools are obligated to draw home zones such that overcrowding of home zone 
qualified students will not be likely and no students seeking entry who live within the zone are 
denied access. Schools must define their respective home zones to include at least a portion of 
the immediate neighborhood, although this area is not mandated to be of any exact size. 
Therefore, each school must be cognizant of its capacity (present and future) and of neighboring 
school capacity when deciding its boundaries. Schools in affected areas are required to have 
proof of consultation and mutual agreement. This implies a degree of collective responsibility for 
enrollment in areas where multiple schools have adopted schemes. The consultation process is 
outlined in the guidelines and the focus is on which stake holders should be contacted by the 
school in the process. Consultations are recommended (but not mandated) to take place between 
the school and parents of current students of the school; the school and the residents in the 




school and boards of other schools that share interest in the area of enrollment concern (New 
Zealand Ministry of Education, 2011, p. 17) The guidelines also provide detailed assistance to 
schools on procedures to follow in the event that parents are fabricating their address of 
residence for the purpose of getting their child enrolled.  
Additional Enrollment Scheme Requirements- State Integrated (Religious) Schools 
State-integrated schools encompass approximately 10 percent of the school market with 
the majority originating as former private Catholic schools (LaRocque, 2004). Through similar 
levels of funding and subsidies, these schools are now considered a part of the public (state) 
system. Where the intent of the enrollment scheme legislation for state schools is to grant those 
students living in home zone areas first priority of enrollment, in the case of state-integrated 
schools, the intent of the legislation is to enable these special character schools to enroll students 
meeting the requirements of the school’s mission (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2012, p. 
2). These schools do not have to create a home zone, although the scheme must ensure local 
students are guaranteed entry into the school with a local student priority emphasis on 
“preference students” over “non-preference” students. This means that those students living 
within a local area who meet the school’s character mission requirements (i.e. are of Catholic 
faith if the school is a Catholic school) will be given enrollment priority over other local non-
Catholic students. For the purpose of defining “reasonably convenient” in the State integrated 




view of ‘closeness’” (p. 6). This enables schools to prioritize within the larger home zones 
preference students over non-preference students more effectively.  
State integrated schools must also enter into a process of consultation with community, 
parent and other school stakeholders before adopting a scheme. This process may include public 
meetings, or public surveys. Other requirements include informing the public, entering 
negotiations with other network schools prior to adopting a scheme, and steps to defining 
acceptable local addresses when determining enrollment eligibility are very similar between state 
and state-integrated schools. State-integrated enrollments are up for annual review each year 
before the 1
st
 of May by the Education Secretary.  
 Per-pupil funding  
Under Tomorrow’s Schools, New Zealand public schools are financed with a per-pupil 
system that includes additional funds for schools depending on the types of programs offered and 
the types of students served. New Zealand has in place a system of ranking school student body 
socioeconomic status by national decile for the purpose of targeting funds.
21
A school’s decile is 
an index of student body socioeconomic status and is compiled from five variables using census 
meshblock data based on student home address: Household income, the percentage parents in 








low-skill occupations, a measure of household crowding, the proportion of parents without 
higher education, and the percentage of parents on direct government assistance (see Appendix 1 
for additional details). Each of the five census indicators are weighted by the number of students 
per meshblock and combined into an overall decile ranking for the school. The school decile 
exists to “measure the magnitude of the educational challenges faced by the school by virtue of 
the mix of students it serves” (E. B. Fiske & H. F. Ladd, 2000, p. 184). By design of the decile 
ranking system low-decile schools contain the poorest students from the most disadvantaged 
households on a national scale while high-decile students come from New Zealand’s most 
privileged households. A school’s decile is reviewed and re-calculated annually if there is a 
perceived need to review the ranking. The Ministry of Education cites two reasons for a school 
decile rank to migrate, “a change in the shape of the catchment (which may be associated with a 
SES change) and/or a change in SES without apparent catchment change.”
22  
School deciles are 
assigned and re-visited with population shifts as necessary.  School funding is framed in terms of 
decile rank in Ministry reports and decile rank is also commonly used as a framework by which 
schools are differentiated in the broader context of public and written perception. Per-pupil 
funding formulas are in place and schools of lower decile rank receive additional funds in 
addition to the base per-pupil allotment.  
An analysis of New Zealand’s 2010 operational and base state and state-integrated per-
pupil funding structure by school sector reveals some potential tension in the marketplace. For 






the lowest decile schools (ranks 1-3), the Ministry of Education provides between $84 and $307 
additional dollars per pupil (see Figure I-1 and Figure I-2, authors calculations). Marginal 
increases per student become negligible for schools ranked 4 and above, where added per pupil 





Figure I-1 Overall Per-Pupil Finding by Decile (2010) broken down by school year level cohorts 
 





















Y 1 – Y 6 $1,608 $1,346 $1,100 $944  $880  $856  $832  $806  $786  $756  
Y 7 – Y 8 $1,638 $1,333 $1,121 $1,002 $967  $944  $920  $894  $873  $843  
Y 9 –Y 10 $1,785 $1,479 $1,265 $1,143 $1,105 $1,077 $1,050 $1,022 $1,002 $971  
Y 11 – Y 15 $1,786 $1,502 $1,314 $1,231 $1,207 $1,178 $1,151 $1,124 $1,103 $1,072 
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New Zealand Per Pupil Funding:   
Includes the Base amount for each school type plus any additional 
funds as differentiated by school decile 
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The New Zealand Ministry of Education report on compulsory sector schools in 2010 
provides details on how schools fared financially by school decile rank. In 2008, the gap in 
operating deficit between low and high-decile schools was 3-percent (43 for schools ranked 1-3 
and 40 percent for decile 8-10 schools). In 2009 the gap in operating deficit had widened to 10-
percentage points while the share of low-decile schools in deficit increased and the share of high 
decile schools in deficit decreased (48 percent in low decile versus 38-percent in high decile 
schools) (The New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2011).
23
 The number of schools operating at 
a deficit in 2010 grew to 56-percent for low decile schools and to 52-percent for mid-decile 
schools, while high decile schools grew to 45-percent in deficit.
24
 By 2012, deficit levels across 
deciles were estimated to fall to 44-percent for low decile schools; 49-percent for mid-decile 
schools and 41-percent for high decile schools.
25
  
Henry M. Levin has written extensively on the importance of school finance as a key 
design element in systems of choice (Levin, 2010, 2012). Simply put, appropriate levels of 
finance will expand the choice set available to parents by providing incentives to schools to 
accept students accordingly. However, school systems that are built upon per-pupil funding 
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formulae provide implicit incentives to individual schools to seek out relatively low-cost students 
to educate (Lubienski, 2005; Zimmer & Guarino, 2013). This problem is well known and 
reported upon. L. Huerta and d’Entremont (2010) write about the reality of imbalanced funding 
structures for charter schools in the United States. This is due to the tendency for charters to 
receive fewer funds for non-instructional costs- compelling them to rely upon the types of 
students being educated to achieve results. Given the pressure to compete, charter schools by 
default have a “built-in incentive” to enroll students that help rather than hinder a school’s 
educational performance (Weitzel & Lubienski, 2010, p. 224). MacLeod and Urquiola (2009) 
provide a theoretical framework for  unpacking a school’s motivation to be selective and build 
reputation in a competitive setting. The authors develop a ‘reputation model’ in a public/private 
school system operating vouchers and find that parental preferences for performance do not 
necessarily compel schools to become more productive. The authors examine conditions where 
schools in a competitive voucher scenario are instead incentivized to exhibit selective behavior 
leading to stratification of students by socioeconomic status. Loeb, Valant & Kasman (2011) in 
their survey of school principals in Milwaukee find that principals in reaction to the sense of 
being in competition with other schools will invest advertising rather than in improving school 
quality (p.158). Lubienski (2005) summarizes findings on Michigan’s statewide educational 
reform initiative where school choice and competition were introduced as a means to improve 
educational quality and school innovative practice. Michigan’s statewide choice initiative 
demonstrated “an unexpected lack of innovation at the technical core of educational 
organizations, (and) researchers note a high degree of innovation in other areas, such as 




diversity of pupils at the school-level requires careful consideration of fiscal incentives. The 
author reviews several cases of how ‘receiver’ schools (more affluent schools) are compensated 
for the cost of taking lower socioeconomic status students and finds that incentive payment 
schemes vary (p.136-138).  
In an edited volume, C. Lubienski and P. C. Weitzel (2010) provide a 20-year review of 
the charter school movement in the United States. They call for regulation of market mechanisms 
in order to mitigate adverse student sorting as produced by the market interaction between 
parents and schools. The book discusses the per-pupil funding model used to induce competition 
for students in systems of school choice, open enrollment and charter schools as inherently a 
double-edged sword. “Charter schools have an incentive to compete for the cheapest and easiest 
students to educate,” according to contributors Ni and Arsen (2010) and schools that avoid high-
cost students not only cut average costs, they also appear to improve their own efficiency (p. 
117).  Depending on the structuring of fiscal incentives, the New Zealand example may be 
vulnerable to these drawbacks in addition to issues of fiscal imbalance. On the supply side, 
school individual incentive to garner advantaged students from higher-income households will 
be present if marginal per-pupil funds do not sufficiently address the costs of educating high-
poverty, high-need students. On the demand side, a consequence would be as noted in Levin 
(2010); “Children in poorer households are unlikely to be able to benefit as much from schools 
requiring parent contributions as are students from wealthier families, resulting in stratification 




Wylie and King (2005) refer to “an increasing tightness” in balancing budgets for mid-
decile schools in the New Zealand example. Approximately fifteen percent of funding is linked 
to school decile rank, according to the authors. When struggling, higher decile schools are in a 
better position to supplement income than low-decile schools by virtue of their ability to ask for 
higher voluntary donations (Wylie & King, 2005, p. 56). The authors find a problem of 
inadequate marginal funding by school decile to be felt in particular by mid-decile schools (p. 
74). Low–decile schools receive a Ministry-allocated boost in per-pupil funding to compensate 
for their lack of ability to rely on parents to make school donations in times of “tightness.” High-
decile schools in turn rely on parents to come up with donations (which range from 15 percent 
for additional funds raised by primary schools to 19-percent of additional funds in the case of 
secondary schools) (p.viii). The range translates into a low of less than $50 per parent donation 
in 2004 in secondary schools to a high of $300 in 2003 (with an increase to $400 by 2004) 
(p.56).  Of course, the ability of parents to contribute is commensurate with school decile rank. 
What remains, argue Wylie and King, are a larger group of mid-decile schools caught between 
inadequate funding at the administrative level and parents who are unable to make up for the gap 
on the community end. The most any school can receive is an additional $307 / pupil from the 
Ministry when a school’s overall decile rank shifts from 2 to 1 (Figure I-2). If schools are able to 
extract more from parents through donations ($400 per parent as indicated in Wylie and King, 
2005) than through per pupil funding- it is rational to expect that schools may look to home zone 
design as a means to bridge the funding gap. Additional details about operational funding and 




funding structure shortfalls, are schools compelled to behave selectively when it comes to 
drawing home zones? 
Parental Preferences & Information  
On the flip side of the problem of fiscal incentive to be selective in the presence of a 
distribution of high and low-cost students is the tendency for parents to regard student body 
composition in the school choice process.  Studies on New Zealand indicate student body 
composition is predominantly on the minds of choosing parents. Schools in competition in New 
Zealand are reportedly becoming vertically differentiated along lines of race and class and 
remain largely homogenous along programmatic or technological dimensions (Lubienski, 2006; 
Lubienski et al., 2013). Gordon (1994) provides a summary of the literature in New Zealand for 
the early 1990’s regarding student movement between schools under open enrollment. The 
author’s literature review reveals that school roll shifts were into schools located in areas of 
affluence; social aspects of a school such as reputation mattered; and exit was exercised most 
often by the most affluent parents. Gordon emphasizes in her review that social hierarchies 
dominate the means by which schools in New Zealand are differentiated by parents, as opposed 
to horizontal diversity; “there has been no attempt to provide any form of market diversification 
other than social hierarchies… there is a dearth of real educational choices within state schools,” 
she writes (p.19). Wylie (2006) found that New Zealand parents often consulted their children in 
making school choices and based decisions on where the friends of the child were deciding to 




preference determinants found in a parental choice survey issued in 2003 included school 
‘reputation’, family tradition, whether or not the child’s friends were planning to enroll as well, 
and the proximity of the school to the household (p. 7).  Stubbs and Strathdee (2012) interviewed 
principals in four New Zealand schools regarding the perception of parental decision-making in 
school choice. Two factors contributed to parental preferences according to the principals 
interviewed: The availability of information on student body socioeconomic composition as 
provided by the New Zealand Ministry of Education for all schools (the school’s decile rank), 
and the school’s ethnic profile as publicly perceived (p.118).  
Given the incentive for both the supply and demand forces of the market to value student 
body composition, information flows become a mediating factor in understanding how schools 
become composed.  From an education system perspective, information must facilitate 
competition and thus exit (Hirschman, 1970).  Competition implies strategic interaction between 
suppliers and consumers, and therefore implies an information exchange that is also strategic 
(Loeb, Valant, & Kasman, 2011; C. Lubienski & P. Weitzel, 2010). Schools, knowing parental 
preferences for student bodies that provide favorable peer effects have not one, but two 
incentives to ‘attract’ advantaged students. Schools are held accountable for school performance 
by their obligations to meet Ministry standards, and they are responding to the preferences of 
parents in the market. Therefore, the line between information dissemination and pure 
advertising becomes difficult to track or regulate.  
Parental preferences for school quality (such as high test scores or programmatic 




themes on preference ordering as it relates back to information flows(L. A. Huerta & 
Zuckerman, 2009; Lubienski, 2006, 2014; C. Lubienski & P. C. Weitzel, 2010). Buckley and 
Schneider’s (2002) survey in Washington, DC found parents claimed that good academics and 
good teachers were their main reasons for choosing a school. When asked about socioeconomic 
status or race of students, the parents claimed this was not important. However, when the authors 
monitored the way parents were searching the schools they ended up choosing, they found that 
for the first 8-10 iterations- parents were looking for schools that were whiter and of lower 
poverty. This was an excellent test of the issue of social desirability in the data. “Social 
desirability” implies that even though parents claim that all they care about is school quality they 
still “directly look for” demographics when selecting schools. Dougherty et al. (2010) introduce 
a web-based school comparison tool known as “SmartChoices” that enables parents to compare 
over 200 public schools and programs in the city of Hartford, Connecticut in the United States. 
The authors also provided a program of parental training in how to search for schools using the 
tool and ultimately were able to analyze how parents sorted information and prioritized school 
characteristics in their searches. The comparison tool enabled parents to contemplate and 
effectively rank achievement, distance and racial balance as they evaluated schools in their 
choice sets while their searches created data points for evaluation of parental preferences for the 
authors of the project. The authors found that training parents about school searches led to 
achievement being more influential than racial balance and distance in searches (p.23).   
Market theory stipulates perfect information be a crucial part of consumers making 




administrative innovation in market-based school reform, the introduction of choice implies an 
information flow that is accurate, timely, and trustworthy (Loeb et al., 2011; C. Lubienski & P. 
Weitzel, 2010). The efficiency of how schools distribute information is also of importance to the 
notion that competition will stimulate improved schools (Levin, 2012; Loeb, Valant & 
Kasman,2011; Weitzel and Lubienski, 2010; Levin, 2010; Levin, 2006; Levin, 2001). In their 
chapter, “Information Use and Epidemics in Charter School Policy,” from The Charter School 
Experiment: Expectations, evidence and implications, Lubienski and Weitzel provide a survey of 
the issues underscoring the role of information in any market-based educational reform. The 
authors examine the “availability” and the “use” of information with regards to the charter school 
movement in the United States and categorize information types into three groups: a) 
information regarding achievement, b) information regarding school integration, and c) 
information regarding resources (p. 198). The mapping of parental preferences to the availability 
of information about these preferences serves the basis by which decisions are made in the 
education market of open enrollment. 
As established above, parental preferences for schools in New Zealand are related to 
school socioeconomic status composition.  Complementing this preference is one of the most 
handy pieces of information available about schools in New Zealand- the school decile rank- first 
made available to parents in 1995 (Edward B Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 2000, p. 199). The New 




school type, authority, gender, and administrative information.
26
 Data about student body 
composition, language ability and Māori Language immersion level can also be found at the 
school-level.
27
 Throughout Ministry of Education’s outputs (website, publications, online 
information initiatives and reporting processes) school decile is a lasting and dominant 
framework by which schools are assessed, reported upon and described. A recent attempt to 
improve information sets for parents was launched by the Ministry known as the Public 
Achievement Information (PAI) initiative. Information such as graduation rates or student 
achievement results have begun to appear in these school-level directories since 2013. Parents 
are now able to navigate to the school of their choice using the map provided and can learn more 
about school achievement and quality.  Figure I-3 provides a screen shot of a school profile as 
available currently for schools via web search. Funding decile is listed for each school in a very 
prominent location when the search for schools is perfomed. The user can click on tabs and 
explore deeper for school standards achievement. 
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Figure I-3 School Information for Parents 
I argue school student body socioeconomic status remains a dominant feature of the 
market structure, and this problem and its consequences was foreshadowed 16 years ago: 
“Once the decile rankings of schools were calculated and made public in 1995, parents 
had a compact summary measure on which to base their shorthand judgments about a 
school’s quality.” (E. B. Fiske & H. F. Ladd, 2000, p. 199) 
The authors were able to statistically link the migration of students into higher decile schools 
with the proportion of a receiving school’s minority composition and concluded that schools 
with higher concentrations of minorities were at a competitive disadvantage in the market. At the 




remove school decile ratings from its reports.
28
 In a news article released about the decision, the 
decile was being dropped “in an effort to break the stereotype that a school’s decile rating was 
reflective of its performance,” and in response to what was described as the use of school decile 
rank a means by which parents and commentators were judging schools.
29
 However, as of 2015, 
school decile rank remains on key documentation providing information on schools as published 
by the Ministry of Education.
 30
 The decision by the Ministry to remove publication of the decile 
rank along with the PAI initiative to make information about school performance available may 
alleviate the tension, but the effort may be fall short of what is needed to align incentives and 
information flows away from adverse outcomes of schools behaving strategically.  
CHAPTER III HOME ZONE BOUNDARY DISCONTINUITY 
Empirical Overview 
In order to address the research questions of this dissertation, I compiled data on schools and 
neighborhoods for four metropolitan areas: Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. 
These four areas comprise approximately fifty-three-percent of the population of the country, 
and the sample cities represent schools in areas from the north to the very south of New Zealand. 










Primary and secondary state and state-integrated school characteristic data comes from the New 
Zealand Ministry of Education and the Education Directory of Schools.
31 
Spatial data depicting 
school zone boundaries is publicly available under the Official Information Act from the 
Ministry of Education with the most recent zones dated on 24 September 2010.
32 
Schools and 
their enrollment zones are mapped using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Enrollment 
zones are spatially joined with census meshblock community profile data and school profile data 
and then imported into STATA for descriptive and analytic analyses.  
Schools 
Across the four urban regions selected for this analysis, a total of 13 territorial authorities 
were identified, containing 995 elementary and secondary compulsory schools.  Information on 
each school was obtained from the New Zealand Ministry of Education Directory of Schools (see 
Appendix 4 for the school data dictionary). The 995 schools were checked for existence through 
all or part of 2009 in order to qualify for the analysis.  One school was identified from the sample 
as having shuttered its doors sometime in 2009 and dropped from the final sample.
33
 Sixty-eight 
schools were identified as private schools with no enrollment schemes in place and in many 
cases, no decile ranks. Another thirty-seven schools were identified as either special schools or 
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teen parent unit schools and not included in the analysis as their enrollment is targeted to specific 
populations as identified and respective catchments are not based on neighborhood. Special 
schools, teen parent units and private schools were removed from the analysis, limiting the scope 
of the study to state and state-integrated schools only. The remainder leaves a sample of 886 
state and state-integrated schools operating in the primary and secondary sectors. In order to 
include school capacity for students, school enrollments were sourced from New Zealand 
Ministry of Education Directory of Schools as at July 1, 2009.
34
.   
Home Zone Boundaries  
The New Zealand Ministry of Education’s goal in keeping with the Education Act of 1989 is to 
ensure it is able to meet its commitment to enroll local students, (New Zealand Ministry of 
Education, 2011). These obligations are accomplished by restricting access to the school through 
the implementation of enrollment schemes with geographically defined catchment areas known 
as home zones. This study focuses on how schools in excess demand act to preserve their 
commitment to ensuring local students are able to attend. Some schools have enrollment schemes 
for different purposes other than addressing excess demand or preserving local access. For 
example, fourteen state-integrated schools had enacted schemes by the 2009/10 school year but 
the  purpose of the scheme was not to preserve access to local students in cases of excess 
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demand. Seven of these schools had geographically defined zones that covered the full area for 
the city in which they were located and were removed from the home zone analysis. Because the 
analysis tests the hypothesis for whether or not schools are deliberately selecting areas of 
enrollment entitlement on the basis of socioeconomic status, there is no need to evaluate these 
cases as all residents are eligible to attend on the basis of residence..  In seven separate cases, it 
was found that enrolment schemes exist but do not involve specifically defined geographic areas. 
In these cases, the Ministry of Education commitment to preserving local access does not apply 
either as students are reserved access by religious affiliation rather than by local proximity to a 
school. These schools are not considered in the analysis of home zones but remain in the full 
sample. In two cases, schools were found to have more than one home zone. These schools 
catered to students in more than one sector and the smallest home zone was selected for the 
analysis . In the sample of 886 state and state-integrated schools included in this analysis, 372 
(43%) had drawn boundaries for the purpose of preserving access to local students  due to excess 
demand and therefore met the criteria for inclusion in the analysis of boundary design as of 
2009/10. 
Spatial data including shape files for 359 school zone boundaries was publicly available 
from the Ministry of Education under the Official Information Act with the most recent zones at 
the time of this analysis dated on 24 September 2010.
35  
Nine schools with geographically 
defined home zones were not included in the coordinates spatial data and were added to the 






sample of schools with home zones by cross-referencing Ministry of Education enrollment 
scheme listings for 2010 and 2011. Information on home zones for these schools was retrieved 
by searching the New Zealand Ministry of Education’s website for school listing by enrollment 
zone maps.
36
 These nine enrollment zones were individually rendered using Google Earth and 
imported into ArcMap for the analysis (see Appendix 4, Table II-10 for full details on schools 
home zone exclusion/inclusion special status in the study).   
Community Characteristics 
Household characteristics are represented by the smallest unit of census data available- 
the census meshblock- using data from the 2006 census at Statistics New Zealand.
37
 A 
meshblock in an urban area is designed by statistics New Zealand to be the size of a cityblock 
and contains approximately 110 people.
38
 Meshblocks were identified as being located within the 
four metropolitan areas comprising 5 regional councils and 13 territorial authorities (see 
Appendix 5for more details on meshblock sampling and exclusions). Spatial data depicting the 
census meshblock boundaries is also available through Statistics New Zealand and was used to 
link school home zones to their constituents for the analysis using ArcGIS.
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In order to link 












household characteristics to geographic areas, all meshblocks identified as belonging to one of 
the four metropolitan regions (by membership in one of the 13 Territorial Authorities) were 
extracted and mapped. This yielded a set of 18,505 meshblock geographies for which 18,332 
were unique meshblocks. The two datasets (spatial and non-spatial census characteristics 
associated with meshblocks) were merged and a final sample of populated, contiguous 
meshblocks was generated (n= 16,880).  
Education Market Overview 
Table I-1 provides school student body composition characteristics of the 886 schools in the 
sample divided by enrollment scheme status with breakdowns for school metro area, sector, 
gender and authority. The purpose of this approach is to provide a general overview of how 
schools “in demand”- or oversubscribed (schools with enrollment schemes) are composed 
relative to those schools that are not in demand (schools that remain open and available to all 
students in the metropolitan area).Overall, schools that have employed enrollment schemes and 
defined home zones vary significantly in student body composition characteristics from those 
schools that remain open to all students. Scheme schools are always larger in size and are 
composed of fewer minorities on average (45-percent minority for scheme schools versus 58-
percent for non-scheme schools, p <.001). Schools in demand also have statistically significantly 
more affluent student bodies with average decile rankings of 7.22 for scheme schools versus 4.96 




Across cities, Wellington schools with excess demand had the most affluent students (an 
average decile rank of 8.4 vs. 5.6 for non-scheme schools, p <.001). Auckland had the lowest 
ranked scheme schools on average (6.8 compared to 4.5 for non-scheme schools in Auckland 
p<.001); indicating Auckland is likely experiencing a systemic problem with supply. These two 
northern cities also had the highest concentrations of minority students with 67-percent of 
students being of minority status in non-scheme schools versus 55-percent in scheme schools for 
Auckland (p<0.001) and 61-percent minority for non-scheme versus just 36-percent for scheme 
schools in Wellington (p<0.001). For Christchurch and Dunedin the direction of socioeconomic 
disparity between schools in demand and those not in demand is consistent with northern 
schools, but the proportion of minority students to the south is much lower. Christchurch non-
scheme schools were 44-percent minority with an average decile rank of 4.5 while scheme 
schools were just 25-percent minority and ranked decile 7.6 on average ( p<0.001).  Dunedin 
scheme schools were 27-percent minority and averaged decile 6.3 compared to 18-percent 
minority and decile 7.4 on average for scheme schools (p< 0.01 and p<0.05). Schools in 
Auckland and Wellington to the north also had the greatest variation in decile rankings for 
student bodies, reflecting the wider range of populations housed in those two cities compared to 
Dunedin and Christchurch.  
Primary schools with schemes were ranked decile 7.3 on average compared to 4.9 for 
non-scheme schools. Secondary differences were more compact between those schools in 
demand and those without schemes with an average rank of decile 7 versus 5.36 (p<0.001). 




decile lost significance for full composite scheme versus non-scheme schools. Composite 
schools service a broader range of children in both primary and secondary sectors- and likely 
exist in areas that are peripheral to the main education market such as suburbs that are more 
sparsely populated (see Appendix 2 for more information on school sectors). Another interesting 
finding is that girls schools with and without schemes did not exhibit statistically significant 
differences in student body composition (perhaps due to a smaller sample size), but the gap in 
student body affluence appears for boys schools in demand (decile 9.0 vs 6.81 on average, 
p<0.05). Single- sex schools with enrollment schemes are more narrowly represented in the 
higher deciles versus non-scheme single-sex schools. State-integrated schools that have adopted 
schemes start at decile 6 and range to decile 10 whereas state schools with schemes appear in all 
deciles across cities. At the city-level, excess demand or the need for enrollment schemes is 
restricted to deciles ranked 3 and above in Christchurch and 4 and above for Dunedin, whereas 
schools with schemes in the north island cities of Auckland and Wellington are across deciles. 
Overall, there is strong evidence that the types of schools experiencing excess demand are more 
affluent and composed of fewer minorities for most sectors and school types. Because the degree 
of the relationship varies by location, school sector, school gender and authority- these aggregate 
frameworks will continue to be used as a basis by which I further investigate school selective 
behavior under conditions of excess demand. 
 
  





Table I-1 The Public (State and State-Integrated) Market for Schooling  
Variable 










Decile*** 372        228,051  7.2 2.8 1 10 514      145,870  5.0 3.0 1 10 
Auckland Decile*** 229        154,825  6.8 3.1 1 10 256        86,137  4.5 3.0 1 10 
Wellington Decile*** 62         29,535  8.4 2.4 1 10 117        30,511  5.6 3.2 1 10 
Dunedin Decile* 17           7,029  7.4 1.8 4 10 62        10,862  6.3 2.6 1 10 
Christchurch Decile*** 64         36,662  7.6 2.1 3 10 79        18,360  4.5 2.6 1 10 
% Minority*** 369        112,690  0.45 0.27 0.07 1.00 484        81,179  0.58 0.30 0.07 1.00 
Auckland % Minority*** 229         91,114  0.55 0.28 0.07 1.00 252        55,453  0.67 0.29 0.12 1.00 
Wellington % Minority*** 62         11,427  0.36 0.17 0.10 0.97 114        16,633  0.61 0.27 0.07 1.00 
Dunedin % Minority** 16           1,132  0.18 0.05 0.08 0.26 52          2,517  0.27 0.15 0.09 1.00 
Christchurch % Minority*** 62           9,017  0.25 0.11 0.08 0.64 66          6,576  0.44 0.23 0.07 0.99 
Primary Decile*** 302        130,882  7.3 2.8 1 10 429        95,066  4.9 3.0 1 10 
Secondary Decile** 66         93,564  7.0 2.8 1 10 66        45,495  5.4 2.9 1 10 
Full Composite Decile 4           3,605  5.8 3.4 1 9 19          5,309  5.6 3.4 1 10 
Boys Decile* 6           9,261  9.0 1.7 6 10 16        12,195  6.8 2.8 1 10 
Girls Decile 8         10,836  8.4 2.1 5 10 15        10,290  7.1 2.7 1 10 
Coed Decile*** 358        207,954  7.2 2.9 1 10 483      123,385  4.8 3.0 1 10 
State Decile*** 359        222,665  7.2 2.9 1 10 377      103,037  4.5 2.9 1 10 
State- Integrated Decile* 13           5,386  7.9 1.6 6 10 137        42,833  6.2 3.0 1 10 




Boundary Discontinuity Design 
Evidence of both schools and middle class parents attempting to maintain ‘clear systems 
of privilege’ by controlling school district boundaries or enrollment policy exists in New Zealand 
(Gibson & Boe-Gibson, 2014; Lubienski et al., 2013; Pearce & Gordon, 2005; Rehm & 
Filippova, 2008) and elsewhere (Bayer et al., 2007; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Stuart-Wells et 
al., 2012; Tannenbaum, 2013).  The literature focuses mostly on demand-side dynamics under 
the assumption that boundaries are stable over time and movement into and out of zones is 
driven by households.  Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) look at support for vouchers across voter 
constituencies in California and find that homeowners seek to protect property values when 
considering whether or not to support vouchers. Wells et al. (2012) study migration patterns in 
Long Island, NY, United States vis. a vis. school enrollment zones. The authors argue that stable 
boundaries over time lead to constituent behavior that maintains and protects privilege. 
Tannenbaum (2013) looks at school choice reforms from Charlotte-Mecklenburg from 2002-
2003 to determine how redistricting affects house prices. The author finds an increased (as 
opposed to decreased) willingness to pay for access to good schools by parents in the market 
place post-redistricting, which is counter-intuitive to reform intent. Patrick Bayer, Fernando 
Ferreira and Robert McMillan (2007) model household sorting between school districts in the 
United States by using boundary discontinuity design (BDD) (Bayer et al, 2007 citing Black, 
1999). The authors test for discontinuities in household socio-demographic characteristics in the 
direct vicinity of school enrollment zone boundaries and find that school quality is greater on the 




‘discontinuity in local school quality’ as modeled, supplies an explanation for household sorting 
that is driven by the quest to secure entry into the best schools in the United States.   
In similar studies on school boundaries in New Zealand, the findings are more nuanced. 
Rehm and Filippova (2008) find that home zone boundary uncertainties in New Zealand lead to 
non-uniform influence of zones on housing prices. Gibson and Boe-Gibson (2014) explore the 
relationship between home zone boundaries and housing prices for Christchurch, New Zealand 
and find evidence that the presence of home zones have an influence on housing prices. Building 
school quality into their pricing model, the authors find that a standard deviation increase in 
performance increases housing prices by 6.4%. The authors focus on how households sort 
between home zones but also attribute part of the dynamic to the supply-side effects of school 
boundaries and zoning processes such as the ability of the school to draw their own home zone.  
Both studies focus on how parents or households sort with respect to home zones. I argue that the 
lack of consistent duration of home zones due to instability in political regimes confounds 
research into New Zealand’s current understanding of the consumer-driven relationship. An 
analysis of demand-side properties contributing to school composition would be a portrayal of 
immature effects of home zone policy.
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 For this analysis I have utilized census data from 2006 
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 The hypothesis is that home zones instituted closer to the timing of the census (2006) would have a 
composition that would most closely represent the school’s intent for student body composition going forward- and 
the composition of the households in the zone would be expected to be more advantaged than the school student 
body decile at the time of the drawing of the boundary. If a zone had been in place for longer- there would be the 
expectation that households were moving into the zone if the school was in demand- and homezone and school 
composition would be a consequence of both supply and demand-side forces at play. For New Zealand, the presence 
of home zones was initially a phenomenon of high decile schools (Edward B Fiske & Helen F Ladd, 2000; 




to capture household composition characteristics which is within 7 years of the time enrollment 
schemes were implemented by schools in the sample. Table I-2 provides a breakdown of home 
zone tenure and Figure II-15 in Appendix 7 provides histograms by city for the number of 
months home zones had been in effect as of 2010. Many schools -mostly in the Auckland metro 
area implemented schemes in 1999 (n=166 or 47-percent of the sample) and at least 53-percent 
of schools have schemes that were implemented within 5 years of 2006. Therefore the 
relationship between boundary placement and household characteristics is argued to represent a 
supply-side dynamic on the merit that households have had minimal time to sort in response to 





                                                                                                                                                             
schools, it would be expected that the distribution of the difference between school decile and home zone decile may 
reflect the idea that some zones are “out of equilibrium.”  In a sensitivity analysis provided in Appendix 7 I explore 
the relationship between home zone composition, school decile rank and time since implementation of the scheme 
for further insight. I find low decile schools in general have home zone compositions that are by default more 
advantaged than their student bodies while high decile schools experience the opposite. But the difference is not 
consistent with the amount of time a scheme has been in place. Simply comparing homezone composition to school 






Table I-2 Home zone tenure for the sample n=372 schools  
 
Year Enacted Count Percent 
School zone 
drawn within 7 
years of census 
data 
(47% ) 
1999 166 45% 
2000 10 3% 
School zone 
drawn within 5 




2001 17 5% 
2002 16 4% 
2003 22 6% 
2004 33 9% 
2005 21 6% 
2006 31 8% 
2007 14 4% 
2008 22 6% 
2009 12 3% 
2010 8 2% 
 
In order to assess a school’s hypothesized motivation to build and maintain its student 
body in response to anticipating parental preferences for peer effects, this analysis aims to 
differentiate home zones by their inclusion/exclusion policies, controlling for supply-limiting 
factors such as school availability and capacity. The BDD approach tests the sentiment as 
articulated by Gordon (1994) about enrollment scheme potential; “under enrollment schemes 
parents do not choose schools; schools choose students according to the rules set out by the 
school” (p.17).  In a direct test of the hypothesis that schools are indeed “strategically reaching” I 
apply the method of BDD here for the purpose of modeling discontinuity in household socio-
demographic composition at the border of enrollment zones between meshblocks that are 
included (discluded). Differences at the border in household characteristics would represent a 




as the dependent variable, the dependent variable in this model would be whether or not a given 
household is in the home zone and its children entitled to attend.  
 Using ArcGIS, I took several steps to create a dataset of census meshblocks that were 
either claimed or unclaimed by schools. Following Bayer et al. (2007)I take a band of 
households on both sides of an enrollment zone at a short distance on each side of the 
boundary.
41
 In the first step, each school enrollment zone boundary was buffered by 200 meters 
on both sides of its border. Next, buffers were intersected with meshblocks at the school-level 
and given a unique identifier composed of the school ID and the meshblock ID. The four 
metropolitan areas containing 372 school zones with enrollment schemes used in this analysis 
when intersected with meshblocks for the full geographic area yielded a sample of 39,019 unique 
meshblock/school ID’s. Because several school zones overlap and school boundaries are not 
mutually exclusive, individual meshblocks appeared more than once in the sample as being 
either claimed or unclaimed within the 200-meter boundary by more than one school. Of the 
39,019 school/meshblock ID’s 14,405 meshblocks were unique (see Appendix 6. Figure II-13 
and Table II-12 for a full breakdown of meshblocks duplicates in the sample).  
School/meshblock ID’s were coded for their membership as 1= within, and 0=excluded based on 
three degrees of inclusion criteria resulting in three nested samples for sensitivity analysis. The 
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 The authors employ an analysis using 0.2 and 0.1 miles on either side of a zone. For this analysis I will restrict the 
band as narrowly as possible to the borders while ensuring adequate sample size. This is the advantage of BDD 
design- where a sufficient sample size from the narrowest band possible is used- which enables holding constant 
neighborhood characteristics that may influence zone membership while allowing household characteristics in each 




smallest dataset has a dichotomous dependent variable, ‘IN.’ Meshblocks are coded IN=0 (0% 
included) if they fall completely outside of a school zone but within the 200m buffer just outside 
the border. When a meshblock was completely contained within the zone and within 200 meters 
of the school boundary it was coded as IN= 1(100% included). The sample size for this dataset 
was 19,362 meshblocks. Across the sample, several meshblocks were found to straddle home 
zone boundaries. By spatially generating estimates of the percentage of a meshblock contained 
within (outside) the zone using the spatial intersect tool in ArcGIS, a bi-modal distribution was 
discovered (see Figure I-4).  
 





Only 1,511 of the 39,019 meshblocks in the sample (3.8 –percent) straddled the school 
zones boundaries by between 30 and 69-percent inside the zone indicating meshblocks are 
logically and consistently composed to streets or city blocks. Meshblocks therefore provide a 
fairly good spatial unit of analysis for examining households at the boundary of school home 
zones as they are either mostly inside or mostly outside the zone. I then constructed the main 
sample used in the BDD analysis to include meshblocks that were less than 30-percent inside the 
school zone at the boundary (IN2=0) with meshblocks 70-percent or more contained within 
coded as included (IN2=1). In the cases where a meshblock was between 31 and 69-percent 
inside a zone, it was removed from the IN2 sample for being both inside and outside the zone for 
that particular school. The main idea is to capture school motivation in choosing meshblocks, 
and those that are more evenly straddling a border are considered not to be areas of clear 
decisiveness on the part of the school. The sample size using this criteria for inclusion(exclusion) 
was 36,504 unique school/meshblock ID’s. The third and final sample of all 39,019 meshblocks 
uses the percentage of the meshblock that is in the zone as the dependent variable and values 
range between 0 and 1 (the percentage inside a zone for each meshblock within 200 meters). All 
three inclusion criteria were modeled separately for sensitivity analysis and results are provided 





Figure I-5 BDD Coding Example 
Because home zones in New Zealand are not drawn in a mutually exclusive way whereas 




analysis. The total number of meshblocks which repeat themselves within the sample sits at 88-
percent. This means that meshblocks appear uniquely in the sample in just 12-percent of cases- 
or stated differently- selected meshblocks that appear just once in the sample are affiliated with 
only one home zone (school) where meshblocks appearing more than once have been claimed by 
more than one school. The number of duplicates associated with a given meshblock in the final 
sample using meshblocks in proximity with the boundary ranges from 0 to 12. As will be 
explored in the choice analysis, the probability that a meshblock would be duplicated is 
associated with census meshblock household characteristics. See the Part II for further 




Table I-3-Descriptive Statistics for meshblocks at the boundary 
Meshblocks at the boundary and mostly inside (>= 70%) or mostly outside (<= 30% inside) of the Zone 
MB N=36,933 
IN2=0; MB is less 
than 30% inside 
the zone and 
within 200m of 
boundary 
IN2=1; MB is 
70-100% Inside 





Measure mean sd mean sd d 
MB percent in school zone*** 0.03 0.06 0.99 0.04  
Distance from MB to school (meters) *** 2655 3461 2431 3591 -0.06 
Number same-sector schools located in MB *** 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 -0.05 
Number home zones (all sectors) claiming MB** 4.48 2.36 4.53 2.21 0.02 
Number of schools inside MB    ** 0.06 0.25 0.05 0.23 -0.02 
Pop06*** 122.70 85.14 127.00 78.76 0.05 
Pop u19 (2006)*** 40.43 29.53 38.98 26.22 -0.05 
Pop u19 (2006) (percent)*** 0.28 0.10 0.27 0.09 -0.06 
Median family income 2006*** $67,466   21,550   71,923   21,196  0.21 
Percent Unemployed*** 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.08 
Blue collar workers (count)*** 31.68 18.00 30.80 17.40 -0.05 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent)*** 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.17 -0.07 
Edu- no qualifications (count)*** 19.52 15.57 18.12 14.35 -0.09 
Edu- no qualifications (percent)*** 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.10 -0.13 
Edu- college or higher (count)*** 22.40 17.60 23.89 17.72 0.08 
Edu-college or higher (percent)*** 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.11 
Private occupied w/children (percent)*** 0.62 0.18 0.61 0.17 -0.07 
Bedrooms (mean)*** 3.06 0.59 3.09 0.59 0.05 
Crowding (persons per bedroom)*** 0.95 0.24 0.93 0.22 -0.11 
Movers (count) (in res less than 5 yrs)*** 78.12 54.93 75.65 50.16 -0.05 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs)*** 0.56 0.15 0.55 0.15 -0.07 
No-partner (count)*** 42.14 29.07 40.35 26.38 -0.06 
No partner (percent)*** 0.39 0.12 0.37 0.11 -0.15 
Pop EU (percent)*** 0.63 0.21 0.66 0.21 0.16 
Pop  Māori  (percent)*** 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.10 
Pop Pasifika (percent)*** 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.16 -0.12 
Pop Asian (percent)*** 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 -0.07 
Pop Middle Eastern/LatinAmerican/African (%)*** 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.06 
Pop other (percent)*** 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.09 




BDD Descriptive Results 
Table I-3 provides descriptive results for the BDD model using the IN2 sample criteria. 
Variables to control for school-aged population and how well demand is accounted for by other 
schools were assigned to each meshblock. In addition, the straight-line distance between the 
meshblock and the school under consideration is included to account for proximity as a possible 
explanation for inclusion (exclusion) at the boundary. Meshblocks located within 200m of school 
zone boundaries and claimed by zones (IN2=1) are statistically significantly different to those 
meshblocks just outside (or mostly outside) the school zone boundary across several 
characteristics. Meshblocks that qualify as claimed have statistically significantly higher incomes 
(+0.21 standard deviations higher for included, p<0.001) and fewer proportions of residents 
without school qualifications (-0.13 standard deviation decrease in the proportion of the 
meshblock without qualifications, on average, p<0.001). Included meshblocks also have 
statistically significantly fewer people living on public assistance (a reduction by -0.15 standard 
deviations, p<0.001). They have fewer people occupying low-skill jobs and lower unemployment 
rates (-0.07 and -0.08 standard deviation reductions in the proportions of each, p<0.001). 
Meshblocks that are included contain fewer minorities and higher proportions of people of 
European descent. Included meshblocks have percent European proportions that are greater by 
+0.16 standard deviations (p<0.001) with a reduction in percent  Māori  by -0.10 standard 
deviations, a reduction in percent Pasifika by -0.12 and a reduction in percent Asian of -.0.07 
standard deviations (p<0.001 for all differences). Meshblocks that are claimed are also less 




meshblocks claimed by school zones.  Of note was a discontinuity in child-aged population at the 
border. Where the overall population of meshblocks that were included was greater (127 people 
versus 122, p<0.001), there were more children on average residing in meshblocks located just 
outside the school zone (a reduction in school-aged population of -0.05 standard deviations for 
excluded meshblocks, p<0.001). 
 





Figure I-7 -Percent Minority Population at the boundary 
The box-plots above provide an illustration of discontinuities across meshblocks that are 
included versus excluded by city for income and minority composition. The shift in prosperity 
favoring membership inside the zone (shown as median family income in 2006) is apparent for 
all cities (Figure I-6).  Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin appear to have the greatest 
discontinuity- while Christchurch is less clear. Wellington and Auckland appear to have higher 
average income levels and greater variation in income compared to the southern cities in the 
sample. Meshblocks that are claimed by schools appear to be composed of lower percentages of 
minorities (non-Whites) than those that fall just outside the boundary (Figure I-7).For the cities 
of Auckland and Wellington, the discontinuity is more visible than what is seen in the southern 




higher proportions of minorities as well as greater variability across schools in student body 
racial composition. 
BDD Analytic Results 
In order to test the hypothesis that household demographic characteristics vary at the 
home zone boundary, I run a series of regressions. The likelihood of being included in a school 
zone is a function of household characteristics using the logistic model: 
Equation I-1   Pr (Yi =1 | Xi) = logit-1(Xiβ) 
 
Where Yi is the dichotomous dependent variable (IN2) and X is a vector of meshblock 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. I include market controls to account for why a 
meshblock may or may not be included. The number of school zones already claiming the 
meshblock; the distance of the meshblock centroid to the school and the number of same-sector 
scheme seats available to the inhabitants of the meshblock as well as school-aged population are 
included. Socioeconomic indicators include median family income, the percent of the meshblock 
that is unemployed, percent working in blue-collar professions, percent of households that were 
movers within the past 5-years, the percent with college education or higher, and the percent of 
household heads with no partner. Demographic variables include percent Indigenous population ( 
Māori ), Pasifika, Asian, Middle Eastern/Latin American (abbreviated as MELAA) and other 




I crudely explore the role of school governance as potentially playing a role in boundary 
discontinuity. Controls for BoT composition include the number of trustee members, the percent 
of the board that was parents and students, and the percent of the board that was minority. BoT 
variables were drawn from data reflecting the same year during which the school’s enrollment 
scheme went into effect. The BDD approach in this circumstance also speaks to Orfield’s (2002) 
characterization of communities of wealth that seek to maintain a quality of life by promoting 
growth moratoriums and restricting access through land use and zoning practices. By virtue of 
allowing schools to govern themselves, the BoT provides a venue by which demand forces can 
exercise additional influence on the supply of seats to households in the community. Taken 
together, the results of the analysis illuminate both household characteristics and school 
administrative characteristics that contribute to boundary discontinuity. By way of sampling, 
each meshblock is clustered at the school-level with city fixed-effects. I employ robust standard 
errors.  
Subsets of the data are modeled independently in order to explore variation in the 
relationship between meshblock characteristics and zone membership outcomes within the 
education market. As established earlier, our four metropolitan areas have unique economies, 
compositions and histories and so it is hypothesized that the education market in Auckland to the 
north has a dynamic that is entirely different than the one in Dunedin, which is located at the 
opposite (southern) end of the country. Another consideration is that schools may have different 
motivations for selecting student depending upon the sector being served.  In her 1997 survey of 




concern with being overworked compared to secondary schools- which the author attributes to 
higher degrees of administrative funds available to secondary schools (p.16). In subsequent 
surveys of BoT’s conducted in 2003 and 2006, Wylie (2007)  found primary schools continued 
to experience greater administrative strain than secondary schools- with higher principal 
turnover. Such workload discrepancies may lead to motivational variance between sectors 
around choosing students. Wylie also reported one of the main issues secondary schools consult 
parents and community on are operational aspects of school enrollment schemes, suggesting 
student body composition was a priority in that sector (Wylie, 2007). I also provide results by 
school gender to reflect behavioral differences between schools that are coed and single-sex. 
New Zealand has a long tradition of single-sex education- many of the oldest schools in the 
country are all-boys or all-girls schools with long-standing reputations for academic excellence. 
It is hypothesized that single-sex schools will make determinations about boundary design that 
are more exclusive than coed schools. Finally, I test for discontinuities in household 
characteristics at the boundary between low, mid and high-decile ranked schools. It is 
hypothesized that both mid- decile and low-decile schools inherently seek out more advantaged 
households out of fiscal necessity given the problems associated with per-pupil funding structure 
and governance in these schools as discussed in the literature review. For each market analysis, a 
baseline model is first estimated (not shown) and compared with regression outputs for each 
subset. Interaction terms are included to test whether or not relationships are statistically 
significantly different between sectors of interest in a full conditional model that is presented 







Table I-4 BDD Results Metropolitan Model with City Interactions 
 MetroModel  Auckland  Wellington  Christchurch  Dunedin  
1 is 70-100% inside; 0 is less than 
30% inside 
          
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.967* (-2.26) 0.974 (-1.90) 0.780** (-2.74) 0.844* (-2.47) 0.987 (-0.32) 
Number same-sector schools located 
in MB 
0.716*** (-4.15) 0.782* (-2.43) 0.620* (-1.96) 0.568*** (-3.32) 0.773 (-0.74) 
Sum scheme seats available to MB 
(per 100) 
1.017*** (6.65) 1.017*** (6.07) 1.049*** (3.83) 1.001 (0.28) 1.023 (0.98) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-1.41) 0.999 (-1.32) 1.000 (0.01) 0.999 (-0.52) 0.994 (-0.92) 
Priv. occ w/child (% growth 06-96) 1.293* (2.49) 1.390* (2.48) 1.718 (1.76) 0.990 (-0.05) 1.127 (0.19) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.028 (0.31) 1.103 (0.84) 0.965 (-0.13) 1.094 (0.58) 0.568 (-1.40) 
Percent Unemployed 0.667 (-0.63) 1.210 (0.24) 0.0179* (-2.23) 1.046 (0.03) 0.0143 (-1.13) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.615 (-1.85) 0.482* (-2.00) 0.785 (-0.48) 0.687 (-0.85) 526.9*** (3.43) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.956 (-0.23) 0.849 (-0.70) 0.279* (-2.25) 0.824 (-0.49) 1.538 (0.39) 
No partner (percent) 0.347*** (-4.58) 0.208*** (-5.66) 0.613 (-0.79) 0.437 (-1.72) 0.664 (-0.46) 
Movers (percent) (in res < 5 yrs) 0.457*** (-4.44) 0.403*** (-3.91) 0.333* (-2.28) 0.790 (-0.72) 0.0465* (-2.38) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.749 (-0.88) 0.701 (-0.88) 1.654 (0.64) 0.635 (-0.65) 0.179 (-0.83) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.332*** (-3.69) 0.361** (-3.08) 0.112* (-2.43) 0.537 (-0.63) 0.0308 (-1.55) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.452** (-3.16) 0.545* (-2.07) 0.0694*** (-3.31) 0.516 (-1.20) 0.0149* (-2.26) 
Pop Middle Eastern/Latin 
American/Afr. (%) 
0.135* (-2.35) 0.0643** (-2.72) 6.575 (0.79) 0.149 (-0.99) 4.846 (0.40) 
Pop other (percent) 0.685 (-1.12) 0.698 (-0.71) 0.169* (-1.99) 1.105 (0.21) 13.59 (1.21) 
Total Members on Board  1.062* (2.36) 1.043 (1.44) 1.094 (0.68) 1.249*** (4.38) 1.140 (0.92) 
Board Percent Minority 1.513* (2.07) 1.627* (2.14) 2.295 (1.26) 0.355 (-1.67) 0.450 (-0.67) 
Wellington 1.931* (2.29)         
Christchurch 0.694*** (-4.31)         
Dunedin 0.366*** (-4.81)         
(Dunedin==1)*perc_coll06 124.7*** (5.09)         
(Wellington==1)*perc_bluea06 0.236** (-2.58)         
(Dunedin==1)*perc_pac 0.0345* (-2.40)         
Observations 24006  15281  2812  5252  661  
Pseudo R2 0.031  0.032  0.082  0.019  0.116  
N_clust 372  229  62  64  17  




Table I-4 provides results by city metropolitan area. Controlling for school-aged population and 
growth, the distance of the meshblock to the school, the number of other same-sector schools co-
located in the meshblock and a measure of competition
42
 (operationalized as the number of 
scheme seats available to the individual meshblock from all schools guaranteeing enrollment), 
characteristics of transiency, single family structure and race are the main significant 
contributors to the likelihood of exclusion. The MetroModel results indicate that a meshblock 
was 65-percent less likely to be included in a home zone for a one-percent increase in the 
number of households that were headed by un-partnered adults (p<0.001). A one-percentage 
point increase in movers led to a 55-percentage point reduction in the likelihood of inclusion. 
The percentage of a meshblock that was indigenous Māori  is consistently insignificant across 
cities, but other minority groups have significant odds of exclusion. For Pasifika households, a 
one-percentage point increase in percent Pasifika led to a 67-percent decrease in the odds of 
being selected by a school with an enrollment scheme (p<0.001). The odds were reduced by 55-
percent (p<.01) and 87-percent (p<0.05) for meshblocks increasing by one percentage point in 
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 Although not the focus of this dissertation, the role of competition on school selective behavior 
is crudely captured across models based on methods used in Carr and Ritter (2007). The authors measure 
the amount of competition faced by a traditional public school in three ways: a dummy variable for 
whether at least one charter school is located in the same district, the number of charter schools located in 
the same district, and the market share of charter schools within each district. More sophisticated 
techniques (not used here but worth exploring) include (Bayer & McMillan, 2005) who construct a set of 
school specific elasticities of demand as the estimated change in average local property values per 
standard deviation increase in test score or application of the Herfindahl Index H, as a measure of 
competition ranging from 
 
 






Asian and Middle Eastern/Latin American/African American (MELAA) composition 
respectively. Board of Trustee (BoT) composition also played a role in the likelihood of 
inclusion for the full sample. An additional board member translated into a 6.2-percent increase 
in the odds of a meshblock being included (p<0.05) while a one-percentage point increase in 
minority composition on the board contributed to an increase in the odds of inclusion by 51-
percent (p<0.05). Board parent and student composition was not significant in any iteration 
performed and dropped in the final model.
43
 Wellington meshblocks had a 93-percentage point 
increase in the odds of being included in a home zone relative to Auckland (p<0.05), while 
meshblocks in Christchurch and Dunedin to the south had lower odds. 
When considering the results separately by city the extent to which relationships are statistically 
significant varies and Auckland appears to be driving the overall significance of household 
characteristics by virtue of its share of the sample size. What is worth pointing out is a lack of 
association between household characteristics and the likelihood for inclusion that is specific to 
Christchurch. While general pattern for favoring households appear consistent in the other cities 
to varying degrees, Christchurch appears to be poorly explained by the model. This provides 
preliminary evidence that something else may be contributing to criteria used by schools in that 
city for inclusion(exclusion).  It appears that Wellington is driving the aversion to meshblock  
percent Asian composition, although when tested in an interaction in the full model there is no 
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 BoT parent and student composition’s lack of significance may be attributable to inclusion of meshblock 
socioeconomic characteristics in the overall strategy. The issue of parental influence on the drawing of the home 




significant evidence of a meaningful difference. Wellington meshblocks with a one percentage-
point increase in percent blue collar workers had an added reduction in likelihood for inclusion 
of nearly 75-percentage points over and above Auckland (p<0.01). In Dunedin, meshblocks with 
a one-percentage point increase in Pasifika households saw a further reduction in the odds of 
inclusion compared to Auckland on the order of 96-percent (p<0.05).  
BoT size was important in Christchurch (an additional member led to an increase in the 
odds of inclusion by 25-percentage points), and in Auckland, minority representation on the 
board led to an increase in the odds of inclusion by 63-percentage points.  In all cities except 
Dunedin, the relationship between the percentage of households with a college degree or higher 
is negative. This is likely due to the fact that households that are educated are less likely to have 
children. In Dunedin, the opposite is true, where a one-percentage point increase in the percent of 
a meshblock with college or higher led to an increase in the odds of being selected by 5.26 times 
(p<0.001).  
School Sector Results 
Table I-5 provides results from the school sector analysis. It is hypothesized that as 
students age their backgrounds contribute more to peer effects thereby rendering household 
characteristics more salient predictors for inclusion in the secondary sector, but the fact that 
primary sector homezones tend to be much smaller may prevent this relationship from coming to 
light in this test. The conditional model is set-up with the primary sector for the Auckland region 
as the reference group. The disaggregated results hint at some variation by school sector, and 




confirmed in two cases. Secondary, intermediate and composite schools are more likely to be 
inclusive than primary schools. Composite schools are 11-times  more likely than primary 
schools to enroll Pasifika students (p<0.01) and secondary schools are 60 percentage-points less 
likely to take on meshblocks with a one-percentage point increase in Asian composition 
(p<0.05).  A closer look at disaggregated results reveals that non- Māori  minorities are zoned 
out by both secondary and primary schools alike, with more of a discriminatory emphasis found 
in secondary schools. For primary schools- it’s a decline in the odds of inclusion by 60-
percentage points and for secondary schools a decline in the odds of nearly 90-percentage points 
for each additional 1-percent increase in Pasifika students is found (p<0.01 and p<0.001). 
Percent  Māori  has no statistically significant relationship with the odds of inclusion in the 
primary or secondary sector, although the direction of the relationship is positive for primary 
schools and negative for secondary schools. Conversely, composite schools are inclusive of 
minorities across the board, although not all relationships are statistically significant. A one-
percentage point increase in percent  Māori  at the meshblock-level  increases the odds of 
inclusion in intermediate schools by 7 times (p<0.05) and by 43 times in composite schools 
(p<0.05). For Pasifika students, the odds of inclusion are up by 560 times greater in composite 
schools for a one percentage point increase in meshblock Pasifika composition (p<0.01). Where 
primary and secondary schools are zoning out meshblocks with high proportions of Asians in a 
statistically significant way, the direction of the relationship is opposite again for composite and 
intermediate schools in the sample, although these coefficients are not significant. This speaks to 
the unique role intermediate and composite play in the education market. Across all school 




odds of inclusion into school zones. Finally, within the composite school sample, median family 
income stands out controlling for other household characteristics and controls. The odds of 
inclusion increase by 72-percentage points for each added percentage-point increase in the log of 







Table I-5-Boundary Discontinuity Design - School Sector Model with City Fixed Effects 
 Sector Model Primary Secondary Intermediate Composite 
1 is 70-100% inside; 0 is less than 30% inside           
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.952* (-2.40) 0.952 (-1.29) 0.955* (-2.18) 0.886 (-1.72) 0.828 (-1.37) 
Number same-sector schools located in MB 0.785** (-3.01) 0.818* (-2.38) 0.793 (-0.62) 1.395 (1.11) 0.402*** (-4.82) 
Sum of scheme seats available to MB (per 100) 1.016*** (4.19) 1.047*** (5.30) 1.008 (1.79) 1.160*** (5.67)   
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-0.87) 0.998* (-2.26) 1.000 (-0.38) 1.001 (0.24) 1.011 (1.43) 
Private occupied w/ children (MB perc growth 06-96) 1.310** (2.61) 1.271 (1.66) 1.312 (1.35) 1.352 (1.21) 1.433 (0.39) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.015 (0.17) 1.013 (0.10) 0.760 (-1.82) 1.273 (1.35) 1.723*** (3.45) 
Percent Unemployed 0.731 (-0.50) 0.597 (-0.58) 4.462 (1.22) 0.0803 (-1.85) 0.0604 (-0.82) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.762 (-1.05) 0.909 (-0.29) 1.014 (0.02) 0.699 (-0.59) 0.339 (-0.90) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.804 (-1.18) 0.945 (-0.23) 0.888 (-0.34) 0.626 (-0.87) 0.258 (-0.95) 
No partner (percent) 0.284*** (-5.19) 0.309*** (-3.71) 0.331* (-2.43) 0.196* (-2.27) 0.581 (-0.57) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.448*** (-4.55) 0.492** (-3.03) 0.494* (-2.00) 0.312** (-2.72) 0.245* (-2.02) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.904 (-0.30) 1.081 (0.19) 0.289 (-1.82) 7.933* (2.24) 43.18* (1.97) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.306*** (-4.13) 0.410** (-3.18) 0.113*** (-3.38) 1.339 (0.53) 560.4** (3.23) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.525* (-2.54) 0.502* (-2.33) 0.112*** (-4.65) 1.005 (0.01) 5.210 (0.76) 
Pop Middle Eastern/Latin American/African (percent) 0.123* (-2.48) 0.167 (-1.57) 0.225 (-0.98) 0.0749 (-1.19) 0.000773 (-0.86) 
Pop other (percent) 0.680 (-1.13) 1.033 (0.07) 0.380 (-1.46) 1.036 (0.03) 0.436 (-1.65) 
bot_tot 1.056 (1.79) 1.081* (2.20) 1.032 (0.59) 1.195 (1.68) 0.899 (-0.53) 
bot_percmin 1.433 (1.62) 1.219 (1.08) 2.722* (2.06)   43.56*** (5.01) 
Wellington 1.075 (0.68) 1.034 (0.35) 1.295 (0.90) 1.961 (1.84)   
Christchurch 0.700*** (-4.13) 0.733** (-3.00) 0.480*** (-3.96) 0.930 (-0.32) 4.892 (0.35) 
Dunedin 0.842 (-0.91) 0.821 (-1.25) 0.689 (-0.82) 3.494*** (4.63)   
secondary 1.435* (2.17)         
intermediate 1.578*** (5.82)         
composite 1.451*** (3.42)         
(composite==1)*perc_pac 11.48** (3.19)         
(secondary==1)*perc_asian 0.394* (-2.05)         
Observations 24006  12612  7185  3701  508  
Pseudo R2 0.036  0.022  0.046  0.081  0.047  
N_clust 372  268  66  34  4  





School Gender Results 
Steeped in historical tradition and often associated with the most prestige are New 
Zealand boys and girls-only schools. The full model (Gender Model) is constructed with coed 
schools in Auckland as the comparison group (see Appendix 8 Table II-17). Overall, boys 
schools are less inclusive than coed schools (odds of inclusion for an average meshblock are 90-
percent less if the school is a boys school compared to a coed school; p<0.001), while girls 
schools are not statistically significantly different to coed schools. However, I find that boy’s 
schools are statistically significantly more likely to take on meshblocks with higher proportions 
of movers and non-partnered households than are coed schools.  Composition of the Board of 
Trustees at the time the boundary was drawn remains significant in the full model and 
significantly different for boy’s schools versus coed schools. For each additional member on the 
BoT for boys schools compared to coed schools the odds of inclusion for a meshblock increased 
11-percentage points (p<0.05). BoT minority representation is negatively associated with 
inclusion- an increases of 1-percent is associated with a decrease in the odds of inclusion by 93-
percentage points for all-boy’s schools compared to coed schools (p<0.001). In the case of all-
girls schools, fewer statistically significant differences to coed schools are evident. Girls schools 
are 85-percent less likely than coed schools to include a meshblock for each additional 
percentage point increase in meshblock Asian composition (p<0.05). In the case of ‘Other’ 
minorities, the odds of inclusion in girls schools drop by nearly 97-percentage points (p<0.001) 




School Decile Results 
According to (Wylie, 2007)  parent members of high decile BoT’s were more likely to 
have issues with school enrollment schemes than were parents on boards of low decile schools 
(p.41). Gordon (1994) predicted that middle class areas (hence schools) would have great interest 
in strategically zoning for students. (Lubienski et al., 2013) found that schools of middle decile 
rank tended to “reach” for socioeconomic effects. The authors were somewhat limited in their 
ability to make the claim because of the problem of the bounded nature of the data in the decile 
framework. Decile 1 and 2 schools de facto have nowhere to “go” but up when drawing their 
boundaries on average; and the highest decile schools face the same limitations- only to trend 
down in socioeconomic status if any movement in school composition is to occur. The beauty of 
the boundary discontinuity design is that it provides the opportunity to look at borders and 
decisions as made by individual schools between meshblocks in the presence of household 
characteristic variability. Decile 10 and decile 1 schools alike made choices at the border 
between meshblocks when drawing home zones and the BDD framework allows these decisions 
to be illuminated. Results on boundary discontinuity by three groupings of school decile appear 
in Table II-14. Schools ranked decile 1-3 comprise the low socioeconomic status school 
grouping; deciles 4-7 compose the middle and deciles 8-10 comprise the grouping of high 
socioeconomic status schools. A full conditional decile model with city fixed effects is included 
and mid-decile schools in Auckland are the reference group (see Appendix 8  Table II-18).  
I find that mid-decile schools in Auckland are statistically significantly less likely to 




MELAA populations. The low-decile model reveals that race factors in positively for the odds of 
inclusion with  Māori  and percent-Pasifika in the presence of household racial heterogeneity. 
Meanwhile, the opposite is true for high decile schools. An increase in percent-Asian or Pasifika 
meshblock composition led to a decrease in odds for inclusion in high decile schools at the 
boundary. However, when testing for significant differences in behavior between high versus 
mid-decile or low versus mid-decile schools, only high decile schools behave in a way that is 
statistically significantly different. When looking at the marginal effect of a high-decile school 
compared to mid-decile school, the odds of inclusion were reduced by 55-percentage points 
(p<0.05), while low-decile schools had no significant difference relative to mid-decile schools in 
the odds. Interactions terms reveal that high -decile schools were statistically significantly less 
likely than mid-decile schools to take on meshblocks with higher proportions of Pasifika and 
Asian students (97-percent reduction and a 64-percent reduction in the odds respectively, 
p<0.001 and p<0.01), while more likely to take on meshblocks with higher proportions of 
college educated households (3.2 times more likely, p<0.05). Low decile schools when interacted 
with select household characteristics showed no significant difference in the odds of inclusion 
compared to mid-decile schools. These results shed more light on the common question posed in 
the literature regarding the role of middle-class communities (hence, schools) in gerrymandering. 
The evidence provided here does not clearly support the case that selective behavior is driven by 
mid-decile schools, rather the evidence suggests high-decile schools are more likely to be 




BDD Sensitivity Analysis 
Results of three separate regression analyses for each of the four categories of analysis are 
provided in Appendix 9. I employ logistic models for the IN and IN2 criteria of inclusion 
(exclusion) at the boundary and a GLM model for the third criteria- where the dependent 
variable is the percentage of the meshblock that is contained within the home zone. Coefficients, 
and model fit are provided for ease of comparison. The goal is to ensure that decisions for 
including households made by schools are adequately represented by using the geography of the 
meshblock in absence of household-level data. Because coefficients remain consistent across 
each model (in direction and for the most part in significance), I conclude the decision to use 
meshblocks as a means to test school motivation to choose households as sufficient.  
Discussion 
Across all models, certain household characteristics retain significance in predicting 
discontinuity. In the cases of increasing proportions of non-partnered and transient households, 
meshblocks had statistically significantly unlikely odds of being included at the boundary. 
Another interesting finding is that percent- Māori  rarely appears as a significant predictor (and 
in many cases the odds are inclusive), whereas non- Māori  minorities are significantly 
negatively associated with inclusion. This leads to one possible conclusion that school boards are 
zoning out immigrants in favor of White/European/Pākehā and the indigenous Māori populations 




the Ministry guidelines on the development and operation of enrollment schemes (New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2011). Throughout the document which is issued by New Zealand’s 
Secretary for Education in response to the 1989 Education Act- detailed guidelines are provided 
on how to “deal” with certain problematic "scenarios." Parents who are transient, students who 
come from non-traditional family structures and families that have “recently arrived in New 
Zealand” are listed in multiple ways as being strong candidates for investigation by the school 
Board of Trustees for attempting to gain access to schools illegally.  Pages 7 through 9 give 
seven examples of these prospective scenarios and the grounds by which school boards may be 
entitled to investigate and exclude such parents or students. The document provides the 
following examples:  
“Example one- A family has moved into the zone just prior to the application for 
enrollment.  
Example two- A student is boarding at an in-zone address. His family lives just outside 
the school zone. 
Example three- A student lives with her grandmother inside the school zone.  
Example four- A student has recently moved in with his father who lives in the school 
zone, having previously lived with his mother, outside the school zone. 
Example five-A family has recently arrived in New Zealand. They are living in a rented 
flat whilst they look for more permanent accommodation. 
Example six-A family is sharing a house with another family 
Example seven- A family gives a motel as their in-zone address.”(pp. 7-9)  
Schools are encouraged to investigate these scenarios for legitimacy “as a genuine in-zone living 




further investigation at a later date” ( p.9). A count of wording in the guidelines reveal that the 
words “suspicious” or “suspicions” are used 15 times; “suspect” appears  twice; “genuine,” 
“genuineness” or “genuinely” appear 43 times;  and “investigate” or “investigation(s)” appear six 
times. With such explicit problem scenarios pointed out and the suspects therein profiled by 
family type, transient tendency and immigration status in the document language expressly, it is 
no surprise that schools are zoning these types of households out. One plausible explanation is 
that schools may be opting to avoid these problem “scenarios” all together, on the Ministry’s 
express guidance to do so. 
Meta Analysis 
I now explore individual estimates of standardized mean difference (SMD or Cohen’s d) 
between meshblocks by household characteristics at the school-level using random effects meta-
analysis (Table I-6). This analysis is different from the above logistic regressions which 
estimated the sample mean as opposed to individual school means. By employing meta analysis 
techniques, I can see how mean school-level inclusion (exclusion) decisions play out by 
comparing schools to one another. Treating schools as individual ‘studies,’ the treatment 
(inclusion in the school zone) is differenced from the control (exclusion from the school zone) to 
yield an estimate,    of difference in means; 
Equation I-2 
           , where         
 ) and          




Meta analysis outputs a standard error for the school-level estimate,   and under the assumption 
of school random effects (there is something unique to schools that affects variance of   ) the 
method also provides an estimate of between-school heterogeneity (   ). Table I-6 gives results 
of the SMD estimates for select characteristics disaggregated by city. I also provide results for 
school age population at the boundary with the expectation that excluded meshblocks would be 
less populated by children.  
Table I-6- Meta-Analysis (SMD) Table 
Meshbock Standardized Mean Difference in select 
characteristics by Metro Area (IN2=1 minus IN2=0) 







Auckland 0.23*** 72.4%*** 
Wellington 0.22** 70.6%*** 
Christchurch 0.17** 63%*** 
Dunedin 0.37* 66.9%*** 
Overall 0.222*** 70.9%*** 
Percent Minority 
Auckland -0.16*** 78.2%*** 
Wellington -0.20** 73.8%*** 
Christchurch -0.11** 53%*** 
Dunedin -0.17 46.7%* 
Overall -0.16*** 74.7%*** 




Auckland -0.14*** 66.8%*** 
Wellington -0.15* 72%*** 
Christchurch -0.14*** 39.5%** 
Dunedin -0.17 76.5%*** 
Overall -0.14*** 65.7%*** 
Under 19 Pop 
(2006) 
Auckland -0.06** 48.6%*** 
Wellington 0.01 47.7%*** 
Christchurch -0.01 38.2%** 
Dunedin 0.06 58.1%** 





The purpose of organizing the data by city in Table I-6 is to illustrate geographic differences in 
boundary discontinuity. Auckland  takes the lead with the most substantive and significant 
boundary discontinuity in the case of income, percent minority and percent with no educational 
qualifications. In all three characteristics, the discontinuity is in the direction of socioeconomic 
advantage favoring the school. Christchurch stands out for being relatively less susceptible to 
boundary discontinuity across measures. SMD’s at the border are smaller in that city and in the 
case of income and percent minority- less significant. I-squared values give an estimate of the 
percent of variation in SMD that can be attributed to between-school heterogeneity within each 
city. Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin have higher I-square values (>75%) for differences in 
income, race and education levels which means most of the variation in SMD’s in these locations 
is attributable to differences between schools in each city.  For Christchurch, differences at the 
boundary exhibit less variation as a consequence of between school heterogeneity –indicating the 
possibility that schools are behaving more in unison with each other with regards to zoning 
practice. All areas except Auckland showed no meaningful difference in child populations for 
included versus excluded meshblocks at the boundary.  Auckland on the other hand was found to 
exclude meshblocks at the boundary that were populated with more school-aged children (-0.06 
SMD, p<0.01).   
Figure I-8, Figure I-9 and Figure I-10 provide illustration of SMD’s ordered by school 
decile rank for the secondary school sector stratified by metropolitan area. As decile increases, 
the gap in means for income becomes larger favoring higher income for inclusion. This indicates 




degrees of discontinuity at the boundary in favor of higher income households.  The relationship 
is most noticeable for Auckland and to a lesser degree, Wellington (both located in the north). 
Noticeable is the tighter clustering of SMD variation in the case of Christchurch which has an 
average SMD of -0.04 while Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin each have SMD’s of 0.32, 0.31 
and 0.39 respectively.  
The same pattern holds for racial composition (Figure I-9 and Figure I-10). In all cases 
secondary schools are taking meshblocks with fewer  Māori  and Pasifika peoples at the 
boundary. For Auckland, secondary schools are exhibiting greater degrees of deference for 
meshblocks with fewer  Māori  and Pasifika inhabitants as school decile increases. The 
relationship between school decile and increase in discrimination is not as clear for the other 
cities but the overall effect is to discriminate. Of note, there does not appear to be a consistency 
between school decile and the degree of discontinuity in Christchurch for either  Māori  or 
Pasifika students at the boundary, and there is a clear “shrinking” of SMD’s around zero on both 
sides (meaning SMD’s are in both directions) in the Christchurch example. To make the 
comparison, Christchurch SMD for percent- Pasifika is -0.03, whereas Auckland, Wellington 
and Dunedin each have SMD’s of -0.26, -0.25 and -0.34 respectively. The forest plot proves to 








Figure I-8- Forest Plot- Median Family Income (2006), Secondary Schools 
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Figure I-9 Forest Plot- Percent  Māori  (2006), Secondary Schools 
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Figure I-10 Forest Plot- Percent Pacifika (2006), Secondary Schools 
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Random-Effects Meta Regression 
The meta analysis results indicate that significant variation in SMD values between 
schools is present with a lesser extent in the case of Christchurch.  The forest plots also reveal a 
relationship between school decile ranking and the direction and size of the difference in means 
across characteristics. This is most clearly seen for Auckland schools. It appears that as school 
decile increases evidence for discrimination becomes more acute. These results provided further 
evidence contrary to the middle-class gerrymandering hypothesis and shifts the focus to higher 
decile schools. One way to confirm this relationship is with meta regression.  As established with 
the meta analysis, the assumption that schools behave differently- that is to say that the true 
effect sizes,    vary between schools, was captured in Equation I-2. In order to test the 
hypothesis that standardized mean differences in household socioeconomic characteristics vary 
at the home zone boundary as a function of school decile, I provide the following random-effects 
meta-regression: 
Equation I-3 
             , where         
 ) and          
      
In this model the dependent variable,    is the school’s standardized mean difference for the 
variable of interest (i.e. percent minority) at the boundary between included (excluded) 
meshblocks as specified using IN2 criteria. As an extension to the random-effects meta-analysis I 




racial composition, and number of trustees. Using STATA, between –school variance,    is 
estimated first, followed by an estimate of the coefficient on school covariates using weighted 
least squares regression. Fixed-effects meta-regression provides a joint-test for the null 
hypothesis that coefficients for school characteristics are zero on SMD. Results are presented by 
city in Table I-7.  
Table I-7 Random-Effects Meta-Regression, SMD Family Income (2006) 
 All Auckland Wellington Christchurch Dunedin 
Decile (2009) 0.0381*** 0.0454*** 0.0799 0.0157 0.124 
 (3.42) (3.70) (1.72) (0.55) (1.44) 
# Trustees 0.0321 0.0707** -0.0614 -0.0950* 0.0233 
 (1.66) (3.27) (-0.74) (-2.25) (0.19) 
Trustee % minority (non- 
Māori ) 
-0.184 -0.385* 0.768 0.136 0.0437 
 (-1.03) (-2.03) (0.98) (0.20) (0.03) 
Trustee %  Māori  -0.569* -0.646* -0.272 0.972 -4.581 
 (-2.07) (-2.18) (-0.26) (1.16) (-1.87) 
N 368 227 62 62 17 
   0.149 0.124 0.290 0.0670 0.220 
   69% 67% 70% 58% 60% 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.316 0.265 0.370 
t statistics in parentheses  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
What was first observed in the forest plot is confirmed in the meta regression. School 
decile overall (thanks to the case of Auckland, as suspected) was found to predict variation in 
SMD for income. For each added school decile rank, the difference in SMD at the boundary 
could be expected to increase by 0.04 standard deviations favoring increased income (p<0.001) 
holding the size of the Board of Trustees, and Trustee minority composition constant. In the case 




deviation increase per unit-increase in decile (p<0.001), adding up to sizeable gap in SMDs 
between decile 1 and decile 10 schools. The size of the Board of Trustees matters in different 
ways for Auckland and Christchursh. BoT size contributes to the increase in SMD in a positive 
direction for Auckland (an additional board member leads to a 0.07 standard deviation increase 
in SMD favoring higher income (p<0.01). The opposite is true in Christchurch- an additional 
trustee contributes to a decrease in SMD for income (p<0.05). The effect of Board of Trustee 
composition on SMD’s for family income at the boundary was larger when taking minority 
composition into consideration. A one-percentage point increase in non- Māori  minority 
composition on a trustee board for Auckland led to almost a 0.4 standard deviation decrease in 
SMD for income (p<0.05). A one-percentage point increase in  Māori  composition on the board 
has a greater impact with a 0.65 standard deviation decrease in SMD for income (p<0.05). 
Minority composition does not appear to affect boundary discontinuity for income in the other 





Figure I-11    Bubble Plot Income SMD vs. Board Percent  Māori  Composition (Fitted meta-
regression- Auckland) 
A second meta regression was conducted using SMD in 2006 New Zealand deprivation score 
(NZDep06) as the dependent variable. NZDep06 measures a composite index of poverty and 
higher values indicate greater deprivation exists. A one percentage-point increase in  Māori  BoT 
composition increases SMD at the border by one standard deviation in NZDep06 score 
(p<0.001). This means that schools with higher concentrations of  Māori  members on the Board 
were substantially more inclusive of deprived meshblocks for Auckland. Within Auckland, 















results. The higher the decile, the less deprived the included households were at the boundary 
(for each increase in school decile, a reduction in NZDep06 of -0.03 standard deviations was 
found (p<0.01)). 
 
Table I-8 Random-Effects Meta-Regression, NZ Deprivation Index(2006) by City 
 All Auckland Wellington Christchurch Dunedin 
decile09 -0.0270** -0.0333** -0.0570 -0.0121 -0.108 
 (-2.61) (-2.73) (-1.60) (-0.59) (-1.00) 
# Trustees -0.0426* -0.0716** -0.00556 0.0785* -0.0973 
 (-2.38) (-3.32) (-0.09) (2.64) (-0.63) 
Trustee % minority (non- 
Māori ) 
0.263 0.336 -0.0135 -0.241 0.968 
 (1.59) (1.80) (-0.02) (-0.49) (0.49) 
Trustee %  Māori  1.004*** 1.048*** 1.082 -0.607 3.454 
 (3.95) (3.56) (1.38) (-1.02) (1.12) 
Constant 0.140 0.320 0.286 -0.577** 0.746 
 (1.05) (1.94) (0.74) (-2.75) (0.54) 
N 372 229 62 64 17 
   0.148 0.139 0.187 0.0355 0.521 
   0.752 0.741 0.765 0.505 0.848 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.0662 0.139 0.675 
t statistics in parentheses   * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Identification Strategy & Limitations  
Because there are no school districts in New Zealand I relied on the metropolitan area 
boundary as defined by its membership across territorial authorities to establish my sample. If 
boundaries of school home zones coincide with boundaries of adjacent metropolitan areas or 




characteristics drive inclusion would be confounded by the fact that another administrative or 
historical boundary may be at play. This seems to be the case in one suburb of the Auckland 
region. Several school home zones overlap and stop at a roadway running north-south in that 
area. The roadway also neatly divides household characteristics into low and high socioeconomic 
status, with the included areas coinciding with affluence. In this area, school boundaries are 
possibly adhering to the historical township enclave boundaries by their design, rather than to the 
difference in household characteristics at the boundary. Only one home zone in this area was 
found to straddle both sides of the roadway. The problem was for the most part avoided by the 
averaging out of meshblock characteristics inside versus outside a school home zone at the 
school-level. In other words, as structured the BDD design does not directly compare 
discontinuities using the nearest neighbor at the meshblock-level on either side. Rather, the 
design was structured so that meshblocks that were included(excluded) were clustered at the 
school-level to calculate differences in means. In the cases where a boundary was backed up 
against a metropolitan boundary, the meshblocks on the other side were not included in the 
analysis. Therefore, meshblock discontinuities coinciding with metropolitan boundaries were not 
counted for the analysis. 
A second study limitation also pertains to the drawing of home zone boundaries and may provide 
limits to the identification strategy employed. There is a lack of information on how stable home 
zone boundaries are over time. No data on how often or how drastically a home zone border is 
re-drawn was available for this analysis. However, the aim of this analysis is not to produce 




Instead, this analysis aims to examine the evidence for school motivations to choose students in 
the presence of household heterogeneity. Therefore a cross-sectional analysis gives clear 
evidence of decisions made by schools for the drawing of home zones using data on households 
that is within 7 years of the time the boundary was drawn. Although not precise in timing, the 
identification strategy is arguably sufficient to investigate school motivations at the time 
boundaries were drawn. Further research could look into zone stability and duration. For 
example, some schools included in this analysis for having home zones in 2010 no longer have 
them in 2015, while other schools identified as not having zones in 2010 had implemented zones 
since that time. Exploring revisions to boundaries over time would provide added insight into 
school motivations. 
Third, school special character or programatic features that explain sorting at the school 
boundary or zone-level may not be readily identifiable in the school characteristic data employed 
in this analysis. This shortcoming will also confound the identification strategy around BDD. 
Schools selected for the sample were exclusive of schools catering to special populations as 
indicated in Ministry of Education school profile data. In cases of composite and intermediate 
schools, BDD findings indicated the likelihood of including minorities (in particular,  Māori  and 
Pasifika students) was highest, which suggests programs exist in these institutions that explain 
boundary or zone discontinuity which were not accounted for in the data or model strategy. In 
order to overcome this, separate models were run by school sector to provide clearer paths to test 




necessitate looking at individual schools on a case-by-case basis to identify and account for these 
unobserved contributors to boundary discontinuity. 
CHAPTER IV HOME ZONE DISCONTINUITY 
Home zone composition vs. Community composition 
This next chapter investigates the obligation that schools with schemes preserve access to 
students residing nearby. The Ministry of Education provides a set of guidelines for enrollment 
schemes that expressly states one of the main tenets of the scheme is that it does not “exclude 
local students” (New Zealand Ministry of Education, 2011, p. 2). However, the guidelines also 
suggest that schools may exclude areas already covered by adjacent schools when drawing 
zones. Schools are expected to draw zones in consultation with one another and it is entirely 
acceptable that some areas will be overlapped by more than one school home zone as a result. 
Therefore, it is possible that a school could draw a scheme that is not entirely inclusive of the 
local area in which it is located when another school serving the same sector is near-by. These 
two themes on zoning are somewhat pitted against each other. Schools that become over-
subscribed need to put up a home zone to protect the rights of enrollment of local children. Yet 
they may exclude local students if a school with no scheme is close by. This discrepancy creates 
a second unique opportunity to examine school behaviors from the perspective of zone 
discontinuity. The main question is: Do schools draw zones in a manner that strategically 
“reaches” for the most advantaged meshblocks using adjacent schools for cover in the presence 




advantaged students with the landscape of adjacent schools in order to maximize zone 
composition in the direction of privilege?  
The literature provides helpful guidance with regards to studying school attendance zone 
construction worth noting here. Variance between school zone composition and the general area 
within which such a zone exists is a primary metric for testing for gerrymandering. Willie, 
Edwards, and Alves (2002) suggest that no more than 5 to 10 percentage points deviation in 
composition along demographic lines between school zones and the communities within which 
they exist should generally occur. In addition, the authors suggest that any attendance zone as 
drawn should “link together contiguous neighborhoods to create zones, thereby avoiding 
suspicion of gerrymandering” (p.18). In a very comprehensive investigation of both the design of 
school attendance zones and their implications, (Richards, 2014) adapts the concept of “voter 
exchange” from the electoral literature on gerrymandering to the school zoning context. Richards 
identifies two types of students- those that are “zoned in” and those that are “zoned out” by 
comparing actual boundaries to ‘natural boundaries’ which the school would be expected to take 
in the absence of gerrymandering. Richards provides a good discussion on the use of circular 
buffers versus Voroni polygons in constructing ‘natural boundaries’ for comparison in this 
context. Both methods have their limitations- circular buffers with equal land area to actual 
zones are what Richards refers to as the “theoretical ideal to which existing attendance zones 
may be compared to assess the effects of gerrymandering on an individual attendance zone,” in 
absence of being a means to feasibly redistrict zones (p.1127). As an alternate- the Voroni 




appropriate to the research intent- Voroni polygons can provide a “reasonable counterfactual” to 
the existing zone because the geometry of the Voroni creates boundaries that are convex and 
inclusive of areas that are only closest to the school relative to other schools. The method also 
has its drawbacks- as the construction of the Voroni boundaries is dependent upon the 
arrangement of schools across a given landscape. 
 Figure I-12 diagrams the potential discrepancy between the obligation to local coverage and 
actual home zone placement using an illustrative example. I utilize ArcGIS to map out the home 
zone and also create a 2-kilometer buffer around the school. The local buffer is netted of areas 
that are not populated and what remains is classified as an area directly local to the school that is 
viable for homezone inclusion in the spirit of the Ministry Guidelines. I then intersect each 
school home zone with the eligible local 2km buffer and net out the difference. Schools are 
identified by the degree to which they overlap their local populated area with a variable (local) 
taking on a value between 0 and 1. A value of .7 indicates the school zone overlaps 70% of the 
eligible populated meshblocks identified as falling within a 2-kilometer radius of the school.  
The idea is to examine whether or not “neighborhood preference” is being preserved by the 









Figure I-12 Illustration of local overlap concept 
 
Do zones preserve rights of enrollment for students residing close to schools who would 
otherwise lose access under conditions of school popularity? If so, then zones should be drawn in 
an un-biased manner relative to the local community being served. Figure I-13 provides a 
histogram of home zones by the percent of the local 2km buffer that is overlapped with the home 
zone for primary and non-primary sectors. Primary schools naturally exhibit lower degrees of 
local overlap, and this is due to their smaller size in general. Non-primary schools (intermediate 
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Figure I-13 Histogram of Neighborhood Overlap (Primary Sector vs. Non-Primary  
 
To test the hypothesis that schools are strategically reaching, I follow a general approach 
employed by Lubienski et al. (2013). The authors examine home zone composition in a study of 
47 secondary schools with enrollment schemes in Auckland and compare home zone 
composition to the composition of an area buffering the school in a radius of 2km to test the 
hypothesis that schools are zoning for advantaged students. A pre-existing metric of meshblock 
socioeconomic status known as the deprivation score (NZDep2006) is the basis for the 
comparison between home zone composition and the composition of the 2 km buffer.
44
 The 
NZDep2006 is an index generated from 9 census variables capturing measures of socioeconomic 
status. Using deciles as a frame for their analysis, Lubienski et al. (2013) find evidence that 
schools of decile ranks 2,3,8 and 9 are zoning for more affluent students (p.13). Variation 
between home zone median deprivation and the deprivation of the 2km buffer zone enables an 
overall test of the hypothesis that schools are zoning for affluent students. I intersect meshblocks 
with the home zone and assign them a unique ID for membership in a given school’s home zone. 
The 2km buffer around each school is also intersected with eligible populated meshblocks and 
each is assigned an ID for membership in what would be that school’s local buffer zone. I plot 
out kernel densities for aggregated homezone data versus aggregated local 2km buffer data for 
NZDep2006            scores (Figure I-14). 
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Figure I-14 Kernel density plot of school zones versus 2km buffer zone- All schools 
Zone Discontinuity Results 
The results presented above indicate home zones in the sample have lower NZDep06 
(deprivation) scores than the local 2-kilometer buffer. The 2km buffer curve is shifted to the right 
indicating local areas are generally more deprived than home zones overall. Schools with 
enrollment schemes are drawing home zones that are composed of more advantaged households 
than what is found in the immediate local vicinity of the school. This finding corroborates the 
Auckland secondary sector findings of Lubienski et al. (2013) and expands the results to the 
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NZDep2006 scores disaggregated by school sector can be found in Appendix 10.  The 
illustrations reveal that zone discontinuity appears more pronounced for primary and secondary 
schools than it is for intermediate and composite schools. 
I now estimate school-level standardized mean differences in NZDep2006 scores 
between local buffers and home zones using meta-analysis. I provide results by metropolitan 
area, school sector, school zone size and by degree of zone overlap with the local area 
surrounding the school for added insight(see Table I-9). 
Table I-9 Table of Zone vs. Buffer SMD's 
Meshbock Standardized Mean Difference in NZ Deprivation Index Score (2006) 
  D-L Pooled (d) I-Squared^ 
City SMD Auckland -0.099*** 81.70% 
Wellington -0.22*** 79.70% 
Christchurch -0.183*** 83.20% 
Dunedin -0.415*** 77.60% 
Sector SMD secondary -0.178*** 89.90% 
composite + 0.016 88.80% 
primary -0.156*** 74.80% 
intermediate -0.07 89.80% 
Zone Size bigger -0.209*** 85.20% 
same size -0.103** 84.70% 
smaller -0.139*** 78.30% 
local  (Degree to 
which home zone 
overlaps 2km Buffer) 
<30% Overlap local  -0.158*** 76.70% 
30-70%  -0.157*** 86.20% 
>70%  -0.131*** 82.80% 
 Overall -0.149*** 82.20% 





There is consensus in the evidence presented across cities that zoning facilitates an improvement 
in the deprivation index as compared to household composition as locally available to the school. 
However, the behavior of “strategically reaching” is potentially more salient in Dunedin and 
Wellington as opposed to Christchurch and Auckland. The difference between home zone 
composition as drawn and the 2-kilometer buffer varies from between -0.09 SMD in Auckland to 
-0.41 SMD in Dunedin. In all cases except for composite schools, the direction is negative 
(which is in the direction of less deprivation in the zone compared to the local buffer). Across 
sectors, primary (-0.16, p<0.001) and secondary (-0.18, p<0.001) schools are driving zone 
discontinuity. These results are consistent with findings in the BDD logistic regression results 
and confirm a relative absence of gerrymandering behaviors at both composite and intermediate 
sector schools. When comparing schools by zone size, I find that larger zones have greater 
discontinuities (a reduction in deprivation SMD by -0.21 for the home zone, p<0.001) when 
compared to their 2km buffers while zones that are smaller in size than their immediate buffer 
have smaller gaps in SMD, yet these gaps remain significant (-0.14 SMD , p<0.001).  
Table I-9 also breaks down SMD’s by three groupings of local (school home zone 
overlap with the 2km buffer). Zones that exhibit less than 70% overlap (as divided into two sub-
categories in the table) have -0.16 SMD differences in deprivation scores, and zones with greater 
overlap (>70%) are showing discontinuity of -0.13 SMD, (p<0.001).  This means there is a slight 
improvement in disparity as zone overlap increases but the discontinuity is still present even in 
the event of overlap. Taken together, the results for zone discontinuity indicate that schools are 




In addition, the commitment to providing local students access clearly varies as is indicated in 
the histogram of overlap and in the results portraying discontinuity. Schools when drawing home 
zones are found to be inconsistently covering local areas while simultaneously designing 
catchment areas that are more advantaged.  
The results above are useful to make the general argument that schools are strategically 
reaching for more privileged households, but a case-by-case analysis of school boundaries is 
necessary to make a fair judgment. I begin with an illustration of zone discontinuity for 
individual schools of the secondary sector. Figure I-15 provides a forest plot for differences in 
SMD’s using the NZ Dep2006 score. Schools are ordered on the plot by school decile. For lower 
decile schools in Auckland, there is greater variation in deprivation score discontinuity compared 
to higher decile schools. Of interest-the magnitude of the discontinuity does not follow as clear a 
relationship with increase in school decile as seen in the forest plots for boundary discontinuity. 
For Christchurch there is a tendency towards zone’s having a neutral composition vis a vis. the 
local area overall, while Wellington and Dunedin appear more cohesively biased against 
deprivation along this dimension. This method of plotting SMD’s renders a clear picture of 
discontinuity and can be helpful for identifying outliers as candidates for further review.  In 
Chapter 4 I leverage the use of school-level SMD’s to provide examples of boundary 
discontinuity and zone discontinuity and local overlap concepts as they come together at the 





Figure I-15  Forest Plot Zone vs. Buffer (NZDep06) Secondary Sector 
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Discontinuity examples and discussion  
Chapter 4 combines the techniques for identifying gerrymandering as identified above to provide 
a system-wide assessment followed by a template for monitoring schools individually for 
selective behaviors. I begin by tallying the evidence for the full sample. Following this, I provide 
10 detailed school profiles which include maps of the school, zone, 2km local buffer, and a host 
of statistics about zone and boundary discontinuity, governance and school details as a template 
by which the New Zealand Ministry might consider assessing schools with enrollment schemes 
for drawing fair and home zones.  
Combining the Evidence 
This next section address the question: How substantive is gerrymandering in the sample 
of state and state-integrated schools examined?  (Lubienski et al., 2013) found that 
approximately half of the 47 state and state-integrated  secondary schools studied in the 
Auckland metropolitan area were more affluent by comparison of median deprivation decile 
scores (p.90). Findings presented above corroborate and expand this earlier work: Schools are 
selecting households based on socioeconomic status and racial characteristics and this appears at 
the boundary, between the zone and the local area and perhaps in both cases. I apply threshold 
criteria
45
 as key benchmarks representing discontinuity effect size and summarize school 
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behavior below.  Using thresholds for Cohen’s d (SMD)’s of small (0.2), medium (0.4) large 
(0.8) and very large (1.3 standard deviations in difference or greater), I provide counts of the 
number and proportions of schools in the analysis which meet each threshold for discontinuity 
across 8 indicators Table I-10.  
Table I-10 Summary Table of Results- How Many Schools? 
 Standardized Mean Difference (d) Frequencies  
 N* 





 Small Medium Large Very Large 
Measure 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3+ 
Income (BDD) 194 101 55 18 52% 27% 
Percent Minority (BDD) 166 88 37 6 45% 24% 
Percent with no Qualifications (BDD) 161 59 24 7 43% 16% 
Percent Movers (BDD) 136 54 18 6 37% 15% 
Percent with No Partner (BDD) 141 54 26 5 38% 15% 
Percent on Public Assistance (BDD) 160 72 22 4 43% 19% 
NZDep Score (BDD) 190 96 41 10 51% 26% 
NZ Dep Score (Zone vs Buffer) 139 46 14 1 37% 12% 
*Is the count of schools meeting the criteria of having d that is at least 0.2, 0.5, 0.8 and 1.3 
Both boundary discontinuity and zone discontinuity are substantively present and prevalent 
across the sample. I find between 37 and 52-percent of schools sample-wide to be exhibiting 
exclusionary behavior in small to large ways across the selected measures (d or SMD >0.2).  For 
an international comparison- I refer to findings on school zone gerrymandering by Richards 
(2014) conducted across schools representing approximately 54% of all U.S. public school 
students using 2009-2010 school year data (p.1132). The author compares actual zones as drawn 
to ‘natural zones’ which are constructed using Voroni polygons, in a similar tactic to explore 




diversity between actual and ‘natural’ zones for her sample and finds that 9-12-percent of 
attendance zones are attributed to reducing diversity on the order of greater than 0.3 standard 
deviations (p.1137).  The case of New Zealand provides evidence that the extent of 
gerrymandering is perhaps more acute than what is seen in the United States by these very 
comparable methods of estimating the problem. Cases of medium to large discrimination are 
occurring in 12 to 26-percent of schools (d> 0.5).   
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Figure I-16 illustrates the overall sample trend for the two types of discontinuities investigated 
using kernel density and the NZDep Index score. The solid lines represent the distribution of 
deprivation scores for meshblocks that are included in zones and at the border (inside).  The 
dotted lines represent deprivation scores for meshblocks that are just outside home zones (but at 
the border) and for the local 2 km buffer surrounding all schools in the sample. The BDD IN 
curve has the lowest deprivation score (the most affluence) followed by the zone curve. The 
curves representing excluded meshblocks and the 2km buffer are decidedly distributed right- 
towards higher levels of deprivation. 
 Mapping Examples of Discontinuity 
A template for profiling schools in order to identify instances of home zone discontinuity 
follows. Each school is mapped with its associated home zone and the school boundary is 
overlaid with pertinent census meshblock information.  Home zones are summarized by their 
standardized mean differences in meshblock characteristics at the boundary, between the zone 
and the 2 km local buffer area surrounding the school and/or both depending upon the situation. 
In addition, school characteristics including BoT composition and information about school 
decile and percent minority composition are included for each example. Of the 372 schools with 
home zones in place at the time of this analysis, 10 schools were selected for illustration here 




scores would facilitate a visual basis for the discussion.
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 Appendix 11 contains the 10 examples 
of home zones where boundary discontinuity, zone discontinuity, and/or a lack of local 
community overlap are present. In one case, the home zone as drawn shows no strong evidence 
of gerrymandering, and is a fairly good example of ‘neutral discontinuity’ and ‘neutral zoning.’ I 
include two examples in the body of this chapter for discussion. In the case of Example 1 (Figure 
I-17) discontinuity across several indicators is present, including minority composition (-1.83 
SMD inside) and income (+1.34 SMD inside) at the boundary. Statistics for discontinuity 
between zone composition versus the 2km local buffer (depicted on the map) include a 
discrepancy of -1.5 SMD in minority composition and -0.79 for NZDep scores favoring 
affluence inside the zone.  The home zone in the example nets-out the densely populated 
minority-majority areas to the southwest while expanding vastly in geography to the north, 
north/east where neighborhoods become increasingly suburban and non-minority. A buffer of 
2km is drawn around the school and the percentage of what is called “local coverage” is 
calculated as the area within the buffer that is populated and covered by the homezone. In the 
case of Example 1, 85-percent of the eligible (populated) area surrounding the school is covered 
by the school home zone, rather than 100-percent which would better align the school with the 
Ministry Enrollment Scheme Guideline of “preserving local access.”  I include the size of the 
homezone for comparison- in this case it is 154 square kilometers- a size which is substantially 
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 These maps were created for the selected 10 examples only. It is possible several more stark examples exist which 
may not be readily identifiable by using SMD results alone. Schools with small or moderate SMD’s in discontinuity 
could display stark differences at the meshblock-level which would have been lost to the process of aggregating 




larger than that of the local 2km buffer.
47
 Arguably an 85-percent coverage rate seems 
reasonable. The 15-percent that is not included would not be an issue had the area excluded been 
statistically similar in composition or had it been logistically or geographically inaccessible to 
the school. However, the 15% of the local area that is excluded consists of a majority of minority 
households contributing to the discrepancy in SMD’s both at the boundary and at the zone-level. 
In addition, the excluded area shows no logistical or geographic constraints for access to the 
school itself. I conclude that the home zone as drawn in Example 1 is a compelling example of 
gerrymandering. 
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 The area of a 2km buffer is approximately 9 square kilometers, but when considering area I net out the non-















For an example of relative home zone and boundary neutrality, see Example 6 as 
depicted in Figure I-18. The school in Example 6 provides a zone with a good degree of local 
overlap- 86-percent of the eligible 2km buffer surrounding the school is contained within the 
zone. The zone does appear to “carve out” an area of less affluence to the southeast, raising some 
flags, but I rely on compositional statistics here for the full assessment: As indicated in the 
statistics provided with the illustration, differences in SMD at the boundary are inclusionary and 
make sense; the included households have more children of school age (+0.60 SMD inside) and 
are more concentrated with minority households (+0.15 SMD). The zone as drawn has a slightly 
higher (+0.01 SMD) minority composition in its meshblocks than the local 2km buffer 
surrounding the school although the zone is also slightly less deprived (-0.14SMD) than the local 
2km buffer. The school zone went into effect in 2004 and between 2007 and 2015 there was a 6-
percentage point growth in percent minorities from 41-percent to 47-percent minority. Additional 
examples of both types of discontinuity plus calculations for local coverage are provided in 
Appendix 11. Maps are detailed by different meshblock characteristics depending on the types of 
discontinuities present and the size of SMD’s at either the zone or the boundary. It is worth 
noting that in some cases both boundary and zone discontinuity exists, while in others it could be 
one or the other.
Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter provide clear evidence that a climate of strategic behavior 




Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin using 2010 home zones as the unit of analysis. The 
implications of strategic behavior and boundary/zone discontinuity have great potential for 
adversely influencing school composition and integration via student body sorting, choice and 
educational opportunities. Part I has revealed a pattern of consistent, pervasive and in many cases 
substantive levels of gerrymandering exists. A key finding is that when controlling for household 
characteristics including income, education levels and unemployment- racial characteristics 
(especially for non- Māori  minorities) and whether or not meshblocks contain high proportions 
of movers and single-parent households rise to the surface as the most consistent determinants of 
discontinuity. In the primary and secondary sectors the problem is more acute, and in areas to the 
south, race becomes less important. The phenomenon of discontinuity is not consistent across 
geographies- cities to the north have greater degrees of standardized mean differences between 
households included (excluded) in school zones by key socioeconomic and racial characteristics.  
In addition, the variability in SMD’s across characteristics is more drastic and pronounced to the 
north- largely a product of the diversity that exists in these areas. When testing for heterogeneity 
between versus within schools for SMD’s it was discovered that Christchurch and Dunedin tend 
to behave more cohesively, in particular Christchurch when zoning for students. Selective 
behavior still exists in these cities to significant degrees, but it is less pronounced especially in 
the case of Christchurch. The role of school decile in influencing the size and variability of SMD 
by racial characteristics and income is confirmed through the meta-analysis and meta regression 
techniques employed. Higher decile schools produce greater tendencies to discriminate against 




The takeaway from these analyses and school-level maps is that it is possible to test for 
and substantiate the presence of discontinuities in home zone design. Ideally- such 
discontinuities should be identified in the planning stages and addressed prior to implementation. 
If schools were required to submit plans for the drawing of home zones for Ministry assessment 
and approval- the chances of disparate impact for the public education system would disperse. 
The combined results illuminate a problem that is both critical to the issue of school choice and 
educational equity. New Zealand’s initiative to devolve the day –to –day management and 
operation of schools and enrollment schemes to the school level proves that schools can and will 
behave in their best interest at the expense of the common good. The results presented in Part 1 
also remind us that to attribute one dimension of potential gerrymandering to issues of natural 
discontinuities and geographic constraints would be an incomplete or misleading means to assess 
the situation. It is entirely possible that zone neutrality exists yet boundary discontinuity exceeds 
large SMD thresholds. For these reasons, an identification strategy is best served by being multi-
dimensional and conducted on a case-by-case basis. I now consider the implications of school 











CHAPTER V    INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand’s public education primary and secondary market, school choice plays 
out as a function of geographic space and constructed space. Where Part I provides empirical 
evidence of school-level strategic behaviors for selecting students, this Part II examines the 
implications of system design on school choice, educational opportunity and school sorting 
outcomes. When school zones are drawn in New Zealand they are not mutually exclusive and 
often overlap. The result is an opportunity compile evidence on school motivations to choose 
students, as areas of overlap in aggregate are hypothesized to differ in household socioeconomic 
characteristics from areas that contain no overlap and/or no home zones at all. Exploring 
education markets from the north to the south of New Zealand, Part II  looks at the same four 
major urban areas of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin using school zone 
boundary data as of September of 2010. Across the sample, 43-percent of state and state-
integrated (public) schools had enrollment schemes in place. The composition of school home 
zone boundaries in aggregate provides evidence about supply-side motivations and the 
determinants of school choice. Findings for Part II corroborate earlier works on the topic in New 
Zealand: A continuum of educational choice and opportunity exists that is commensurate with 
privilege.  
Research Question 
How do decentralized governance and policy arrangements as currently established in 




expand or shrink school choice sets for households? Is the range of school choice consistent 
across urban neighborhoods in New Zealand? How do school zone policies play out in terms of 
limiting access to educational quality? Are schools more or less segregated than neighborhoods? 
What are the consequences for school integration? Taken together, the answers to these questions 
will aim to answer the larger question of how school system institutional arrangements shape 
outcomes in systems of quasi open-enrollment. 
 Chapter 5 begins with a literature review and policy discussion on the interface of 
geographic or neighborhood space and constructed space in the context of open enrollment and 
other systems of school choice. The review will cover policy literature on school zone politics, 
policy and student body integration initiatives abroad as well as from the New Zealand 
perspective. Next, a model of household choice sets is developed in the four urban areas for 
schooling. Using meshblocks populated with children, estimates of household choice are 
provided by school sector using an ordered probit approach. Meshblocks are found to be 
included in 0-15 school enrollment schemes across the sample, meaning households can have 
anywhere from zero to fifteen schools guaranteeing access for all sectors. The range in choice by 
specific school sector are reduced, with households having anywhere from 0 to a maximum of 8 
schools in their choice set depending upon the sector and the city in which the meshblock is 
located. In order to model the determinants of the size of a household’s school choice set, socio-
demographic characteristics and logistical features that may play a role are incorporated. Results 
are reported by city, sector and within city-sectors and a discussion focuses on the variables with 




probabilities of school choice sets are generated and provided in addition to a final analysis of 
choice sets using meshblock racial composition as an example. 
Literature Review 
In recent education policy literature, a retrospective of the school choice and charter school 
movement for New Zealand and other jurisdictions is underway. Scholars are exploring systems 
of choice and many have found evidence revealing an ‘unintended’ outcome of socioeconomic 
and racial segregation through student body sorting in systems of choice.  This finding has in 
turn propelled researchers to explore and identify system design components that attribute to the 
phenomenon. Three main mechanisms by which students are sorted into schools are presented in 
the literature: Market mechanisms; geographic mechanisms; and policy mechanisms.  These 
approaches acknowledge what Henig (2009) refers to as the confluence of two notions of 
educational space – geographic and constructed. The literature provides insight and evidence into 
the implications of heightened socioeconomic and racial stratification for student outcomes. 
Identifying not only the problem, but providing viable systemic design proposals that aim to 
mitigate sorting and segregation remain in the forefront of educational policy research on school 
choice systems. The literature are assisting educational leaders to become better equipped to 
answer the policy question of how choice can be rendered equitable across several types of 
systems and jurisdictions.  




Ironically, the “radical potential” of school choice to mitigate socioeconomic or racial 
patterns of segregation in schooling that are a function of housing patterns and traditional district 
boundaries appears to be obstructed (Ryan & Heise, 2002, p. 2085). A key question is the role of 
geography and of local education markets (LEM) in terms of their structural implications for 
outcomes pertaining to competition and choice (Weitzel & Lubienski, 2010).  Richard 
Kahlenberg in his new book, The Future of School Integration: Socioeconomic Diversity as an 
Education Reform Strategy, (2012) investigates integration as not just a ‘moral imperative,’ but 
as an education reform strategy for the United States (Kahlenberg, 2012, p. 9).  Kahlenlberg 
covers the following dimensions of integration in his book: 1) Evidence on the costs and benefits 
of socioeconomic integration, 2) The political and logistical hurdles to integration, and 3) 
Socioeconomic integration as a policy solution to education reform issues currently being tested 
(charter schools and schools that fail to reach adequate yearly progress). Each of three modes of 
incorporating integration (by race, socioeconomic status, and ability)  are subject to two sides of 
legality in the event of over or under-saturation, which further complicates the assessment of 
diversity in this context. Kahlenberg’s book provides different metrics for assessing integration, 
identifying the dimensions of integration that produce benefits, and the political and logistical 
viability the concept.  
Mantil, Perkins, and Aberger (2012) analyze National Center for Education Statistics 
Common Core of Data (CCD) in school year 2007-2008 across a sample of US states and test for 
the prevalence of segregation by identifying patterns of high-poverty schools. The authors use 




(as a measure of poverty) within a school that exceeds 90% of enrollment defines a “hyper-
segregated school.” Next, the composition of a school compared to the average student in the 
same category within the school captures “exposure” (p.166-167). Taken together, the two 
metrics are applied to a large sample of schools across most of the 48 states, enabling the authors 
to provide a picture of school composition and integration issues in the 2007-2008 school year. 
The authors consider “parental controlled choice” as a means to achieve socioeconomic 
integration, where choice comes with socioeconomic enrollment targets - schools keep the 
proportion of low-income students at or below some threshold (p.184). The logistical 
requirements for the “parental controlled choice” plan as tested include dissecting the 
relationship between a school district’s overall proportion of students in poverty with the number 
of schools available within the district where students can sort (an intra-district choice concept). 
In order to eliminate high-poverty schools within a given district, the authors find  that 
intradistrict-based choice alone cannot eliminate high poverty schools (an estimated 5 percent of 
high-poverty schools can be eliminated) (p.188).   
An additional logistical perspective provided by (Mantil et al., 2012) is the concept of 
interdistrict choice. The authors divide school districts across six states into one of three 
categories (low, border and high-poverty student composition) and examine each state to see if 
interdistrict partnerships could stimulate socioeconomic integration. The national-level study 
does not account for factors such as school distance, politics, school capacity and infrastructure 
(p.195). However, the authors provide a good glimpse of the “fabric” of inter-district disparity 




perspective. Viability of inter-district choice is based on whether or not high and low-poverty 
districts actually border one another (geographic viability) and whether or not the schools in the 
potential receiver district will be able to absorb the migrating poverty students to eliminate high 
poverty schools (demographic viability). The simplified viability approach employed in Mantil et 
al. (2012) is very helpful in detangling two required mechanics of supply and demand. Lower-
poverty school districts need to have both the capacity to receive high-poverty students, and 
these districts need to be in close proximity. In absence of high and low-poverty school districts 
sharing direct borders, is the reality that school districts are very small in area and easily 
partnered in absence of neighboring one another, thanks to urban infrastructure such as public 
transport (p. 203-204).  These findings indicate the need for multi-dimensional considerations of 
the geographic viability of choice as a means to school integration. The authors propose a 
comprehensive solution that includes amalgamating districts when intradistrict-based controlled 
choice requires more schools per district. The approach is invaluable to providing the logistical 
scope and feasibility of achieving integration through programs of school choice given 
constraints of jurisdiction and geographies. 
Authors Willie et al. (2002) also explore the idea of a controlled choice ‘solution’ that 
will help school administrators achieve three goals: 1) The provision of student choice 2) Student 
body diversity and 3) School improvement. The authors describe a system where school 
enrollment zones at the neighborhood level be abolished in order to facilitate the public process 
of overcoming de facto or de jure housing stock segregation patterns by designing school 




families. Variations on controlled choice are in place to varying degrees of implementation and 
success in school systems across the United States.  (Richards, Stroub, & Holme, 2012) consider 
the success of school choice in the No Child Left Behind provisions for students to leave schools 
not reaching AYP (adequate yearly progress) in the United States. The authors find compelling 
evidence that supply restrictions prevent choice in implementation when considering intra-
district choice. The authors argue, “despite NCLB’s emphasis on reducing the achievement gap 
and targeting students in high-poverty and high-minority schools, participation rates for racial 
and ethnic minorities lag behind those for white students” (p.224).  Districts with under-
performing schools (sending schools) are inconveniently located in the very same districts of 
other sending schools. This dovetails with the problem of solving integration at the intradistrict-
level as outlined in Mantil et al (2012). Potential ‘receiver’ schools in underperforming (also 
high-poverty) districts simply lack the capacity to take students from co-located ‘sender schools’ 
because of district homogeneity along these lines. Therefore, the authors also propose 
interdistrict choice as a potential solution to the “de facto limitation” of supply of choices within 
school districts under AYP and NCLB (p.227).  
 Reardon and Yun (2002) provide discussion regarding district size in the context of 
school choice outcomes in their study of 328 metropolitan areas in the United States. The authors 
examine school segregation and exposure rates for students by race across public and private 
sectors and recommend district and metropolitan area-level studies of vouchers and choice as 
necessary in order to assess the logistical feasibility of integration (p. 28). In all examples, the 




integration is valued by the New Zealand education system as a whole, there is much to learn 
from the literature on how to design choice systems in the presence of geographic and logistical 
constraints. 
Other Determinants of Choice 
Many papers have found evidence that systems of school choice have exacerbated aspects 
of school segregation by ability, race and socioeconomic status (Koedel, Betts, Rice, & Zau, 
2009; Lubienski & Gulosino, 2007; Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009; Saporito & Sohoni, 
2007). Lubienski et al. (2009) and Lubienski and Gulosino (2007) have explored the educational 
landscape with regards to charter school location and phenomenon surrounding the opening and 
closing of schools and find schools acting in a manner that exacerbates segregation. Availability 
of choice is found to be associated with socioeconomic characteristics of households in the 
United States (Tice et al, 2006) and several studies seek to explain this phenomenon using a 
demand-side approach. For example, a study on the choice sets of parents by (Bell, 2009) 
explores the question; “What processes do parents use to construct (those) choice sets?” (p.192). 
Bell’s approach is to decipher the thought processes of parents using the lenses of bounded 
rationality and social capital. In this sense, a parent’s choice set is based upon all available 
opportunities (schools where the parent can enroll their child) but self-restricted to the actual 
schools the parent considers. This approach reveals some of the demand-side restraints to choice 
sets. The author found disparity in the quality of choice sets by parent socioeconomic status. 




failing, non-selective and no tuition schools, while parents with better search capacity (better 
social networks, a history of customary enrollment into better schools) had choice sets with 
better quality schools (p.203).  In addition, behavioral variations were vital in determining choice 
sets. ‘No search’, ‘closed search’ and ‘open searches’ performed by the 48 parents in her sample 
produced on average choice sets containing 1-2, 3.4 and 7.5 schools respectively (pp.198-199). 
Given the sample city had nearly 900 schools and only 10 schools were selected as sources for 
participating parents in the survey, it is possible that choice sets as identified were impeded by 
geographic factors or other barriers to choice that were not addressed in the analysis. Bell also 
identified choice sets by noting when a particular school was mentioned during one of three 
interviews with each parent (p.197). This procedure may have upwardly-biased the size of the 
choice set through the effects of action research- where subjects by their line of questioning are 
educated (and perhaps induced to search).   
Bell’s findings provide a valuable demand-side perspective of choice set content/size by 
considering the role of parent socioeconomic capital in the process. Bell’s work tells us that 
socioeconomic status limits the ability of parents to tap into larger choice sets. Lauen (2009) 
estimates the effect of school choice participation on whether or not students graduate on time 
for Chicago’s array of school choice programs. The study reveals much about the determinants 
of students who are exercising choice.  Participation in school choice- expressed as having the 
propensity to choose a school other than the one to which the student is assigned- is linked to 
student socio-demographic characteristics using propensity score matching methods. ‘Non-




and transient living in communities with few options; ‘choosers’ are identified as coming from 
more highly educated parents, as having participated in choice in the past and as living in 
affluent communities (p.191). The method used by the author gives a more robust estimate of the 
effect of having exercised choice. Students who were able to exercise choice had an 
unconditional on-time graduation propensity that was over 11-percentage points higher than 
those students who did not exercise choice (p.187). When controlling for student socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics, the propensity to complete on time was an increase of four 
percentage points. What is missing in these approaches are supply-side contributing factors. 
Low-income parents had smaller choice sets – and the explanation is presented as endogenous to 
the parents, rather than to some other features of the system as a whole. Part I focused on the 
policy environment of enrollment schemes and market incentives in shaping individual school 
behavior to choose students. We know that household socioeconomic status and racial 
composition factor into school preferences for students, but how does this create or limit 
educational choice and opportunity? 
CHAPTER VI    A MODEL OF HOUSEHOLD CHOICE 
This portion of the analysis refers to “the presence of opportunities” – or the supply-side of 
the choice-set that is determined not by parents but by schools guaranteeing the right to 
enrollment at the school through the drawing of home zones. Supply-side factors in determining 
choice sets are not well understood and worth investigating (Loeb et al., 2011; Lubienski et al., 




decile rank suggests a continuum of choice by school socioeconomic status exists in New 
Zealand (Ladd & Fiske, 2001; Lubienski et al., 2013; Pearce & Gordon, 2005; Thomson, 2010). 
A single household in a given metropolitan area can be “captured” by as many schools as are 
willing to include (it) within their home zone(s). Schools seek students (households) who can 
contribute to the school (via fees and donations and pedigree) and whose children are relatively 
cheap to educate. Higher socioeconomic status students are sought after in order to maximize 
enrollment by anticipating parental preferences for schools with ‘peer effects’ (which are best 
proxied by higher decile student bodies). Schools become over/under subscribed in equilibrium, 
and student body composition polarizes on indicators of socioeconomic status (including race). It 
is predicted that New Zealand’s system of quasi open-enrollment produces a two-tiered system 
of school choice and opportunity contingent upon household socioeconomic status 
characteristics.   
Household Choice Analytic Strategy 
I estimate the determinants of the size of a “school choice set” using an ordered probit 
approach. This model utilizes the full sample of households in the four urban areas rather than 
households at the boundaries of enrollment zones as employed in the BDD model for Part I. The 
hypothesis is that the number of choices available to a given household is a function of the 
characteristics of the household (proxied by census meshblock) controlling for geographic and 
market factors. Each meshblock that was populated with school-aged children in 2006 in 




any and all school home zones claiming it using ArcGIS. Through the spatial join process, 
meshblocks receive a count of the number of schools that are reserving rites of access to their 
residents by virtue of being contained inside a zone boundary.  In a given metropolitan area, 
under the system of open enrollment, any school without an enrollment scheme (having no 
catchment area) is technically available to each household on a first come, first serve basis. 
Therefore the household choice set as modeled here does not contain the metropolitan area’s 
open (non-enrollment scheme) schools .  The discreet dependent variable constitutes a given 
residential location’s “choice set” for schools that are operating enrollment schemes. Table II-19 
in Appendix 12 provides details about the distribution of the dependent variable without 
disaggregating choices by sector. 
 Descriptive Results 
Table II-1 divides meshblocks into “small” (0-3 schools available) and “large” (4-15 
schools available) choice set groups and reports a selection of meshblock descriptive 
characteristics for the two groupings. School sectors are aggregated for this table to provide a 
macro-level view of the landscape. This means that any and all schools guaranteeing access 
despite their sector are counted into the two groupings. A meshblock with 0 choices has no 
membership in any home zone. Similarly- a meshblock with 4 choices in this grouping could 
have 2 primary schools and 2 secondary school zones in its choice set, but the overall tally equals 




underlying characteristics between households that have been zoned in frequently versus those 
that are either excluded or zoned in relatively less frequently.  
Across all characteristics except the number of bedrooms per household, statistically 
significant differences exist between meshblocks with large versus small-sized choice sets (Table 
II-1). Standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d) are included and enable differences to be more 
readily substantiated between the two groups. The first finding that is worth noting is that 
meshblocks with larger choice sets have statistically significantly fewer people in them (-.10 
standard deviations, p<0.001) and are proportionally filled with fewer children (-.50 standard 
deviations, p<0.001). This is completely counter-intuitive to the rationale that would seem to 
justify schools deciding to include (exclude) households. Across characteristics, meshblocks with 
larger choice sets are more advantaged than those with smaller choice sets. Using threshold 
criteria
48
 for medium effect size (>0.4 d), the characteristics that stand out the most include the 
following: Relative to meshblocks with small choice sets, meshblocks with larger choice sets 
have lower proportions of residents on public assistance (-0.48, p<0.001), without school 
qualifications (-0.59, p<0.001), and statistically significantly lower proportions of  Māori  and 
Pasifika populations(-0.71 and -0.70, p<0.001). Meshblocks with larger choice sets also have 
statistically significantly larger proportions of residents that are non-religious (0.42, p<0.001). In 
Part I the percentage of households that were movers and not partnered were found to be 
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statistically significantly associated with meshblocks that were zoned out at the boundary by 
schools. When considering the entire metropolitan sample the relationship does not hold- 
meshblocks with more choices have greater proportions of movers and households that are un-





Table II-1 - Household Choice descriptive statistics 
Descriptive Statistics for Meshblocks Across all 4 Metro Areas- Household Choice Sets 
 (Areas of Large Choice Sets vs. Areas of Small Choice Sets) 
Measure 
CHOICE2=0 
MB is claimed 
by 0-3 home 
zones 
CHOICE2=1 
MB is claimed 




 M SD M SD d 
Pop06*** 129.09 74.13 121.57 76.18 -0.10 
Pop growth (10 yr)  16.71 48.33 18.15 56.42 0.03 
Pop u19 (2006)*** 42.37 26.96 34.96 25.42 -0.28 
Pop under age 19 (2006) (percent)*** 0.31 0.09 0.26 0.09 -0.50 
Median family income 2006*** $62,781  20,585  71,125  21,217  0.40 
Public assistance count (private occupied)*** 11.08 9.06 7.92 7.26 -0.38 
Public assistance percent (private occupied)*** 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.12 -0.48 
Percent Unemployed*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.22 
Blue collar workers (count)*** 31.39 17.09 29.66 17.45 -0.10 
Blue collar workers (percent)*** 0.43 0.18 0.38 0.18 -0.28 
No Educational qualifications (count)*** 22.71 15.32 16.60 13.61 -0.42 
No Educational qualifications (percent)*** 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.10 -0.59 
Owner-occupied households*** 27.30 17.76 29.48 18.82 0.12 
Owner-occupied households (percent)*** 0.59 0.22 0.63 0.22 0.15 
Bedrooms (mean)  3.06 0.49 3.05 0.62 -0.01 
Movers (count) (in res less than 5 yrs)** 70.30 46.50 72.79 52.06 0.05 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs)*** 0.52 0.14 0.56 0.16 0.28 
No-partner (count)*** 37.53 22.36 40.07 30.69 0.10 
Household head is un-partnered (percent)*** 0.37 0.11 0.39 0.13 0.13 
Pop EU (percent)*** 0.59 0.23 0.70 0.16 0.56 
Pop  Māori  (percent)*** 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.07 -0.71 
Pop Pacifica (percent)*** 0.16 0.21 0.04 0.08 -0.70 
Pop Asian (percent)*** 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.07 
Pop Middle Eastern/Latin American/African(%)* 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.03 
Pop other (percent)*** 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.36 
Religion none (percent)*** 0.30 0.12 0.35 0.11 0.42 






In a model of household choice sets, the probability that a given meshblock will have one 
additional school in its choice set will be determined by its socioeconomic characteristics 
controlling for logistical/market factors. An ordered probit model is appropriate to model a 
dependent variable such as a school choice set because of its ordered and finite properties. In the 
case of Auckland, the dependent variable can take on fifteen ordered values: 
Equation II-1 






            
              




              
  
Where γ is the cutpoint indicating which discreet category of choice the latent variable falls into. 
Using the latent model for probit we have:   
Equation II-2 
  
                        
Where   is the number of school choices (choice set) for a resident living in meshblock i as 
represented by the number of school zones that intersect the block, guaranteeing enrollment. X is 
a vector of census meshblock characteristics, including the proportion of school –aged children 
residing in the meshblock and a set of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics including 




reference group.  The vector, G, represents the number and capacity of same-sector open 
enrollment schools within a 2-km radius of the meshblock. The two variables are calculated 
using a process of buffering each meshblock by a radius of 2 kilometers and then employing the 
spatial join technique using ArcGIS.  These measures are included to account for the enrollment 
scheme directive that mandates schools acknowledge one another and school capacity when 
drawing home zone boundaries- a conflicting policy with the Ministry directive that home zones 
also preserve “local access” which was discussed in Part I. It is hypothesized that the presence of 
a nearby school without a scheme will have a negative impact on a meshblock’s probability of 
being included in a homezone of a school of the same sector: Schools deploying enrollment 
schemes can avoid providing local access by relying on nearby open schools to account for 
providing seats to un-wanted local households. In order to also account for enrollment capacity- 
the number of seats at the neighboring same-sector school are also included as a separate 
variable. This is operationalized as the sum of same-sector seats for all schools within a 2 km 
(walking distance) radius of the meshblock. The number of choices available to a given 
meshblock is predicted to be a function of market saturation for the same sector. As the number 
of open school seats in the neighborhood increases, the probability of being included in a 
homezone should decrease. An indicator variable, c for the city in which the meshblock is 
located is included to account for city fixed effects, and    is the error term where         
  . 
Auckland is the reference group, and the constant is not included in the output, as indicators for 
three of the four cities are included in the equation.  Robust standard errors are employed for the 












Table II-2 Household Choice Model- All Sectors, Ordered Probit 
 All  Primary  Intermediate Secondary Composite 
Pop density 2km radius (1,000's) 0.083*** (8.08) 0.180*** (9.48) 1.242*** (28.76) 0.004 (0.24) 3.191*** (8.60) 
Pop u19 (2006) (10's) 0.050*** (9.38) 0.107*** (9.83) 0.068** (2.92) 0.036*** (3.88) 0.180 (1.71) 
Pop u19 (MB % change 10yr) 0.023*** (4.60) 0.045*** (4.84) 0.059** (2.65) 0.017 (1.87) -0.218** (-2.69) 
Median family inc 2006 (log) 0.119*** (14.32) 0.187*** (11.50) 0.236*** (5.93) 0.160*** (10.09) 0.055 (0.43) 
% Unemployed -0.009 (-1.70) -0.015 (-1.41) -0.071** (-2.83) -0.008 (-0.81) 0.068 (0.89) 
Blue collar workers (%) -0.042*** (-6.49) -0.060*** (-4.60) -0.119*** (-3.83) -0.037** (-3.03) 0.022 (0.23) 
Edu-college or higher (%) 0.115*** (15.43) 0.065*** (4.52) -0.062 (-1.77) 0.316*** (21.31) 1.044*** (8.29) 
Owner-occupied hh’s (%) -0.080*** (-10.42) -0.049** (-3.16) -0.013 (-0.35) -0.200*** (-13.93) -0.114 (-0.97) 
Bedrooms (mean) 0.030*** (5.45) 0.046*** (4.21) -0.014 (-0.55) 0.051*** (4.80) 0.151 (1.72) 
Movers (%) (<5yr in res) -0.013* (-2.32) 0.011 (1.05) -0.141*** (-5.55) -0.001 (-0.14) -0.137 (-1.71) 
No-Partner (%) 0.028*** (4.91) 0.012 (1.09) 0.196*** (7.20) 0.090*** (8.33) 0.309*** (3.82) 
Pop  Māori  (%) -0.100*** (-15.90) -0.058*** (-4.60) -0.243*** (-7.32) -0.171*** (-14.40) -0.050 (-0.41) 
Pop Pacifica (%) -0.059*** (-7.51) -0.132*** (-7.88) -0.205*** (-5.01) -0.049** (-3.20) 1.726*** (10.50) 
Pop Asian (%) 0.062*** (9.53) -0.015 (-1.19) 0.357*** (11.74) 0.108*** (8.99) -0.033 (-0.24) 
Pop MELAA (%) -0.017*** (-3.49) -0.063*** (-6.51) -0.056* (-2.54) 0.015 (1.74) -0.377*** (-3.71) 
Pop other (%) -0.025*** (-4.20) -0.004 (-0.30) -0.049 (-1.76) -0.054*** (-4.77) -0.294*** (-3.66) 
Religion none (%) -0.042*** (-7.20) -0.132*** (-11.56) -0.171*** (-6.23) -0.034** (-2.92) -0.160 (-1.78) 
Wellington 0.148*** (19.67) -0.080*** (-5.11) 0.656*** (18.65) 0.421*** (30.10) -1.104*** (-3.38) 
Christchurch 0.407*** (48.48) 0.792*** (49.34) 0.631*** (17.95) 0.168*** (11.51) 8.036*** (17.59) 
Dunedin 0.335*** (58.03) 0.202*** (17.94) 0.317*** (11.97) 0.608*** (56.80) 5.414*** (18.79) 
Sum open schools^ -0.027** (-2.76) -0.043* (-2.12) -0.198*** (-4.05) 0.233*** (12.13) 1.501*** (12.19) 
Sum open enrollments^ 0.056*** (6.25) -0.161*** (-8.01) -0.490*** (-9.76) -0.248*** (-12.66) -2.539*** (-18.90) 
Observations 12,064  12,064  12,064  12,064  12,064  
r2_mf 0.162  0.205  0.176  0.202  0.745  
r2_mfadj 0.160  0.204  0.174  0.200  0.741  
Standardized beta coefficients; z statistics in parentheses    * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




The ordered probit regression is conducted for all sectors and then by primary, 
intermediate, secondary and composite sector for the sample. Coefficients are reported in 
standardized beta format for ease of comparison across characteristics for each sector. Model fit 
parameters of r-squared and adjusted r-squared are included with the outputs of each regression. 
Interpretation of coefficients in the probit regression results presented in Table II-2 are as 
follows: A one-standard deviation increase in each characteristic’s value results in a b standard 
deviation increase (decrease) in the predicted probit index. The coefficient for each city is 
interpreted to mean that the change from 0 to 1 increases (decreases) the predicted probit index 
by b standard deviations. When looking across sectors, the standardized beta approach enables us 
to see which characteristics drive the size of the choice set.  
Across school sectors and overall, key characteristics have persistent positive or negative 
associations with an increase in the size of the choice set. The largest betas are associated with 
the location of the meshblock followed by the population and market/geography indicators. 
Compared to Auckland, meshblocks in other cities have higher probabilities of additional 
choices. When considering all sectors together, meshblocks located in Christchurch see a .4 
standard deviation increase in the predicted probit index followed by Dunedin (0.33) and 
Wellington (0.15)  relative to Auckland (p<0.001). Higher population density and the number of 
children in the meshblock contribute positively to the probability of additional choices across 
sectors. The presence of open schools within 2 km have different effects on choice by sector- for 
the younger sectors, open schools decrease the probability of an added choice in the choice set- 




increases the probability of additional choice. Increased enrollment capacity at neighboring open 
schools of the same sector has a negative association with choice across sectors.  
Moving to household characteristics for all sectors, percent  Māori , and percent Pasifika 
(except in the composite sector) are consistently negatively associated with the predicted 
probability index for choice, relative to the reference group (percent European descent). Other 
racial categories vary between positive and negative associations depending upon the sector. 
Median family income (except in the case of the composite sector) and percent with college 
education (except in the case of choice for the intermediate sector) are consistently statistically 
significantly and positively associated with choice. Increases in percent unemployed and percent 
blue collar are associated with decrease in choice for all sectors except the composite sector. 
Less intuitive findings include the following: Increases in the proportion of religious households 
is consistently negatively associated with choice across sectors, while the percent with no partner 
is positively associated across sectors.  
This next section discuss results within sectors. When holding logistical and market 
controls constant, the household characteristics that have the largest association with choice for 
primary schools are income (+0.19, p<0.001), percent Pasifika (-0.13, p<0.001) and percent non-
religious (-0.13, p<0.001). For intermediate schools, percent Asian is positively associated with 
increasing choice sets (+.36, p<0.001) but percent  Māori  and percent Pasifika decrease 
household choice sets for this sector (-0.24 and -0.21 respectively, p<0.001). Income (+0.24) and 
percent with no partner (+.19) factor in positively to choice set size in the intermediate sector, 




secondary sector, percent with college or higher has the largest association (+.32, p<0.001) while 
percent  Māori  has the largest negative association with choice set size (-0.17, p<0.001). Finally, 
for composite school choice, the largest positive association comes from percent Pasifika (+1.72) 
– which speaks to the unique market composite schools cater to. Characteristics negatively 





Table II-3 Predicted Probabilities of School Choice- School Sector (All Cities) 
 All Primary Intermediate Secondary Composite 
Pred 0 0.0116*** 0.155*** 0.585*** 0.113*** 1.000*** 
 (0.000778) (0.00334) (0.00486) (0.00311) (0.00000622) 
Pred1 0.0723*** 0.522*** 0.402*** 0.419*** 0.00000844*** 
 (0.00337) (0.00623) (0.000949) (0.00673) (5.48e-15) 
Pred2 0.205*** 0.269*** 0.0125*** 0.367*** 6.77e-15*** 
 (0.00519) (0.00219) (0.0000186) (0.00327) (6.04e-19) 
Pred3 0.269*** 0.0467*** 0.0000361 0.0874*** 2.40e-19 
 (0.00518) (0.000487) (0.0000187) (0.000830) (7.41e-19) 
Pred4 0.217*** 0.00624***  0.0132***  
 (0.00389) (0.000108)  (0.0000703)  
Pred5 0.146*** 0.000928***  0.000468***  
 (0.00226) (0.0000213)  (0.00000109)  
Pred6 0.0582*** 0.000124***  0.00000156  
 (0.000948) (0.00000235)  (0.00000115)  
Pred7 0.0172*** 0.00000600***    
 (0.000334) (6.42e-08)    
Pred8 0.00430*** 3.97e-08    
 (0.0000952) (6.55e-08)    
Pred9 0.000687***     
 (0.0000317)     
Pred10 0.000210***     
 (0.00000964)     
Pred11 0.0000345***     
 (0.00000330)     
Pred12 0.0000105***     
 (0.000000902)     
Pred13 0.00000144***     
 (0.000000250)     
Pred14 0.000000287***     
 (6.86e-08)     
Pred15 5.02e-08     
 (8.04e-08)     
N 12064 12064 12064 12064 12064 





When household characteristics are held at their mean in the model, it is possible to predict 
probabilities for each additional choice holding fewer choices constant. The predicted 





Table II-3. Results are presented by school sector aggregated across cities. Across all sectors, the 
probability of being included in zero home zones is 0.011 (p<0.001). When considering sectors 
separately, the probability of a household not being included in any secondary school home 
zones is .113 (p< 0.001),  in the case of the primary sector, the probability jumps to .155 
(p<0.001), for intermediate schools probabilities are .585 (p<0.001) and in the case of composite 
schools the probability is virtually certain (~1.0, p<0.001). The probabilities of having zero 
schools by sector are likely driven by the range of choice set sizes. Choice sets are largest in the 
primary sector and secondary sectors (between 0 and 8 for primary schools and 0 and 6 for 
secondary schools).  Households across the four metropolitan areas can expect between 0 and 3 
intermediate and composite schools in their choice sets for those sectors. Figure II-1 provides a 





Figure II-1 Predicted Probabilities for School Choice Sets- Sector Level 
Further breakdowns of choice results by city and sector are available in Appendix 13.  
Much variation in choice by city is confirmed to exist. For the primary sector- the predicted 
probability of having three primary schools in a choice set is .31 for meshblocks located in 
Christchurch but just 0.002 for meshblocks located in Wellington (Appendix 13, Table II-20). 
Further, the long tail as seen in the graph for all cities for the primary sector is attributable to 
Christchurch- which has a predicted probability for up to 8 primary schools of 0.00008 (not 
significant) and 0.0028 (p<0.001) for 7 schools. This means that meshblocks located in 
Christchurch can expect a .3-percent chance of having 7 primary schools guaranteeing rights of 
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having three secondary schools in a choice set range from a high of .36 (p<0.001) in Dunedin 
and .29 for Wellington (p<0.001) to a low of 0.03(p<0.001) in Auckland and Christchurch 
(Appendix 13, Table II-21).  
 The functionality of predicted probabilities can be extended in another useful way for the 
purpose of illustrating how key characteristics can contribute to choice. Variables that are 
inputted into a regression can be set to a given value and the predicted probability for the ordered 
outcome variable can be computed based upon the value entered while holding all other 
predictors at their mean values. I calculate predicted probabilities for two variables- percent  
Māori  population and percent Pasifika population for further discussion.  By setting the two 
predictors to values of 0 and 0.9 respectively, I am able to determine predicted probabilities for 
meshblocks for each choice set size and provide the results by primary and secondary sector in 
Appendix 12, Table II-22. For the primary sector, I find that meshblocks with 0-percent  Māori  
and 0-percent Pasifika populations have predicted probabilities for having zero primary schools 
of .14. When adjusting the proportion of the meshblock to become 90-percent  Māori  or 90-
percent Pasifika population, the probabilities for having zero primary schools increase to .33 and 
.38 respectively. The predicted probability of having no choice effectively more than doubles. 
For the secondary sector, the discrepancy is even greater. Meshblocks containing zero percent  
Māori  and Pasifika residents have .08 and .11 percent probabilities of no secondary schools in 
their choice sets respectively. When considering meshblocks with 90-percent  Māori  




meshblocks with 90-percent Pasifika residents, the predicted probability of having zero 
secondary schools increases less substantively- to .17.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
When modeling an ordered dependent variable, two types of regression models are 
appropriate- ordered probit and ordered logit. I completed the exercise using both types of 
models and predicted values are plotted against each other in Appendix 14, Figure II-19. The two 
specifications produce almost identical predicted values and model fit values. Full regression 
results for the household choice model using ordered logit are available in Appendix 14, Table 
II-23. Coefficients on characteristics from the ordered logistic regressions are presented as 
standardized betas and are of consistently of greater magnitude than the coefficients produced in 
the ordered probit models. The coefficients for the ordered logistic results are approximately 




CHAPTER VII     ACCESS TO QUALITY SCHOOLS 
We know from the analysis above that the size of a household’s school choice set is 
associated with household socioeconomic status and racial characteristics controlling for 
location, population and market characteristics. But what about the quality of the schools in a 
given choice set? To be fair, there may be minimal educational opportunity implications to 
having few or no home zones claiming a household in a given metro area. Perhaps the open 
schools that are available to such a household have viable educational performance that makes 
zone membership less important in the grand scheme of public primary and secondary education 
in New Zealand. Using the technique of propensity score matching Lauen (2009)compares 
students with similar propensities to exercise school choice in Chicago in conditions where some 
moved into an alternate school and others remained in their assigned school for the effect of 
choice on student on-time graduation rates. Where market theory has heavily relied on the notion 
that choice benefits the most disadvantaged students, Lauen (2009) finds no supporting evidence 
of an added benefit ; the intercept between low, middle and high  poverty schools for on-time 
graduation are not significant (p.196). Instead, Lauen (2009) found the effect of choice on 
propensity to graduate on time to become more pronounced for those students who reside in low-
poverty (affluent) areas- an indication that the quality of options available to students who have 
choice also matters. The author emphasizes a key interpretation of these findings is that choice 




Gibson and Boe-Gibson (2014) analyze the relationship between “schooling opportunity 
sets” and the sale prices of houses in Christchurch. The authors use the percentage of students 
passing NCEA Level 3 examinations at each school for 14 state secondary schools and create a 
metric for defining schooling opportunity sets that provides a simple yet valuable method for 
estimating educational opportunity at the census meshblock-level. Meshblocks are identified as 
belonging to secondary enrollment schemes and assigned schooling opportunity sets based on 
zone membership. The authors include non-enrollment scheme schools in their count of 
opportunities and utilize straight-line inverse distance weights between schools and meshblocks 
to generate weighted average NCEA pass rates for each meshblock (p.10).  
The method enables the estimation of choice sets contingent upon both distance and 
school quality, and provides a compelling metric by which schooling opportunities can be shown 
to vary across households as a function of household location.  The authors employ a partial 
equilibrium approach and estimate educational opportunity counterfactuals for each meshblock 
by simulating the removal of home zones. With the removal of home zones, the authors illustrate 
that meshblocks in close proximity can have dramatically different schooling opportunity sets. 
The authors find that households located in meshblocks just 750 meters apart are subject to 
substantial variation in access to NCEA Level 3 pass rates (p.10). The method provides a clear 
way to see the effect of school home zone boundaries and geographic proximity on opportunity. 
The authors do not expand upon the method for the purpose of identifying the role of household 




as estimated and assigned are instead used as a predictor in a model of dwelling sales prices for 
the region.  
The authors found evidence that a positive relationship between schooling opportunity 
and housing prices exists. The “extent of ‘selection by mortgage’ into better performing New 
Zealand schools is substantial and may exceed what is found in other countries” (p.15). This 
implies educational opportunity is derived by household movement into school zones- a different 
mechanism than the supply-side dynamics of schools having the ability to draw their own zones. 
The presence of some home zones has been discontinuous in space and time due to political 
cycles while only very recently stabilizing (see Appendix 7 for a breakdown of home zone tenure 
by city). I argue that educational opportunity sets as currently arranged are still in their infancy:  
Variation in opportunity is largely an artifact of the decisions to include (exclude) households as 
made by schools. As time passes, the demand-side dynamic via household movement will catch 
up and possibly exceed what is the initial supply-side dynamic to create an equilibrium outcome 
for schooling opportunity sets.  
Schooling Opportunity Sets (SOS) 
In order to include a measure of schooling opportunity in this analysis, I first calculate the 






 Meshblocks are identified as being members in any and all homezones in which their 
geography intersected (was contained or partially contained within) a school homezone and 
assigned a unique meshblock-school ID (MB_ID) to correspond with that membership. In 
addition, each meshblock was assigned a MB_ID for all schools in the metropolitan area that did 
not contain homezones- as all schools without home zones were considered to be a component of 
all household choice sets within each metropolitan area. Following Gibson and Boe-Gibson 
(2014), each meshblock was assigned an inverse distance to each open and zoned school with 
which it was affiliated which was then normalized by the sum of all inverse distances for all 
schools in the opportunity set under consideration.  
Information about school performance is currently available at both the school-level as 
well as in aggregate by gender, ethnicity, region and territorial authority.
50
 Education Counts 
provides select metrics of school quality including data for three indicators of student success 
upon exit from secondary schools.
51
 For primary, contributing and intermediate schools spanning 
years 1-7, the percentage of students achieving National Standards in mathematics, reading and 
writing were averaged for a single school-level score.  In the case of secondary schools, the 
percentage of students achieving NCEA level II or above was used (see Appendix 15 Table II-25 
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 Ideally the calculation of distance would be based on a network analysis using roadways that would yield either 
travel time or road distances. 
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for technical notes from the Ministry of Education about school leavers). Across all schools in 
the meshblock’s choice set (open plus zoned schools) the associated performance indicators were 
weighted and then summed to generate a single numeric estimate of each meshblock’s schooling 
opportunity set (SOS): 
Equation II-3 
        
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
      
    
    




 is the individual performance indicator for each school, i; di is the inverse distance of 
the meshblock centroid to school i and Dmbx is the sum of di…n for meshblock x.  SOSmbx is the 
resulting inverse-distance weighted schooling opportunity set for each meshblock, x.  
Across the 886 state and state-integrated schools in the sample, 75 schools had either 
partially missing or no data on school achievement in 2013 (see Appendix 15, Table II-26). In 
order to address this issue, I turned to the literature and performance data for all schools. 
Education Counts releases decile-level data for the percent of students achieving the New 
Zealand National Qualifications Framework (NFQ) at level 2 or level 3 and above. The percent 
of students leaving school with the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) at 
Level 2 or above are also available. Other school leaving data include the percentage of students 
finishing secondary school with the university entrance standard achieved. Figure II-2 shows the 
relationship between school decile and the proportion of students with NCEA Level 2 and 




and the proportion of students leaving school with qualifications is consistent and positive across 
the three cohorts. The proportion of students meeting standards has grown the most for lower 
decile schools between 2009 and 2013. As student bodies increase in affluence, higher rates of 
qualifications are achieved  
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The Ministry also provides data pertaining to student disruptive behavior.
52
 School 
socioeconomic status (as indicated by quintile below) is linked to increased rates of students 
being stood down, suspended, expelled or excluded Figure II-3.  
 
 
Figure II-3 Age- Standardized rates of School Disruption by School Quintile (2013)  
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In one of the earliest analyses of school quality within the context of the reforms brought 
on by the Education Reform Act (Tomorrow’s Schools), E. B. Fiske and H. F. Ladd (2000) 
examined urban results for school certificates and bursary results using 1996 data. The authors 
tabulate results by school decile and draw the conclusion that performance is correlated to school 
student body socioeconomic status. As evidenced in the literature and Education Counts 
statistics, school decile is correlated with measures of school performance. In order to assign 
those schools missing data for the analysis a performance metric, I therefore utilized the 
connection between school decile and performance as established. Each school with missing 
performance information was assigned the national average performance indicator for all schools 
in its respective decile using 2013 performance data. 
Analytic Results 
In order to maximize the discussion on how school boundary design can influence both 
access to schools (choice) and also access to school quality, I present a graphical comparison of 
descriptive statistics (Figure II-4). Standardized difference (Cohen’s d) values were previously 
calculated for households with greater than three schools in aggregate in their choice set versus 
households with 0-3 choices (Table II-1). Using these same household characteristics I next 
calculate d between Schooling Opportunity Sets (SOS) that had 75-percent or greater rates of 
students meeting national standards or school qualifications for the primary and secondary 
sectors respectively versus those who had less than 75-percent of students achieving the results 




addition to d’s between choice set groupings and provides insight into the continuation of the 
phenomenon of boundary impact. By viewing the d’s together, it is clear that meshblocks with 
more schools to choose from have the same characteristics as meshblocks that have access to 
higher quality schools. These meshblocks are substantively more affluent, composed of more 
owner occupied households are much more likely to be of European descent. Across most 
characteristics, there are greater Cohen’s d absolute values at both extremes for school quality 
than there are for household choice set size. This suggests inequalities in households become 









Figure II-4 Comparison of Cohen's d: Select household characteristics for households with more (less) school choice and quality 
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Next, I disaggregate schools into primary (includes composite and intermediate schools) and 
secondary sector groupings for two separate regression analyses. The metric for quality as 
utilized here was differently distributed between the two groups which would have skewed the 
analysis had these schools been analyzed in aggregate (Figure II-5). 
 
Figure II-5 Histogram of School Quality by Sector 
 
Table II-4 Schooling Opportunity Sets (Primary & Secondary Groups) 
Schooling 
Opportunity Set 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Primary (SOS_p) 16880 0.715603 0.04282 0.444617 0.882155 
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For the primary sector, a given household (meshblock) could expect a primary sector opportunity 
set consisting of a low of 0.44 to a high of 0.88 with a mean of 0.71 (Table II-4). This is 
interpreted as the inverse distance weighted average score for National Standards in 
mathematics, reading and writing for all primary sector group schools to which the inhabitants of 
that meshblock were eligible to attend. For the secondary sector grouping the opportunity set is 
interpreted as the inverse distance weighted average of students meeting or exceeding NCEA 
Level II requirements for all schools in the meshblock’s choice set. Because schooling 
opportunity sets are operationalized as percentages with values falling between 0 and 1, I employ 
the generalized linear model (GLM) regression using the logit link and binomial family with 
robust standard errors: 
Equation II-4   
                            
 
 Where the dependent variable, SOSx is the inverse-distance weighted schooling opportunity set 
for each meshblock, x. The model incorporates a vector, x of household characteristics, market 
and geographic factors. Household characteristics include meshblock income, education, 
unemployment, household mobility, ownership, and racial composition as well as controls for 
meshblock school –aged population and population density. Market factors that may explain the 
SOS such as the number of scheme schools in the same sector (choice) and the influence of 
competition through the presence of nearby private schools as well as the geographic area of the 
meshblock are also included. I rely on established evidence that open enrollment policy plays out 




group). Results including calculations for model fit (Akaike’s Information Criterion [AIC] and 
Bayesian Information Criterion [BIC]) are reported in  
 Table II-5. 
 Table II-5 Schooling Opportunity Set Analytic Results 
 Primary SOS  Secondary SOS 
main     
# Home Zones claiming MB 0.996** (-3.05) 1.081*** (40.02) 
Sum private schools w/in 2km  0.995*** (-6.62) 1.005*** (4.35) 
km2 1.000* (-2.31) 1.000 (-1.81) 
Pop u19 (2006) (%) 1.134*** (6.59) 1.145*** (5.05) 
Pop density w/in 2km  (1,000's) 0.990*** (-5.55) 0.995 (-1.89) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 0.984* (-2.45) 0.937*** (-7.19) 
% Unemployed 0.917 (-1.52) 1.049 (0.60) 
Blue collar workers (%) 0.938*** (-4.02) 0.952* (-2.25) 
Edu-college or higher (%) 1.816*** (33.39) 1.780*** (23.55) 
Owner-occupied households (%) 0.894*** (-11.22) 0.852*** (-10.86) 
Movers (%) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.944*** (-5.17) 0.929*** (-4.86) 
Pop  Māori  (%) 0.557*** (-25.71) 0.450*** (-27.36) 
Pop Pacifika (%) 0.696*** (-27.59) 0.671*** (-20.68) 
Pop Asian (%) 0.984 (-1.04) 1.229*** (8.93) 
Pop MELAA(%) 1.176** (2.59) 1.600*** (5.32) 
Pop other (%) 0.930* (-2.45) 0.940 (-1.54) 
Religion non Christian (%) 0.726*** (-12.68) 0.524*** (-16.17) 
Wellington 0.978*** (-3.99) 0.979** (-2.82) 
Christchurch 0.866*** (-25.63) 0.703*** (-53.28) 
Dunedin 1.232*** (31.57) 1.155*** (12.69) 
Observations 12,071  12,071  
AIC 9685.9  8716.6  
BIC 9841.2  8872.0  
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***




The GLM results confirm the hypothesis that household schooling opportunity sets are a function 
of household characteristics in both the primary and secondary school sector groupings. Holding 
population and choice constant, the most substantive declines in SOS are commensurate with 
household racial compositional characteristics.
53
 Meshblocks with higher proportions of  Māori , 
Pasifika,and Other categories of race; higher proportions of blue collar workers, movers, non-
Christians and owner-occupied households have reductions in SOS in statistically significant 
ways. Meshblocks with higher proportions of college-educated households and percent MELAA 
categories are found to have improvements in SOS, (p<0.001). Income and percent unemployed 
drop off in significance when controlling for other household characteristics in the primary 
model, but for the secondary model, income is negatively associated with SOS (p<0.001). In the 
case of percent Asian, the secondary sector results are opposite to the primary results- increases 
in Asian populations lead to improved SOS (p<0.001).  Across cities and in both sectors, 
Wellington and Christchurch meshblocks have on average lower values for SOS compared to 
Auckland. In Dunedin the average meshblock fares statistically significantly better than 
Auckland for SOS score (p<0.001). Overall, these results support the hypothesis that educational 
opportunity remains connected to household characteristics despite the arrangement of open 
enrollment and home zones in New Zealand. The question of whether or not access to 
opportunity is a more restricted terrain than access to choice will be addressed in Chapter 8 of 
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 The table above provides insight into the direction of the relationship between each characteristic and the SOS. 
The coefficients are reported as odds ratios to facilitate this view. For interpretation of the coefficients for their 




this analysis, following a brief look at student body sorting and segregation levels as presented 
next. 
 Segregation: Households vs. Schools 
Tomorrow’s Schools included the expectation that open enrollment would “undo” the 
limits on opportunity caused by the underlying arrangement of housing stock. However, as 
scholars began to look into the impact of the reform, evidence of adverse sorting came to light. 
Edward B Fiske and Helen F Ladd (2000) reported on students sorting by ethnicity between low 
and high deciles. Wylie (2006) warned of parental choice generating a bi-modal distribution of 
school composition-where areas of high and low-income neighborhoods would sort into either 
high or low-decile schools at the cost of school integration. Gordon (1994) foreshadowed 
increasing presence of homogenous groupings (socioeconomic sorting) between schools and a 
“spiral of decline” as less desirable schools were faced with fewer pupils who were the least 
likely to exit due to socioeconomic constraints coupled with reduction in funds (p15). Thomson 
(2010) predicts the likelihood that low-poverty schools had an enrollment scheme when negative 
externalities were present for four urban areas of New Zealand. Schools of high decile rank were 
more than twice as likely as other high decile schools to “put up a fence” and limit access for 
high-poverty students when in close proximity to such externalities. In other words, schools in 
areas of contiguous low-poverty neighborhoods tended to have no enrollment schemes, 
particularly those ‘embedded’ or ‘buffered’ by other low-poverty schools.  The likelihood of 




high-poverty neighborhood. Stubbs and Strathdee (2012) study changes in the composition of 
schools by student ethnicity in one local market in New Zealand in order to examine whether 
there was an impact of school choice on student body composition. Data between 1984 and 2009 
on enrollment for four secondary schools was used to examine school composition by white 
(European), Māori  and Pasifika Island groups over two general periods of enrollment scheme 
policy. The authors found three of the four schools in the sample experienced a period of 
instability immediately following Conservative legislation in 1989 that fostered school choice by 
de-zoning. The authors report declines in enrollment coupled with increases in ethnic 
polarization in addition to declines in student achievement during the time de-zoning was in 
place. By 2000, enrollment policies in New Zealand enacted by the Labour government 
facilitated more stability in enrollment/growth management through the institution of local 
catchment areas according to the principals surveyed. A majority of principals (6 of 7) preferred 
the current enrollment scheme policy over the pre-2000 period of instability associated with de-
zoning (p.120).  
This next section provides some insight into these cautionary tales to the prediction that 
schools in New Zealand stood to become more segregated rather than less so, by Tomorrow’s 
Schools. Several examples exist on the topic of estimating segregation across households 
(Iceland & Weinberg, 2002; Koedel et al., 2009; Massey & Denton, 1988; Massey, Fischer, 
Dickens, & Levy, 2003) and schools (Reardon, 2009; Reardon & Yun, 2002; Reardon, Yun, & 
Chmielewski, 2012; Richards, 2014; Richards et al., 2012; Stroub & Richards, 2013; Tate, 




evenness of the distribution of a given population (such as minority or low socioeconomic status) 
in the metropolitan area and ranges from a value of 0 (no segregation) to 1 (high segregation).  
The index is touted as the “most widely used measure of residential evenness” (p.284). Massey 
et al. (2003) estimated the geography of inequity in the United States by socioeconomic status. 
The authors estimate dissimilarity for regional, state and metropolitan areas between defined 
categories of affluent and poor residents. Reardon (2009) measures segregation in cases of 
continuous or ordinal (using income as an example) and categorical (race) data in the United 
States.  The average (weighted) index of dissimilarity for Blacks vs. White, non-Hispanics for 
metropolitan areas ranged from 0.727 in 1980 to 0.640 in 2000 (Iceland et al, 2002, Table 5-1). 
The measure of dissimilarity by socioeconomic status (affluent vs. poor) as estimated in Massey 
et al. (2003) shows a range of 0.141 in 1980 to 0.119 in 2000- indicating segregation by 
socioeconomic status is not as salient as the degree of segregation by race in the United States. 
 Stroub and Richards (2013) provide an analysis of the degree of school segregation that 
exists in the United States between 1993 and 2009 using Theil’s entropy index. The authors 
select this method in order to disentangle the relationship between changes in community 
demographic composition versus school demographic composition over time while also taking 
into consideration districting. In the United States many communities have experienced a shift 
from being majority white communities to minority white communities over time. Theil’s index 
enables the quantification of segregation between categories of race over time (p.504). Between-
district segregation in the Unites States was found to be “a far more salient mechanism” in the 




Richards (2014)  estimates the effect of individual and aggregate effects of school attendance 
zone gerrymandering on school diversity by calculating Simpson’s diversity index and Theil’s 
entropy index within the context of school districts by using a robust method of counterfactuals. 
The author creates ‘natural’ attendance zones for schools and calculates two measures of 
segregation- one for the actual area and one for the natural area as constructed. Effect size 
differences in segregation levels at the school and aggregate level provide a very valuable means 
by which boundary design can be seen for its role in both exacerbating and in some case 
reducing segregation as produced by the arrangement of housing stock and school district 
boundaries. 
 Mantil et al. (2012) illustrate the geographic viability of school integration in the context 
of districting.  By comparing two similar states (Missouri and Nebraska) geographies overall are 
found to have comparable demographics. However, Nebraska has a much more geographically 
distributed mix of low and high-poverty school districts, and notably- plenty of partnership 
opportunities under this aim. Missouri, on the other hand, has poverty concentrated in the south, 
and a more evenly distributed/ mix of poverty across the northern portion of the state (pp. 202-
203). “Most high-poverty schools are located in high-poverty districts,” which means that district 
boundaries must be removed if integration efforts are to be continued (p.189). In all cases where 
authors explore segregation of schools, the research frame work accounts for the composition of 
school districts and their member schools in sorting. More advanced techniques account for sub-
categories of race and changes in demographic composition over time and space. School systems 




housing stock patterns. With regards to New Zealand, the primary added contribution to school 
sorting besides housing stock patterns in a given metropolitan area is the arrangement of school 
home zones. What exists is a complicated landscape of school-level catchment areas that have 
high degrees of overlap, some overlap and areas with entirely no home zone overlap- collectively 
sorting students into schools.  
Index of Dissimilarity- Housing Stock vs. Schools 
Meshblock minority composition was a robust predictor of exclusion in home zones as 
established in Part I. In Part II, race continues to play a strong role in determining household 
choice sets and access to quality schools.  Coefficients on minority composition were found to 
remain statistically significant in results when other measures of socioeconomic status including 
family income were included. Therefore, I provide basic school and community racial 
segregation estimates using the Index of Dissimilarity.
54
 I begin by estimating neighborhood 
racial dissimilarity using Census Area Units within each of the four metropolitan areas under 
consideration. Census area units are an appropriate unit to employ because of their size and 
stability over time (Iceland & Weinberg, 2002). The census area unit is populated by 3,266 on 
average, whereas the census meshblock is populated by an average of 110 residents.
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 The area 
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 This is by no means an exhaustive analysis of school versus community segregation-levels, rather an anecdotal 
example of how school home zone practice may contribute to increased phenomenon of segregation in New Zealand 
public schools. Further analyses of segregation in schools can be conducted using more advanced methods such as 
Theil’s Index and additional indicators of socioeconomic status such as the deprivation index. 
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unit is named and is the best representative of a metro-area’s known and established 
neighborhoods. The index is denoted as follows:
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Equation II-5        
            
 
   
          
 
 
T denotes the total population of the geographical area under consideration (the metropolitan 
area as a whole); ti denotes the total population of area i- in this case of the census meshblock; P 
denotes the proportion of the geographical area (either metropolitan area or school zone) that is 
minority; and pi denotes the proportion of the census meshblock that is minority.  
Following (Iceland & Weinberg, 2002; Massey & Denton, 1988) the reference group  
(majority group) by which the index will be estimated is the ‘European Ethnic Group’ 
classification in the census, with all other categories of ethnicity ( Māori , Pacific Peoples’, 
Asian, MELAA, and ‘other’) as the minority group. The index “measures the percentage of a 
group’s population that would have to change residence for each neighborhood to have the same 
percent of that group as the metropolitan area overall” (Iceland & Weinberg, 2002, p. 8). In 
terms of the Auckland metropolitan area, this would translate into the percentage of non-
European (minority) population that would need to move out of the Area Unit (or neighborhood) 
to another neighborhood within the metropolitan area in order to achieve the same proportion of 
minorities in each Area Unit as in the Auckland metropolitan area as a whole.  The Index of 
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Dissimilarity is estimated using census data for the census cohorts (2001 and 2013). Percent 
minority is generated based on the percentage of Europeans rather than on the sum of each 
minority category due to issues of rounding and summing in census data. For schools, I use the 
same categories of race as provided in the Ministry of Education data about students for the years 
2001, 2005, 2009 and 2015. The two sets of indices are discussed below. 
Segregation Results 
The pattern of household segregation follows a north-south pattern in the four metro 
areas under consideration (Table II-6). However, within each area, the level of segregation is 
fairly consistent from 2001 to 2013. For example, in Auckland to the north, the index was 
highest in both 2001 and 2013 (.37 and .39 respectively), and in Dunedin to the very south- the 
index was the lowest (0.22 in 2001 and 0.20 in 2013). For the primary sector up to an additional 
20 percentage-points are added to the index of dissimilarity. While 37 to 39-percent of 
households would have to relocate to achieve racial integration in Auckland, 53 to 56-percent of 
primary students would need to change schools in order to achieve the same aim for that sector. 
In Wellington, households needing to relocate for integration fall in the 31 to 33-percent range 
while primary schools in 2001 needed 52-percent of students to move for integration- an increase 






Table II-6 Indices of Dissimilarity - Race (2001-2015) 
 Indices of Dissimilarity- Race (2001- 2015) 
 New Zealand Metro Areas vs. Schools (Primary & Secondary Sector) 
City 2001 2005 2009 2013 2015 
Auckland Metro Area 0.37   0.39  
     A-Primary Schools 0.53 0.55 0.56  0.55 
     A-Secondary Schools 0.38 0.39 0.42  0.42 
Wellington Metro Area 0.33   0.31  
     W-Primary Schools 0.52 0.45 0.42  0.40 
     W-Secondary Schools 0.35 0.33 0.32  0.28 
Christchurch Metro Area 0.26   0.24  
     C-Primary Schools 0.25 0.31 0.35  0.34 
     C-Secondary Schools 0.25 0.20 0.20  0.21 
Dunedin Metro Area 0.22   0.20  
     D-Primary Schools 0.30 0.30 0.28  0.23 
     D-Secondary Schools 0.19 0.16 0.16  0.14 
 
By 2015, there was decrease in primary sector dissimilarity index to 40-percent of students 
needing to relocate if integration were to be achieved, which remains 11-percentage points 
higher in segregation than the housing stock.  In the two southern cities, dissimilarity gaps are 
substantially lower between households and primary schools, but the direction is the same- 
schools have higher indices of segregation than housing stock. Dissimilarity for secondary 
schools is much closer to the indices for the metro areas than is the case for primary schools. For 
Auckland- secondary schools are between 1 and 3 percentage points higher on the index; for 
Wellington dissimilarity is higher in 2001by three percentage-points for secondary schools 
compared to the metro area but the index becomes on par with the metro area as time progresses. 
For Christchurch and Dunedin the index is consistently lower in secondary schools than it is in 
the metro area, indicating secondary schools are achieving gains in diversity relative to 




presented earlier on home zone discontinuities being less severe as well as to school choice sets 
being larger in these two southern cities. 
Overall, these basic results on increased dissimilarity  in primary schools are consistent with 
other findings (Kalogrides & Loeb, 2013) and could be attributed to the fact that the primary 
sector has more schools and smaller home zones- hence more opportunities- for sorting than the 
secondary sector.   The distinct north- south trend in degrees of dissimilarity may be driven by 
the influx of immigrants to the north, in particular in Auckland. To explore this possibility 
further, Appendix 16 provides graphic representation of percent minority versus index of 
dissimilarity by year and sector for all cities. Given a steady increase since 1999 in the share of 
schools instituting enrollment schemes, it would be expected that the trajectory of dissimilarity 
might be linked. All cities experienced growth in percent minority, however only Auckland 
experienced a growth in segregation for its metro area, primary and secondary school sectors. 
The remaining cities each saw minority population growth coupled with declines in the index of 
dissimilarity for schools.
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 It could have been expected that an increase presence of home zones 
would lead to further polarization in school student bodies, yet this finding is remarkably helpful 
to the discussion on home zone guidelines. One explanation for the leveling-out of sorting could 
be the degree to which school home zones are ultimately overlapping one another. As seen in the 
southern cities of Christchurch and Dunedin, and to be examined in more detail next there are 
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 This holds except in one case- Christchurch primary schools where the index increased by 10-percentage points 




greater degrees of choice in these areas. Perhaps one mechanism for ensuring choice and 
boosting diversity is that school zones as drawn are not mutually exclusive. Overlap de facto 
contributes to choice and may explain a reduction in student body polarization as more schools 
engage in the practice.  
CHAPTER VIII THE LANDSCAPE OF CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY 
This final chapter links together the presence of enrollment schemes, boundary design, 
choice set size, sorting and dissimilarity for a final discussion of New Zealand’s landscape of 
school choice and opportunity. Across cities, open enrollment is represented by school decile 
ranking using 2014 data in Figure II-6. All four markets show an increase in the proportion of 
schools with enrollment schemes as the school’s student body composition gains in 
socioeconomic status. Dunedin and Wellington have the highest proportions of schools operating 
without home zones across deciles, while Christchurch operated the lowest proportion of low 
decile schools with schemes but the highest proportions of schools with schemes at decile rank 6 






Figure II-6 Proportion of schools without enrollment schemes by school decile rank and city, 
2014 
 
High proportions of enrollment schemes in high decile schools would be expected to lead to 
sorting by race between schools and higher indices of dissimilarity. However, the presence of 
schemes by school decile do not necessarily map to the presence of higher (lower) levels of 
choice or increased (decreased) indices of dissimilarity in the education markets under 
consideration. For Auckland the relationship seems confirmed: This city has some of the lowest 
proportions of schools without schemes but it also has the highest indices of dissimilarity in both 
primary and secondary sectors. Christchurch has the highest proportion of high decile schools 
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proportion of schools with schemes is highest at high deciles for Christchurch, but Figure II-7 
below confirms that the degree of  home zone overlap in this city “un-does” some of the 
potential restrictions on choice we would otherwise expect with home zone abundance in that 
city especially at higher deciles.
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 Predicted probabilities indicate that overlap has contributed to 
households in Christchurch and Dunedin having more schools in their choice sets than 
households in the northern cities. In the case of Christchurch, the size of the household choice set 
for the city as a for all sectors is the largest, ranging between 2 and 15 schools with an average 
choice set size of 5.3 schools (Figure II-7). Figure II-17 and Figure II-18 in Appendix 13 graph 
predicted probabilities for school choice set size for the primary and secondary sector by city.  
                                                 
58






Figure II-7 Predicted Probabilities for School Choice Sets- All Sectors by City 
The predicted probabilities for each choice set size by city for all sectors are detailed in Table 
II-7. Across cities, the probability of there being zero choices in a household’s choice set holding 
household characteristics at their mean value is 0.01 for all areas, 0.05 for Auckland; 0.000002  
for Wellington (p<0.001 in all cases). In the case of Christchurch- there are no predicted 
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Table II-7 Predicted Probabilities of School Choice- City Table 
 All Auckland Wellington Christchurch Dunedin 
Pred0 0.0116*** 0.0537*** 0.00000194   
 (0.000778) (0.00273) (0.00000319)   
Pred1 0.0723*** 0.156*** 0.0402   
 (0.00337) (0.00622) (0.0295)   
Pred2 0.205*** 0.262*** 0.249*** 0.0197***  
 (0.00519) (0.00640) (0.0159) (0.00252)  
Pred3 0.269*** 0.251*** 0.268*** 0.145***  
 (0.00518) (0.00504) (0.0133) (0.0121)  
Pred4 0.217*** 0.165*** 0.251*** 0.200***  
 (0.00389) (0.00322) (0.00958) (0.0114)  
Pred5 0.146*** 0.0767*** 0.167*** 0.210*** 0.193*** 
 (0.00226) (0.00171) (0.00286) (0.0109) (0.0168) 
Pred6 0.0582*** 0.0255*** 0.0248*** 0.195*** 0.350*** 
 (0.000948) (0.000800) (0.000169) (0.00919) (0.0247) 
Pred7 0.0172*** 0.00765*** 0.000484*** 0.140*** 0.333*** 
 (0.000334) (0.000351) (0.0000254) (0.00597) (0.0142) 
Pred8 0.00430*** 0.00200*** 0.0000390*** 0.0657*** 0.121*** 
 (0.0000952) (0.000121) (0.00000622) (0.00269) (0.00146) 
Pred9 0.000687*** 0.000236*** 0.00000361 0.0202*** 0.00241*** 
 (0.0000317) (0.0000568) (0.00000229) (0.000813) (0.000338) 
Pred10 0.000210*** 0.0000956*** 0.00000287 0.00425*** 0.000662 
 (0.00000964) (0.0000256) (0.00000418) (0.000155) (0.000438) 
Pred11 0.0000345*** 0.0000265  0.000475***  
 (0.00000330) (0.0000305)  (0.0000349)  
Pred12 0.0000105***   0.0000898***  
 (0.000000902)   (0.00000534)  
Pred13 0.00000144***   0.00000720***  
 (0.000000250)   (0.000000963)  
Pred14 0.000000287***   0.000000987***  
 (6.86e-08)   (0.000000152)  
Pre15 5.02e-08   9.24e-08  
 (8.04e-08)   (0.000000166)  
N 12064 7208 2151 2054 651 




Dunedin and Christchurch have the highest probabilities for larger choice sets and an absence of 
probabilities for the zero and 1-3 choice predictions. These southern cities have therefore 
managed a seemingly impossible feat- the coexistence of enrollment schemes and choice. 
The Landscape of Choice  
I now provide maps of household choice and schooling opportunity sets for the primary 
and secondary sectors for each of the metropolitan areas (Appendix 17). The maps provide a 
simplified means to compare how school home zones come together in the metropolitan areas to 
produce the educational landscape. First, I consider the choice landscape. Using the spatial join 
process, meshblocks are identified as being included in home zones and coded as having 0, 1-2 
or greater than 3 choices. ‘Choice tracts’ are therefore contiguous geographic areas of consistent 
levels of choice. All areas are assumed to have access to schools that do not have enrollment 
schemes- so the shading represents opportunities to attend home zone schools (also known as 
schools that are in highest demand).  It is intuitively hypothesized that inner-city areas would 
have different ‘choice tracts’ than outer regions or suburbs for all metropolitan areas. Generally 
speaking, there are very clear geographic delineations of choice (i.e. tracts of same-size choice 
sets) in the secondary sector for all cities. The availability of choice is more geographically 
sporadic and intermittent in the primary sector- especially in Auckland and Wellington. Again, 
the southern cities display different outcomes. Christchurch and Dunedin have somewhat more 
consistent and contiguous choice tracts. These choice set arrangements may be attributable to the 




degrees of coast line) compared to Dunedin and Christchurch to the south. However, we also 
know from results in Part I that there are some different outcomes for boundary design, overlap 
and zone discontinuity in the southern cities as compared to the north.  
More specific details about the landscape of choice include the following: For the 
primary sector in all areas except Dunedin, increased size in choice sets is largely a phenomenon 
of the suburbs and outlying areas of the city. In the case of Dunedin, the primary sector provides 
the greatest choice to inner city meshblocks. The secondary sector is laid out very differently in 
Wellington, Dunedin and Christchurch than the primary sector, while the arrangement of choice 
for Auckland in the secondary sector more closely resembles the primary sector. For Auckland 
and Wellington, the outer regions and suburban areas still have concentrated pockets of the most 
choice, but the downtown inner core in both metro areas also have a comparable, concerted 
presence of choice. The farthest reaching suburbs in both metro areas tend to shrink off in choice 
set size, relative to what was seen in the primary sector. For Christchurch, the most choice 
afforded in the secondary sector is located in the core downtown area only. Dunedin on the other 
hand has the most consistent landscape of sizeable secondary choice- virtually the entire metro 
region has choice that ranges between 3-5 zones for all meshblocks.
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The Landscape of Educational Opportunity  
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 0 provides additional illustration of household choice as it relates to meshblock characteristics using deprivation 




The landscape of schooling opportunity sets is divided into three categories using Jenks 
natural breaks classification method (see maps in Appendix 17). The darkest areas represent 
meshblocks with the highest performance which is defined by the meshblock’s opportunity set 
score as defined in Equation II-3. Once mapped, ‘opportunity tracts’ emerge as contiguous 
geographic areas sharing common ranges of educational opportunity. I provide a summary on the 
presence of ‘opportunity tracts’ in each of the metropolitan areas with the context of ‘choice 
tracts’ in hand to make the discussion more valuable.  
 In the case of Auckland- we saw earlier that ‘choice tracts’ are quite fragmented yet 
there is evidence that despite this- larger contiguous ‘opportunity tracts’ are available in parts of 
the metropolitan area. This would mean that in absence of an additional choice as guaranteed by 
being zoned in by a school, a household living in an area of fewer choices may still enjoy the 
benefits of greater access to enhanced schooling opportunity as rounded out by the open schools 
that are co-located. Intuitively speaking- tracts of schooling opportunity that are larger in size 
than tracts of choice would indicate that open enrollment schools are neutralizing the effect of 
being zoned out of school home zones with strong performance. This holds for downtown 
Auckland and areas to the north. However, areas to the south in that city see relative shrinking of 
opportunity sets- indicating the landscape of poor performing schools is laid out in a north 
(higher performance) to south (reductions in performance) manner. Being zoned out of choices 
therefore has greater consequences for children in the southern parts of Auckland. For 
Wellington, tracts of greater schooling opportunity are generally less expansive than tracts of 




Lower Hutt. For the primary sector in this city, access to the best schooling opportunities is not 
necessarily commensurate with access to additional school choice, and for the secondary sector- 
access to opportunity is more consistently co-located with access to additional choice. In both 
sectors for Wellington, opportunity appears to be more restricted in geography than does the 
presence of choice- which is the opposite to what was seen in the northern and central regions of 
Auckland.  
For Christchurch, the primary sector areas of greatest opportunity are co-located with the 
areas of the most choice but are also a much smaller sub-set of geographies. This means that 
access to higher performing schools in that city is more restricted than access to additional 
choices offered by being located in multiple home zones at once. In the secondary sector- the 
inverse is true, but not by much. Where the most choice in Christchurch was concentrated in the 
downtown core, schooling opportunity is also co-located, yet slightly expanded out. Areas with 
1-2 secondary schools of choice are almost identically located with the mid-performing schools 
in the opportunity maps. Dunedin’s primary sector becomes less of an even playing field when 
considering opportunity versus choice. The downtown core has the largest pockets of lowest 
performance with areas to the east along the coast and in the suburbs to the north-west providing 
relatively more educational opportunity to residents. For the secondary sector there is a similar 
pattern. 
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 Interpreting the landscapes of schooling opportunity together with choice reveals an 
                                                 
60
 0 provides an additional illustration of the landscape of schooling opportunity sets using meshblock 
percent Pasifika composition as a backdrop in the southern area of Auckland. Areas of high proportions of Pasifika 




important finding: Additional choice does not necessarily translate into households having access 
to greater schooling opportunities in the Dunedin and Christchurch education markets. 
Therefore, earlier points earned by these two cities in being able to provide choice are marred by 
restricted schooling opportunities despite that win. 
The Landscape of Schools 
Education scholars of Tomorrow’s Schools expressed concerns that open enrollment in 
New Zealand would result in a bi-modal distribution of school deciles in areas of adjacent high 
and low-income neighborhoods (Pearce & Gordon, 2005). This was opposed to an outcome of 






Figure II-8 Distribution of NZDep scores by decile and city 
 
By definition, schools with mid-decile rankings are the most integrated schools in New Zealand.  
But how was this achieved? Are mid-decile home zones composed of the most diverse 
meshblocks? If this was the case, the mid-decile homezones would have the most variance. 
School are grouped by decile using school 2012 decile rank and boxplots of home zone 
meshblock NZDep scores graphed by city (Figure II-8). For Auckland we see clear evidence that 
home zones are composed of homogenous populations- the distribution becomes smaller and 


















































shifted towards lower levels of deprivation as decile increases. For the other three cities, there is 
some support for the idea that mid-decile schools may be a product of home zones that are 
inclusive of both high and low-socioeconomic status households.  
I next provide additional insight and anecdote to the question of which conditions lead to 
middle-class (integrated) schools. Schools are classified into low(1-3), middle (4-7) and high (8-
10) deciles and mapped against a backdrop of meshblocks shaded by levels of deprivation using 
the NZDep score. High deprivation scores indicate the most impoverished households, and low 
scores indicate the most advantaged households. Maps are presented for the primary and 
secondary sectors. Neighboring communities with highly discontinuous deprivation index scores 





Figure II-9 SES Landscapes: The arrangement of communities vs. schools 
Figure II-9 captures the sentiment expressed by (Pearce & Gordon, 2005) and hinted at in Figure 
II-8 for the case of Auckland. Low decile schools are clustered into high deprivation areas and 
high decile schools are clustered into areas of affluence. When these areas are co-located, there 
are few instances where mid-decile schools exist. Figure II-9 shows two close-ups where 




the north) and Glen Innes neighborhoods of Auckland. In this area of adjacent extremes of 
deprivation scores- there are no mid-decile schools. The Pakuranga area in Example B in 
Auckland gives an example where three levels of deprivation in the area coexist yielding three 
distinct clusters of school deciles. In Example B, the extent of the discontinuity in deprivation is 
less pronounced and less extensive than what is seen in Example A.  
 




Figure II-10 provides a map of Auckland area with only mid-decile state and state integrated 
schools (deciles 4-7). This map is shaded by deprivation level, with darker areas experiencing the 
highest rates of poverty. The striking finding is a lack of mid-decile schools in areas of the 
highest and lowest deprivation scores or areas in which these two extremes are contiguous. 
Instead, mid-decile schools are mostly clustered well within areas tending towards the mid-
deprivation level. 
 





Figure II-11 above depicts an example of the potential for open enrollment and/or home zone 
policy in aggregate to overcome (or exacerbate) schools polarizing along the lines of 
socioeconomic status.  This example explores the Hutt Valley in Wellington metropolitan area. 
The Hutt Valley spans Lower Hutt to the south west (Example C on the left) and Upper Hutt to 
the northeast (Example D- pictured on the right). By their arrangement, home zones in Lower 
Hutt have a consequence to school sorting that is very different to what can be found just up the 
valley to the northeast in Upper Hutt. Lower Hutt is composed of contiguously arranged low and 
high deprivation areas, and through home zone practice in that area there is a resulting cluster of 
high and low decile schools in that community with only a handful of mid-decile schools present. 
As the example illustrates, the high decile schools are located in the affluent areas to the 
southwest and are protected from infiltration by students in the poor neighborhoods up the valley 
to the northeast through the presence of schemes (shaded in transparent red). Lower Hutt home 
zone borders almost literally stop at the intersection of high and low affluence which is clearly 
visible on the map. The case of Upper Hutt (Example D) is very different and worth noting here. 
A collection of mid-decile schools dominate this community’s landscape and the arrangement of 
home zones in this community is more inclusive (as indicated, most meshblocks are covered by 
at least one zone). The example of school clusters by decile in the Hutt Valley speaks to the 
potential for home zones to either generate integrated schools (mid-decile schools) or proliferate 





CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION 
Summary of Findings 
New Zealand’s Education Act, 1989- known as Tomorrow’s Schools- effectively 
devolved the day-to-day operation and administration of schools from the state to the school with 
the creation of Boards of Trustees (BoT’s). At the same time, open enrollment policy and per-
pupil funding was instituted- with the intention of injecting a market-based atmosphere into New 
Zealand’s education system that would foster school competition and improve educational 
offerings. The reform has been studied both nationally and internationally for its consequences 
and lessons learned as many other countries institute market-based reforms such as charter 
school movements and systems of choice. With open enrollment came the problem of the most 
popular schools being over-subscribed which created waitlists and a “democratic dilemma” over 
rights of enrollment between students residing in the immediate vicinity of a school and those 
seeking to enroll from across the metropolitan area. Today, New Zealand has arrived at a system 
of quasi-open enrollment- where schools in excess demand have responded to the dilemma by 
instituting enrollment schemes with geographically defined home zones that guarantee and 
protect rights of enrollment to households contained within such boundaries. New Zealand 
schools have the right to define their own home zones and are supposed to do so in consultation 
with neighboring schools. This devolution of responsibility creates a remarkable opportunity to 




 This study comprehensively investigates the hypothesis that schools are behaving 
selectively and strategically when implementing home zones as evidenced in preliminary 
research into the matter (Lubienski et al., 2013; Stubbs & Strathdee, 2012; Thomson, 2010). A 
broad sample of state and state-integrated schools from across New Zealand representing the 
primary through secondary sectors is evaluated. The cities included in the analysis represent New 
Zealand’s largest metropolitan areas from north to south including Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch and Dunedin.  Of the 886 public schools evaluated, 43-percent (372 schools) had 
enrollment schemes with geographically defined home zones in place as of the 2009 school year. 
The enrollment schemes evaluated in this study were those enacted for the purpose of addressing 
excess demand and preserving the rights of enrollment to local students. This study does not 
evaluate enrollment schemes that are in place for special character or religious schools. 
Enrollment schemes were enacted between 1999 and 2009 and household characteristic data was 
sourced using census meshblock data from 2006. This means that home zone boundaries were 
evaluated against household data that was dated within 7 years of boundary implementation with 
the majority of evaluations using data within 5 years. This enabled the analysis of boundary 
design to be reflective of school-side (supply) motivations. I also estimate school choice and 
schooling opportunity sets for households as a function of socio-demographic characteristics 
while controlling for supply, geographic and logistical factors. Throughout the analysis, I 
provide aggregations of data to reflect nuances in school behaviors at the metropolitan, school 
sector, school gender and school decile levels for added insight. The study offers compelling, 





 The results from Part I provide clear and consistent evidence of the presence and 
prevalence of home zone gerrymandering using the framework of discontinuity. I evaluate two 
basic means by which gerrymandering can be identified: boundary discontinuity and zone 
discontinuity. Boundary discontinuity design enables the comparison of households (as 
represented by census meshblocks) on one side of a school boundary versus the other. I estimate 
standardized mean differences in household characteristics controlling for student population, 
location and availability of other schools using logistic regression and meta-analysis techniques. 
Zone discontinuity is evaluated with the spirit of enrollment scheme guideline policy that 
mandates schools do not “exclude local students” in mind. Expanding upon methods used by 
(Lubienski et al., 2013), I create local neighborhood buffers surrounding the school using GIS 
and compare the socioeconomic and demographic composition of the immediate neighborhood 
to the school’s home zone as drawn. Standardized mean differences between home zones and 
local buffers are estimated using meta-analysis. I find that schools are engaging in selective 
behavior across one or more household socioeconomic or demographic characteristics – with 
indicators of deprivation and minority status consistently maintaining significance in boundary 
and zone discontinuity.  Between 37 and 52-percent of schools sample-wide are estimated to be 
participating in gerrymandering in small to large ways (discontinuities were greater than 0.2 
standard deviations, favoring households with affluence and non-minority status).  Cases of 
medium to large discrimination (standardized mean differences of >0.5) are evident in 12 to 26-
percent of schools. Richards (2014) employed comparable methods to test for school zone 
gerrymandering in the United States and found that a lower proportion of schools-(nine to12-




areas to school zones and found that school zones reduced diversity relative to what was 
available in the local community on the order of 0.3 standard deviations.  
The implications of school-level discontinuities for their aggregated effect on household 
school choice and access to schooling opportunity are the focus of Part II. Schools operating 
enrollment schemes are in excess demand and are therefore assumed to be the most desirable 
schools in the education market. Because home zones are not required to be mutually exclusive 
or completely exhaustive, many home zones servicing the same sector of students often overlap. 
These arrangements create conditions where it is possible that households could have 
dramatically different education market access. I explore the determinants of the size of a 
household’s choice set using only schools in excess demand (those with geographically defined 
home zones) and the quality of the schooling opportunities that are available as a consequence of 
enrollment scheme implementation.  Meshblocks in the four metropolitan areas can expect to be 
claimed by anywhere from zero to 15 schools with enrollment schemes by virtue of being 
located within the schools’ geographically defined home zones zones. I find households of lower 
socioeconomic status and higher minority concentrations to be at a market disadvantage relative 
to affluent and European-decent households for having rights to enroll in these sought after 
schools.  
Tomorrow’s Schools as initially conceived by the Labour party were meant to have 
“initiated choice-based, disintermediating reforms with an eye toward equity and access for 
Māori and Pacific Islander communities” (Lubienski, 2014, p. 434). I find that chances of having 




majority Māori and Pasifika households compared to meshblocks with majority European 
residents in the primary sector. For the secondary sector, the discrepancy is more acute, 
especially for Māori residents. Meshblocks containing zero-percent Māori have an eight- percent 
probability of having no excess demand secondary schools in their choice sets. When 
considering meshblocks with 90-percent Māori populations, the predicted probabilities of having 
no excess demand schools in a choice set increase to 67-percent. I find that households in 
Christchurch and Dunedin enjoy more choice than their counterparts to the north, while the 
secondary sector affords more choice than other sectors in the education market, holding 
meshblock characteristics at their mean. Schooling opportunity sets are calculated for households 
using methods developed by Gibson, Sabel, Boe-Gibson, and Kim (2005) and are modeled as a 
function of household characteristics controlling for supply factors including the presence of 
nearby non-scheme schools.  Meshblocks with higher concentrations of Māori, Pasifika and 
other minorities; higher proportions of blue collar workers; transient households and non-
Christian households are found to have reductions in schooling opportunity sets. In all models, 
student-age population is accounted for.  
The analytic techniques used to evaluate discontinuity are complemented with several 
maps and secondary analyses that bring additional insight into each education market/sector. At 
the metropolitan level, I examine underlying household landscapes in comparison to school-level 
sorting by calculating levels of dissimilarity between households and schools. Primary schools 
are consistently more segregated than households while the secondary school sector is 




Conditions for integrated (mid-decile) schools are examined geographically and I find the 
presence of contiguous tracts of affluence and poverty do not necessarily produce mid-decile 
schools; instead such landscapes produce clusters of high and low-decile schools. Tracts of 
choice and schooling opportunity are mapped by sector for each city and examined.  I find 
different degrees of selective behavior exist across the four metropolitan areas considered. There 
was a consistent pattern for higher levels of disparate impact in zones drawn in Auckland and 
Wellington compared to the southern cities of Christchurch and Dunedin. Christchurch schools 
were engaging in selective behaviors, but the tendency was less disparate and variation in 
selective behavior between schools in that city was considerably smaller than what was seen in 
other cities.  
A brief look at the economies of each area may provide some intuition into the drivers 
behind each outcome. The New Zealand economy has been characterized by economist 
Shamubeel Eaqub as a collection of regions “worlds apart from one another,” a function of 
disparate forces of “urbanization, globalisation technological change and ageing” between areas 
of the country (Eaqub, 2014, p. 8). Large income gaps persist between Auckland and Wellington 
to the north in comparison to regions of the south.  In 2013, regional median incomes were 
$76,500 in Auckland, $74,300 in Wellington, $65,000 in Christchurch and $56,400 in Dunedin 
region (Eaqub, 2014, p. 12).  Each city is well known for its unique contributions to New 
Zealand’s overall economy. Auckland is the commercial capital, Wellington is the political 
capital and both cities are ranked as having the most complex and dominant economies. 




complex economy relative to northern cities and Dunedin with its strong tertiary sector is highly 
educated as a population yet its fastest growing economy is stone fruit growing (p.15-16).  
Auckland leads the way in growth of the nation’s financial and insurance sectors, and is the 
largest magnet of immigrant populations with established areas of urban poverty (p.24). Housing 
prices follow a north-south trend with average prices at $600,000 in Auckland and $200,000 in 
Southland (p.58). Differing economies across regions produce gaps in educational attainment 
levels between cities.  In 2013, Wellington had the greatest proportion of college-educated 
residents (43-percent); Auckland had 28-percent, Dunedin had 24-percent and Christchurch had 
22-percent (p.54). School tendencies to behave selectively may be influenced by the size, shape 
and content of job markets and the expectations these settings produce in parents about schools. 
The flows of immigrant populations into cities from the north to the south over time may provide 
further explanations of school behaviors in being inclusive of European and in some cases Māori 






Figure II-12 Discontinuity Practice vs. School Composition and Quality 
 
Figure II-12 provides a view of schools ordered by school decile and compares average 
levels of discontinuity (at the boundary and at the zone) to school student body composition 
(percent minority) for the sample of 372 schools with enrollment schemes used in this analysis. 
School decile ranking is not based on student body racial composition, but as the graph indicates 
the two are clearly negatively correlated. As school decile increases, student bodies are 
composed of fewer minority students. The degree to which schools engage in gerrymandering is 
commensurate with school decile and student body composition- schools at lower deciles with 
majority minority students discriminate less than those schools with mostly European student 
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integrated schools and gives occasion to discuss what has been established as de jure and de 
facto segregation in the public school system in the United States.  
In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
children should not be deliberately segregated by race in the public school system, establishing 
de jure segregation to be unconstitutional (Goodman, 1972). De jure segregation was intentional- 
public school students were segregated on the basis of race by state law. Brown v. Board of 
Education left the issue of de facto segregation undecided: The ruling would not cover cases 
where students could be segregated by race in public schools due to underlying neighborhood 
compositional dynamics coupled with community-based schooling principles (p.278). Goodman 
(1972) elaborates the de facto case as “neither imposed by a state racial classification nor simply 
one aspect of a larger state system of apartheid…the alleged harmful effects on Negro children 
arise in the context of a state policy-the preservation of neighborhood schools-that has a proper 
governmental objective, and the harmful effects are not self-evident nor judicially noticeable” 
(283). By 1961, gerrymandering of school attendance boundaries that led to racial segregation 
was ruled a violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution in Taylor v. 
Board of Education (Goodman, 1972).  
Results presented in this study verify that New Zealand schools are discriminating against 
students of color through the mechanism of enrollment scheme policy which expressly permits 
them to draw their own catchment areas. Effectively, schools are engaging in gerrymandering. In 
June of 2012, Christopher Lubienski released results of a study finding similar evidence of 




Prime Minister John Key was reported as saying that zone manipulation was illegal (McQuillan, 
2012). According to coverage in the New Zealand Herald at the time, the Ministry of Education 
was called upon to verify(substantiate) Lubienski’s findings (Harper & Shuttleworth, 2012). The 
article reports that the Green Party also called for a review of Tomorrow’s Schools as a 
consequence of Lubienski’s findings.   
Implications 
I argue that restricting access to educational opportunity as a function of household 
demographic characteristics only spells out long-term societal problems for New Zealand. 
School decisions to zone out unwanted students generate a two-tiered education market place 
that is dependent on race and socioeconomic status. The arrangement of home zones has 
potential to ‘double-up’ the effect of poverty on disadvantaged households by excluding or 
limiting their children from the same level of educational opportunity and school choice children 
from affluent households currently enjoy. All of these factors diminish the viability of diversity 
and inclusion in the public education system and confirm the idea that Tomorrow’s Schools 
could produce conditions that contribute to a “spiral of decline” as articulated by Gordon (1994). 
Basile (2012) links components of “the critical factors for successful education and increased 
graduation,” to integrated schools. These schools include better teachers with greater 
expectations, a base of more active and contributing parents who incentivize accountable 
schooling and improved student atmosphere conducive to the general goals of schooling (pp. 




performance, and eventually to other societal benefits, such as increased civic and political 
participation (Jacobsen, Frankenberg, & Lenhoff, 2012).  
New Zealand’s Ministry of Education is well aware of a growing disparity in educational 
achievement.  In 2009, New Zealand students placed well on Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) results and were fourth in reading literacy, 13th in mathematical and 
seventh in scientific literacy proficiencies (Telford & May, 2010). Results in achievement were 
consistent with 2000 standings, indicating New Zealand’s rank is fairly stable among the OECD 
and non-OECD participating countries in PISA. However there is a discrepancy between Pākehā 
(European) or Asian student achievement compared to Māori and Pasifika student results in 
addition to a large distribution of test scores across New Zealand students compared to other 
countries. In the case of average scores, Pākehā  and Asian students achieved a mean score of 
541 points and 522 in reading literacy respectively (p. 12).  Māori  and Pasifika students scores 
were 478 and 448 points- both below the OECD mean and the difference accounted for 93 
points. In Mathematics, the problem was similar- Pākehā / European and Asian students received 
a mean score of 537 and 529 respectively, while  Māori  and Pasifika students scored below the 
OECD mean with scores of 476 and 446 (p.28). Science mean results showed the widest gap of 
107 points with Pākehā / European students averaging 555 and Asian students 530 points while 
Māori and Pasifika students continued to score below OECD averages with 487 and 448 points 
respectively (p.38). Among participating OECD countries, New Zealand also exhibited some of 
the widest distributions between the lowest and highest test score percentiles for reading, math 




range of 348 points.
61
 The gap between the 5th and 95th percentile was 334 points in reading- the 
4th highest level of achievement disparity.
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 In the case of math scores, New Zealand placed 7th 
highest for the most disparity with a 5th and 95th percentile score gap of 316 points.
63
 The 
change in variability shifted between 2000 and 2009 for New Zealand, with a 40.4 percent 
increase in variation between schools from 2000 to 2009 while within-school variance decreased 
by 15.7 percent.
64
  Poor performers are increasingly isolated as the disparity shifts from within 
schools to between schools. 
Education Reform in Focus: Achievement 
The New Zealand Ministry of Education 2012 Annual Report begins by acknowledging 
the achievement in PISA disparity expressly, stating “Our highest-achieving learners compare 
with the best in the world, but those groups least well served by New Zealand’s education system 
achieve outcomes comparable with the lowest-performing OECD countries” (The New Zealand 
Ministry of Education, 2012, p. 10). The 2012 Education Amendment Bill stated plans for 
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student performance on the reading scale 
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revising section 75 of the Education Act 1989 to re-focus and clarify the role of the BoT towards 
student achievement. A disclosure statement regarding the legislation of BoT’s is still available 
on the Ministry of Education’s website, outlining the legislative initiative’s intent as follows; 
“Whilst most Boards do an excellent job, the extent to which they focus on the 
educational achievement of all learners can be inconsistent. For example, some Boards 
try to extend their role to run non-educational activities. Others are focused on property 
and commercial matters, but provide insufficient focus on student achievement.” 
65
 
In June of 2013 Section 75 was amended to include the following additional language;  
“A school’s board must perform its functions and exercise its powers in such a way as to 
ensure that every student at the school is able to attain his or her highest possible 
standard in educational achievement.”(Government of New Zealand, 1989) 
In addition a taskforce was convened by the New Zealand government Cabinet to provide “the 
groundwork for a review of the Education Act in 2015,” which released its findings in May of 
2014  (Taskforce on Regulations Affecting School Performance, 2014, p. 32). The taskforce was 
“established by the Government to consider how improved legislation and regulation could 
contribute to the goal of raising the achievement of all students, but particularly the most 
vulnerable” (p.2).  BoT roles around school governance were found to be too ambiguous while 







many boards suffered from a lack of capability (pp.20-21). The taskforce also characterizes a 
framework in the existing Education Act as being permissive of collaboration that was rarely 
invoked by schools for the purpose of the common good. The absence of collaboration among 
schools- in particular around the common interest of boosting student achievement is articulated 
as a lost opportunity:  
“Collaboration is not a strong feature of the current model. While collaboration among 
schools is possible under the Act, the current regulatory system lacks incentives that 
encourage boards and school management to work together to raise student achievement. 
In some cases, competition among schools may be to the detriment of student outcomes.”
 (Taskforce on Regulations Affecting School Performance, 2014, p. 25)  
‘Clustering’ was another term used to describe possibilities for schools working together over 
common goals. Teachers and principals consulted were interested in the concept but felt 
inadequately supported to take part due to a lack of resources. The view expressed by the 
Taskforce was that “this system lacks incentives for collaboration and the concept of each 
student as a part of a wider educational community” (p.26). The authors continue, “the 
community as a whole is likely to raise student achievement for all…the change in approach has 
been described as moving from schools to schooling” (p.26).  The Taskforce notes that 
enrollment schemes as well as finance are either forming or reducing incentive to collaborate- 
depending on the situation, “where schools feel that they are competing for students, this is a 




Education Reform Out of Focus: Diversity and Inclusion 
The New Zealand Ministry of Education’s influence, focus and plans for the reform of 
education is focused on issues of achievement and curriculum, but remains at arm’s-length with 
regards to the problem of schools drawing their own home zones. On November 2, 2015, the 
Minister for Education, Hekia Parata released a discussion document calling for public input in 
defining the goal of public education in New Zealand. Specifically, the Minisry is asking for 
input regarding the roles and responsibilities of the BoT in improving achievement including 
ways by which BoT’s may work more closely together and collaborate (New Zealand Ministry 
of Education, 2015). The Ministry is also looking for suggestions on how enrollment scheme 
management could be improved from an arguably administrative perspective.  The focus is on 
addressing schools that are lagging in implementing schemes when over-subscribed and on the 
application of an override function in limited circumstances whereby the Ministry could direct a 
school on a case by case basis to accept a child (p. 12). The Ministry’s review of the Education 
Act should expressly incorporate a plan to rectify issues of disparate impact and discrimination 
as brought on by enrollment schemes and should include a plan for improving the experience of 
the education marketplace for all consumers and providers. Equitable school access, opportunity 
and student body diversity should become elevated as key policy vehicles to improving student 
outcomes- and should take center stage as the reform panacea.  
 
There are several rational explanations for the absence of meaningful enrollment scheme 




evidence that this is a large-scale problem. Previous research quantifying potential disparities has 
focused on individual cities or sectors for New Zealand, possibly down-playing the scale of the 
problem. Another lies in the following complex and interrelated phenomenon: The longer the 
existence of an institutional boundary such as a home zone- the greater the economic, political 
and social stakes in instituting reform. Pearce and Gordon argue that there is “no political 
consensus” about the ideal balance of public and private roles in enrollment rules for New 
Zealand (Pearce & Gordon, 2005, p. 154).  Cathy Wylie has been researching the New Zealand 
decentralization reforms since their inception in 1989 and has warned of enrollment scheme 
policy and school governance consequences for education and society;  
 
“We do not think about ways in which we can enlarge a sense of responsibility to 
the system as a whole, beyond one’s own school…We do not ensure that enrollment 
schemes are equitable, and do not exacerbate social segregation; we do not think and 
plan systematically about how to provide educational opportunities equitably within local 
areas.”(Wylie, 2009, p. 21) 
Wylie suggests Tomorrow’s Schools results in a system of schools mistakenly understood to be 
the responsibility of the parents they serve, rather than the responsibility of the community as a 
whole. Wohlstetter, Datnow, and Park (2008) provide a framework for understanding state-
school relationships known as principal-agent theory (PAT). The authors propose five features of 
PAT that contribute to schools falling out of line with state or ministerial-level policy directive: 




adverse selection (p.241). The concepts of divergent objectives and weak incentives are 
informative to understanding school selective behaviors given current Ministry-level guidance 
and stated objectives. Using the framework of PAT, the agent (school) is “not motivated to share 
the same values” as the Ministry (principal) under the general assumption that the Ministry 
expects schools to be inclusive of all students when zoning (p.243).  
Another explanation for why home zone gerrymandering is absent in the current reform 
discourse may be to do with the fact that the Ministry has already addressed “cream-skimming” 
by regulating the ballot process. While the majority of student enrollment eligibility is 
determined by household residence and status as being in or out of the home zone, some places 
each year may become eligible to out-of-zone students. Depending on left-over seats after all in-
zone students have enrolled, the school Board of Trustees determines the number of ballots each 
year and must advertize this to the community in the local newspaper using a draft template 
which is provided by the Ministry of Education.
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 If the number of out-of-zone applicants 
exceeds the number of places available to out of zone students, schools enroll applicants in a 
priority order using ballot procedures that are detailed by the Education Act and conducted under 
the supervision of a Justice of the Peace, a practicing lawyer or a sworn member of the police or 
a local government returning officer.
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 The idea behind balloting as described by (Pearce & 
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Gordon, 2005, p. 152) was to ensure schools would not be able to engage in cream-skimming 
activities.
68
  Perhaps this overt attempt to regulate the process has provided the illusion that 
schools are indeed subject to oversight regarding cream-skimming. I argue that the number of 
places per school that are affected by ballot are miniscule compared to those places affected by 
home zone placement. No figures on the number of places filled by ballot are publicly available 
in Ministry of Education data about schools, but individual searches of school websites regarding 
balloted places per year reveal a small proportion of seats are in fact available (see Appendix 18 




Tomorrow’s Schools defined a set of institutional rules and guidelines for the educational 
marketplace in which schools must compete for students. The decision to devolve authority over 
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enrollment schemes in a context of per-pupil funding has illuminated a hard truth: Schools prefer 
advantaged, non-minority students. Attributing the potential to manipulate zones in part to the 
need to compete, the New Zealand Herald quoted Secondary Principal’s Council chairman Allan 
Vester in 2012 as saying, 
 “There is an incentive built into the system to include as many students who are 
as good as you can, and exclude as many as you can who won’t add to your reputation. I 
think that’s the whole nature of New Zealand schools…The Ministry of Education do 
have more teeth now to stop them doing things that aren’t fair, but under the previous 
governments, schools and boards of trustees had considerable power to set their 
zones.”(Harper & Shuttleworth, 2012) 
Vester’s remarks speak to the problem of weak incentives from Principal-Agent Theory 
(Wohlstetter et al., 2008). Schools lack proper incentives to be inclusive of low-decile students 
when inadequate per-pupil funding couples with the opportunity to zone in affluent students who 
can pay higher fees. If the Ministry were to consider school-level integration as important then 
leveraging Principal-Agent Theory will provide helpful guidance in designing the regulatory role 
of the Ministry or its regional authorities vis a vis schools around this goal. In response to 
improving the marketplace experience for providers, the Ministry will also need to review the 
connections between school selective behaviors and fiscal incentives more thoroughly. Per-pupil 
funding is arguably not as compelling an argument to take poor students when the opportunity to 
take affluent students and charge fees is more attractive. The Ministry should monitor the 




This study proves that discrimination can be detected and quantified. By identifying and 
testing for evidence of disparate impact on a case by case basis- New Zealand can subscribe to 
the notion that discrimination has no place in the public education system. This cross-sectional 
snap shot pulls back the curtain on school supply-side motivations in an arguably immature 
market. Parents have yet to make their collective move and will continue to vote with their feet 
and either enhance or neutralize disparities resulting from homezone placement going forward. 
Therefore, the Ministry of Education needs to step in and institute both micro (school-level) and 
complementary macro (community or metro-level) approaches to ensuring a healthy 
marketplace. In absence of adequate regional or meso-level authority over the subject of zoning, 
schools left to their own devices are unable to act collectively for the common good. My 
immediate recommendation is that the Ministry of Education should actively arbitrate the 
landscape of opportunity and choice until an intermediary institution can be implemented to take 
this on. The Ministry should without delay review all home zones at the school level to identify 
instances of disparate impact. Schools that are overtly excluding households based on 
socioeconomic status or racial characteristics must be held accountable and directed by the 
Ministry to re-design their home zones. Where logistical, geographical, political or metropolitan 
boundaries cannot explain these discontinuities, boundaries need to be re-drawn.   
The consumer experience should also be improved by enhancing the ability for parents to 
choose schools intelligently. The use of the decile rank as a framework to allocate funds, to 
characterize schools and as the basis for reporting in absence of readily digestible information 




issue has been raised multiple times by scholars and the New Zealand press (Edward B Fiske & 
Helen F Ladd, 2000; Harper & Shuttleworth, 2012; Ladd & Fiske, 2001; Lubienski et al., 2013; 
McQuillan, 2012; Thomson, 2010).  In their landmark book on the subject, Fiske and Ladd 
(2000) expressed much concern about this topic. The authors found a linear correlation between 
school decile rank and student flows between schools under open enrollment. School choice 
between 1991 and 1996 led to an exodus from lower-decile schools into high-decile schools. The 
authors cautioned that parents in the New Zealand school marketplace were informationally 
disabled due to limited and cumbersome sources of information about school quality. As a result 
“the mix of students at the school, and especially the ethnic mix, seems to dominate these other 
sources of imperfect information about school quality” (p.198).   
As covered in Chapter 1, New Zealand parents can search individual schools through the 
Ministry of Education website- but there is no effective way to make comparisons. Even more 
problematic is the fact that decile rank remains a front-facing metric available to parents about 
schools in these searches. The Ministry reported in 2012 that the use of the decile rank would 
become restricted but the initiative remains un-fulfilled at the close of 2015. Dougherty et al. 
(2010) present SmartChoices- a simple online tool where users (parents) can enter in an address 
and see all schools that are available to their child. School performance, racial balance and 
distance between schools in the parent’s choice set are included (p.8). A web application like 
SmartChoices should be considered in the New Zealand education system, with school decile 




would be a great investment in improving the market place’s architecture as the Education Act is 
updated. 
At the macro (metropolitan)-level, educational opportunity and access must be evaluated 
and enhanced.  In a similar approach as employed in Part II- geographies containing school-aged 
children should be evaluated from the perspective of access to choice and schooling opportunity. 
By guiding or directing the placement of home zones under circumstances of over subscription 
the Ministry of Education could create opportunities and conditions for diversity. I recommend 
that the Ministry evaluate each home zone for its added effect on restricting access to educational 
opportunity and mandate that schools draw zones with greater degrees of overlap in such cases.  
Achieving a healthier education market place will be a difficult task to accomplish. 
Significant economic and social factors will dampen the ability of the Ministry to increase 
oversight of school enrollment scheme policy. By estimating partial equilibrium effect of the 
removal of home zones for housing prices, Gibson and Boe-Gibson (2014) provide compelling 
evidence of the challenge. The most advantaged residents of the region could face housing price 
drops of at least $20,000 (p.17). Resistance to increased oversight could be expected from those 
who have already voted with their feet- the “homeowners (who) have paid a price for their 
dwelling that includes the expected value of access (or exclusion) from particular schools” (p. 
18).  Home zone oversight also faces societal challenges. Stuart-Wells et al. (2012) propose that 
school district boundaries (which are social boundaries) by long-term presence act to “shape not 
only opportunities but the very meaning of schooling and education” (p.132). Social boundaries 




factors, including the reputation and status of an institution, which in turn shape and constrain 
the distribution of tangible factors such as material resources, teacher quality and curricular 
offerings” (p.132). Richards (2014) notes “[I]t is difficult to assess the extent to which 
geographic features are truly barriers or whether they are often symbolic boundaries that 
maintain separation between historically distinct communities” (p.1129). For these complex and 
interrelated reasons, improvements to the education market will be difficult to implement. 
Linking New Zealand to the wider educational reform discourse 
Tomorrow’s Schools contains several parallels to international examples that make the 
findings reported here externally relevant. In the United States, charter schools are set up to be 
schools of choice that are funded publicly and governed autonomously -a setting that is quite 
comparable to New Zealand’s educational landscape.  Research into school or supply-side 
motivations in the charter school context abroad has been hamstrung by issues of selection bias 
(Henig, 2008) and problems with identification strategies(Zimmer & Guarino, 2013). For 
example, the charter school movement has been evaluated for its potential to create conditions 
whereby un-wanted students (students of minority status, low-performing students and students 
with special needs) would be ‘pushed-out.’ However, “it is difficult to demonstrate definitively 
that charter schools, or public schools, push out low-achieving students…it is more likely to 
occur in subtle ways,” according to (Zimmer & Guarino, 2013, p. 462). The authors empirically 
evaluate whether or not students exiting charter schools are more likely to be low-performers but 




and others lays in its imprecision in being able to evaluate ‘why’ students exit or transfer 
between public and charter schools. The authors attribute exit to parents rather than to schools, 
and also suggest movement may be more to do with students being transient than with a school’s 
motivation to push them out (p.473).  Where the body of research to date has relied on demand—
side empirics and foggy supply-side explanations of sorting  the New Zealand case provides an 
empirical breakthrough. 
Conditions of decentralization, competition and choice either permit (schools are 
empowered to draw their own home zones) or compel (incentives are perverse) schools to take 
strategic action leading to unintended consequences. In Chile, findings were not dissimilar. 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) study the case of that country’s educational voucher program and find 
a complementary phenomenon that takes place in the market for schooling. Parents are seeking 
to place their child in a setting that offers the best peer groups, whilst schools attempt to attract 
the best students in an effort to improve their productivity (and lower costs by taking on the least 
expensive students to educate). The end result, according to the authors is a sorting equilibrium 
among schools that is polarized.  The complementarities of these preferences along the supply 
and demand side for schooling underscore the competition dynamic. Lower decile schools 
operating autonomously in New Zealand face a “spiral of decline” (Gordon, 1994)– an artifact of 
being forced to compete while lacking adequate community and governance support by default. 
In the charter school example, schools opening up in disadvantaged areas in are met with deep 
challenges in absence of strong communities of support (Henig, 2008) and are found to divert 




(Lubienski, 2005). L. A. Huerta and Zuckerman (2009) describe the tension facing charter school 
administrators who would have been expected to engage in technical efficiencies that improve 
school quality as a consequence of being locally managed and competitive.  Yet “organizations 
that challenge institutionalized conceptions of effective schooling may be seen as ineffective and 
risk their legitimacy,” narrowing behavior towards survival in the marketplace that includes 
traditional public school norms. High decile schools in New Zealand confirm this by actively 
zoning out disadvantaged students in a bid to preserve their reputation and student body 
composition in the market.  
In a thoughtful review of the international experience and evidence, Lubienski (2014) 
writes: “dis-intermediation is less about devolving authority to local actors in order to produce 
more effective or equitable outcomes, and instead actually represents a centralization of policy 
power into the hands of non-state actors” (p.424). In the United States-charter management 
organization entities are outputting schools as chains –thereby creating a “de facto corporate 
model to supplant democratically controlled school districts,” while ‘new policy elites’ are 
influencing education in New York City and Chicago as the new meso (p.432). Education reform 
results not in enhancements to the technical core or to educational quality- rather it facilitates a 
transition of power from one institution to another. The New Zealand example reminds us that 
local control is not without its weaknesses either. There is no such thing as a “one-size fits all” 
solution. As the New Zealand government seeks to reform its own Education Act though 2016- 
policymakers would do well to review lessons from the United States. By placing student 




discontinuity will inevitably surface. Schools at a competitive disadvantage face added 
obligations to achieve, and motivations to gerrymander may become even more acute.  
The template provided in this study for examining the landscape of educational choice 
and schooling opportunity as a consequence of system design is also helpful in answering 
questions about the “choice effect” as described in the literature. Lauen (2009) found the slope of 
the effect of exercising choice on high school completion to vary depending on the 
socioeconomic and background characteristics of the chooser. The author was unable to 
empirically explain this ‘varying effect’ of choice on achievement and calls for more analysis. 
“Further research could determine the mechanisms behind the positive choice effect, whether the 
effect varies in different types of programs and across different locales and student 
subpopulations, and why high-achieving students seem to benefit more” (p.197). The findings 
presented here also indicate the presence of choice is not entirely synonymous with educational 
opportunity. By calculating school choice and schooling opportunity sets at the household-level 
and linking them together geographically, this work illustrates that school boundaries aggregate 
to produce a “choice effect” continuum across households. No education market is the same, 
despite the fact that key household characteristics drive disparities. For New Zealand students, it 






Bascand, G. (2007). Household Economic Survey: Year ended 30 June 2007. Wellington: 
Statistics New Zealand (1178-0479). Retrieved from Wellington: 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/Households/Househ
oldEconomicSurvey_HOTPYeJun07/Commentary.aspx 
Basile, M. (2012). The Cost-Effectiveness of Socioeconomic School Integration. In R. D. 
Kahlenberg (Ed.), The Future of School Integration: Socioeconomic Diversity as an 
Education Reform Strategy (pp. 127-151). New York: Century Foundation. 
Bayer, P., Ferreira, F., & McMillan, R. (2007). A unified framework for measuring preferences 
for schools and neighborhoods. Journal of Political Economy, 115(4).  
Bayer, P., & McMillan, R. (2005). Choice and competition in local education markets. 48. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11802.pdf doi:10.3386/w11802 
Bell, C. A. (2009). All choices created equal? The role of choice sets in the selection of schools. 
Peabody Journal of Education, 84(2), 191-208.  
Brunner, E., & Sonstelie, J. (2003). Homeowners, property values, and the political economy of 
the school voucher. Journal of Urban Economics, 54(2), 239-257.  
Carr, M., & Ritter, G. (2007). Measuring the competitive effect of charter schools on student 
achievement in Ohio’s traditional public schools. 33.  
Dougherty, J., Zannoni, D., Chowan, M., Coyne, C., Dawson, B., Guruge, T., & Nukic, B. 
(2010). How Does Information Influence Parental Choice? The Smart Choices Project in 
Hartford, Connecticut. http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP189.pdf Retrieved 
from http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP189.pdf 
Eaqub, S. (2014). Growing apart: Regional prosperity in New Zealand. Wellington: Bridget 
William Books Limited. 
Fiske, E. B., & Ladd, H. F. (2000). American Educator, 24(3), 28.  
Fiske, E. B., & Ladd, H. F. (2000). When schools compete: A cautionary tale. Washington: The 




Gibson, J., & Boe-Gibson, G. (2014). Capitalizing Performance of'Free'Schools and the 
Difficulty of Reforming School Attendance Boundaries. Retrieved from Hamilton, New 
Zealand:  
Gibson, J., Sabel, C., Boe-Gibson, G., & Kim, B. (2005). House prices and school zones: does 
geography matter? Paper presented at the New Zealand Association of Economists 
Conference, Christchurch, June. 
Goodman, F. I. (1972). De facto school segregation: A constitutional and empirical analysis. 
California Law Review, 60(2), 275-437.  Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3479538 
Gordon, L. (1994). Is school choice a sustainable policy for New Zealand?: A review of recent 
research findings and a look to the future. New Zealand Annual Review of Education, 4, 
9-24.  
Education Act 1989,  (1989). 
Harper, P., & Shuttleworth, K. (2012, Monday, 25 June 2012). Claim Auckland schools skew 
zones. New Zealand Herald. Retrieved from 
http://m.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10815330 
Henig, J. R. (2008). What do we know about the outcomes of KIPP schools. East Lansing, MI: 
Great Lakes Center for Education Research and Practice.  
Henig, J. R. (2009). Geo‐Spatial analyses and school choice research. American Journal of 
Education, 115(4), 649-657.  
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, 
and states (Vol. 25): Harvard university press. 
Hsieh, C.-T., & Urquiola, M. (2002). When schools compete, how do they compete? An 
assessment of Chile's nationwide school voucher program. 58.  
Huerta, L., & d’Entremont, C. (2010). Charter school finance: Seeking institutional legitimacy in 
a marketplace of resources. In C. Lubienski & P. Weitzel (Eds.), The charter school 
experiment: Expectations, evidence, and implications (pp. 121-146). 
Huerta, L. A., & Zuckerman, A. (2009). An institutional theory analysis of charter schools: 





Iceland, J., & Weinberg, D. H. (2002). Racial and ethnic residential segregation in the United 
States 1980-2000: Bureau of Census. 
Jacobsen, R., Frankenberg, E., & Lenhoff, S. W. (2012). Diverse Schools in a Democratic 
Society New Ways of Understanding How School Demographics Affect Civic and 
Political Learning. American Educational Research Journal, 49(5), 812-843.  
Kahlenberg, R. D. (Ed.) (2012). The future of school integration: Socioeconomic diversity as an 
education reform strategy. New York: The Century Foundation Press. 
Kalogrides, D., & Loeb, S. (2013). Different Teachers, Different Peers The Magnitude of 
Student Sorting Within Schools. Educational Researcher, 42(6), 304-316.  
Koedel, C., Betts, J. R., Rice, L. A., & Zau, A. C. (2009). The integrating and segregating effects 
of school choice. Peabody Journal of Education, 84(2), 110-129.  
Ladd, H. F., & Fiske, E. B. (2001). The uneven playing field of school choice: Evidence from 
New Zealand. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 20(1), 43-64.  
Ladd, H. F., & Fiske, E. B. (2003). Does competition improve teaching and learning? Evidence 
from New Zealand. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 25(1), 97-112.  
LaRocque, N. (2004). School choice: Lessons from New Zealand. Paper presented at the Cato 
Institute Conference, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.nzbr.org/nz/site/nzbr/files/speeches/speeches- 
2004/cato_conference_2004.pdf 
Lauen, D. L. (2009). To choose or not to choose: High school choice and graduation in Chicago. 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 31(3), 179-199. 
doi:10.3102/0162373709339058 
Levin, H. M. (2001). Privatizing Education: Can the Marketplace Deliver Choice, Efficiency, 
Equity, and Social Cohesion?  
Levin, H. M. (2010). A framework for designing governance and choice in portfolio districts: 
Three economic criteria. In K. E. Bulkley, J. R. Henig, & H. M. Levin (Eds.), Between 
Public and Private: Politics, Governance, and the New Portfolio Models for Urban 
School Reform (pp. 217-251). Cambridge: Harvard Education Press. 
Levin, H. M. (2012). Some economic guidelines for design of a charter school district. 




Loeb, S., Valant, J., & Kasman, M. (2011). Increasing choice in the market for schools: Recent 
reforms and their effects on student achievement. National Tax Journal, 64(1), 141-164.  
Lubienski, C. (2005). Public Schools in Marketized Environments: Shifting Incentives and 
Unintended Consequences of Competition-Based Educational Reforms. American 
Journal of Education, 111(4), 464-486.  
Lubienski, C. (2006). School Diversification in Second-Best Education Markets International 
Evidence and Conflicting Theories of Change. Educational Policy, 20(2), 323-344.  
Lubienski, C. (2014). Re-making the middle Dis-intermediation in international context. 
Educational Management Administration & Leadership, 42(3), 423-440. 
doi:10.11771741143214521594 
Lubienski, C., & Gulosino, C. (2007). Choice, competition, and organizational orientation: A 
geo-spatial analysis of charter schools and the distribution of educational opportunities. 
Occasional paper(148).  
Lubienski, C., Gulosino, C., & Weitzel, P. (2009). School choice and competitive incentives: 
Mapping the distribution of educational opportunities across local education markets. 
American Journal of Education, 115(4), 601-647.  
Lubienski, C., Lee, J., & Gordon, L. (2013). Self-managing schools and access for disadvantaged 
students: Organizational behaviour and school admissions. New Zealand Journal of 
Educational Studies, 48(1), 16.  
Lubienski, C., & Weitzel, P. (2010). Information use and epidemics in charter school policy. In 
C. Lubienski & P. Weitzel (Eds.), The charter school experiment: Expectations, 
evidence, and implications (pp. 197-217). Cambridge: Harvard Education Press. 
Lubienski, C., & Weitzel, P. C. (2010). The charter school experiment: Expectations, evidence, 
and implications: Harvard Education Press Cambridge, MA. 
MacLeod, W. B., & Urquiola, M. (2009). Anti-lemons: school reputation and educational 
quality. Retrieved from  
Mantil, A., Perkins, A. G., & Aberger, S. (2012). The challenge of high-poverty schools: how 
feasible is socioeconomic school integration? In R. D. Kahlenberg (Ed.), The Future of 
School Integration: Socioeconomic Diversity as an Education Reform Strategy (pp. 155-




Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1988). The dimensions of residential segregation. Social 
Forces, 67(2), 281-315.  
Massey, D. S., Fischer, M. J., Dickens, W. T., & Levy, F. (2003). The Geography of Inequality 
in the United States, 1950-2000 [with Comments]. Brookings-Wharton papers on urban 
affairs, 1-40.  
McQuillan, L. (2012, June 25, 2012, 6:11 pm). School zoning manipulation illegal: PM. News.  
Retrieved from https://nz.news.yahoo.com/a/-/mp/14027931/schools-keep-out-poor-
students-with-zoning/ 
New Zealand Ministry of Education. (2011). Guidelines for the development and operation of 
enrollment schemes. Wellington: Ministry of Education Retrieved from 
www.minedu.govt.nz/EnrollmentSchemes. 
New Zealand Ministry of Education. (2012). Enrollment Schemes – Secretary’s Guidelines for 




New Zealand Ministry of Education. (2015). Having your say about updating the Education Act 
1989. Ministry of Education Retrieved from 
http://www.education.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Ministry/consultations/Updating-the-
Education-Act-1989-A-public-discussion-document.pdf. 
Ni, Y., & Arsen, D. (2010). The competitive effects of charter schools on public school districts. 
In C. Lubienski & P. Weitzel (Eds.), The charter school experiment: Expectations, 
evidence, and implications (pp. 93-120). 
Pearce, D., & Gordon, L. (2005). In the zone: New Zealand’s legislation for a system of school 
choice and its effects. London Review of Education, 3(2), 145-157. 
doi:10.1080/14748460500163955 
Reardon, S. F. (2009). Measures of ordinal segregation. In J. Silber, Y. Fluckiger, & S. F. 
Reardon (Eds.), Research on Economic Inequality (Vol. 17, pp. 129-155): Emerald 
Group Publishing. 
Reardon, S. F., & Yun, J. T. (2002). Private School Racial Enrollments and Segregation. 






Reardon, S. F., Yun, J. T., & Chmielewski, A. K. (2012). Suburbanization and school 
segregation. In W. F. I. Tate (Ed.), Research on schools, neighborhoods, and 
communities: Toward Civic Responsibility (pp. 85-102). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
Rehm, M., & Filippova, O. (2008). The impact of geographically defined school zones on house 
prices in New Zealand. International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, 1(4), 
313-336. doi:10.1108/17538270810908623 
Richards, M. P. (2014). The Gerrymandering of School Attendance Zones and the Segregation of 
Public Schools A Geospatial Analysis. American Educational Research Journal, 51(6), 
1119-1157. doi:10.3102/0002831214553652 
Richards, M. P., Stroub, K., & Holme, J. J. (2012). Can NCLB choice work? Modeling the 
effects of interdistrict choice on student access to higher-performing schools. In R. D. 
Kahlenberg (Ed.), The Future of School Integration: Socioeconomic Diversity as an 
Education Reform Strategy (pp. 223-257). New York: The Century Foundation Press. 
Ryan, J. E., & Heise, M. (2002). The political economy of school choice. Yale Law Journal, 
2043-2136.  
Saporito, S., & Sohoni, D. (2007). Mapping educational inequality: Concentrations of poverty 
among poor and minority students in public schools. Social Forces, 85(3), 1227-1253.  
Stroub, K. J., & Richards, M. P. (2013). From Resegregation to Reintegration Trends in the 
Racial/Ethnic Segregation of Metropolitan Public Schools, 1993–2009. American 
Educational Research Journal, 50(3), 497-531.  
Stuart-Wells, A., Ready, D., Duran, J., Grzesikowski, C., Hill, K., Roda, A., . . . White, T. 
(2012). Still separate, still unequal, but not always so "suburban": The changing nature of 
suburban school districts in the New York metropolitan area. In W. F. I. Tate (Ed.), 
Research on schools, neighborhoods, and communities: Toward Civic Responsibility (pp. 
125-149). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Stubbs, T., & Strathdee, R. (2012). Markets in education: the impact of school choice policies in 
one market context in New Zealand. International Studies in Sociology of Education, 
22(2), 97-124. doi:10.1080/09620214.2012.700184 
Tannenbaum, D. I. (2013). School choice, redistricting, and the distributional consequences of 







Taskforce on Regulations Affecting School Performance. (2014). Considering education 
regulation in New Zealand.  Retrieved from 
http://www.education.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Ministry/Initiatives/Taskforce-on-
Regulations-Affecting-School-Performance/TaskforceReport.pdf. 
Tate, W. F. I. (Ed.) (2012). Research on schools, neighborhoods, and communities: Toward 
Civic Responsibility. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Telford, M., & May, S. (2010). PISA2009: Our 21st century learners at age 15. Wellington: 
Comparative Education Research Unit, Research Division, Ministry of Education. 
The New Zealand Ministry of Education. (2011). New Zealand schools: Ng¯a Kura o Aotearoa  




The New Zealand Ministry of Education. (2012). Annual Report  PŪRONGO-Ā-TAU 2012. 
Wellington: Ministry of Education Retrieved from 
http://www.minedu.govt.nz/~/media/MinEdu/Files/TheMinistry/AnnualReport/2012/MO
EAnnualReport2012FullWeb.pdf. 
Thomson, K. S. (2010). Externalities and School Enrollment Policy: A Supply-Side Analysis of 
School Choice in New Zealand. Journal of School Choice, 4(4), 418-449.  
Weitzel, P., & Lubienski, C. (2010). Conclusion:  Assessing the Charter School Experiment The 
charter school experiment: Expectations, evidence, and implications: Harvard Education 
Press. 
Willie, C. V., Edwards, R., & Alves, M. J. (2002). Student Diversity, Choice and School 
Improvement. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Wohlstetter, P., Datnow, A., & Park, V. (2008). Creating a system for data-driven decision-
making: Applying the principal-agent framework. School effectiveness and school 
improvement, 19(3), 239-259.  
Wylie, C. (1997). The role of New Zealand school boards in 1997. Report to the New Zealand 
School Trustees’ Association, New Zealand Council for Educational Research, 
Wellington.  
Wylie, C. (2006). What is the reality of school competition? Paper presented at the AERA 




Wylie, C. (2007). School governance in New Zealand-How is it working? : New Zealand 
Council for Educational Research Wellington, New Zealand. 
Wylie, C. (2009). What can we learn from the last twenty years? Why Tomorrow’s Schools could 
not achieve key purposes, and how we could do things differently with self-managing 
schools. Paper presented at the NZARE Conference, Rotorua. 
www.nzcer.org.nz/pdfs/learn-last-20-years.pdf 
Wylie, C., & King, J. (2005). An increasing tightness – pressure points for schools’ financial 
management: Second year report from the NZCER school funding study. Retrieved from 
Wellington, NZ:  
Zimmer, R. W., & Guarino, C. M. (2013). Is there empirical evidence that charter schools “push 






Appendix 1 How the New Zealand School Decile is Calculated 




1 Each school provides all student addresses to the Ministry. 
2 Student addresses are assigned to the smallest Census areas called meshblocks. A 
meshblock contains around 50 households. Only Census information for households 
with school-aged children is used. The number and percentage of students from 
each meshblock is determined. 
3 The meshblock is examined against the five following socioeconomic factors: 
 Household 
incomes 
The proportion of households with equivalent income (adjusted for 
the number of adults and children in the household, and the age of 
the children), in the lowest 20% nationally. Households with a 
member who is employed are usually not included in this group nor 
are all households supported on a benefit. 
 Occupation The percentage of employed parents in occupations that are at skill 
levels 4 or 5 (of the 1 to 5 levels in the Australia and New Zealand 
Standard Classification of Occupation (ANZSCO)). These include 
all labourers, all machine operators and assemblers, and others who 
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The percentage of households with an equivalised crowding index 
greater than one. This index is the proportion of household members 
per bedroom adjusted for the presence of children under 10, every 
two of whom are assigned to share a bedroom; couples, and others 
are each assigned their own bedroom. 
 Educational 
qualifications 
The percentage of parents with no tertiary or school qualifications. 
 Income 
support 
The percentage of parents who directly (ie not as a partner) received 
a Domestic Purposes Benefit, Unemployment Benefit or Sickness 
and Invalid’s Benefit in the previous year. It does not include parents 
receiving the Family Tax Credit. 
4 The five census factors are weighted by the number of students from each 
meshblock. This means that meshblocks where only a few of a school’s students 
live will have little impact on its decile., while those having more will have a greater 
impact. 
5 Schools are ranked in relation to every other school for each of the five factors and 
receive a score based on the percentile they fall into. 
6 The five scores for each school are added together (without any weightings) to give 
a total. This total gives the overall standing of the school in relation to all other 
schools in the country. 














Within a school’s operational funding, deciles determine the allocation of: 
 Targeted Funding for Educational Achievement  
 the Special Education Grant  





Ministry of Education resources determined by a school’s decile include: 
 Kura Kaupapa Māori transport (deciles 1 to 10) 
 Priority Teacher Supply Allowance (deciles 1 to 2) 
 National Relocation Grant (deciles 1 to 4) 
 Decile Discretionary Funding for Principals (deciles 1 to 4) 
 Resource Teachers of Learning and Behaviour (RTLBs)  
            Learning Support Funding (deciles 1 to 10) 
 RTLBs for years 11 to 13 (deciles 1 to 10) 
 School Property Financial Assistance scheme (deciles 1 to 10) 
 Study Support Centres (deciles 1 to 3) 
 Social Workers in Schools (deciles 1 to 5) 
 District Truancy Service (deciles 1 to 10). 
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Appendix 2 School Types  
Table II-9 New Zealand School Types 
  Sample (N=886) New Zealand 2012 Totals (N=2,548) 
School Types Count  Share of 
Schools 
Enrollment Share of 
Enrollment 
Count  Share of 
Schools 
Enrollment Share of 
Enrollment 
Full Primary (Year 1-8) 292 33% 74,332 20% 1,100 43.2% 175,498 23% 
Contributing (Year 1-6) 368 42% 122,197 32% 772 30.3% 213,912 28% 
Composite (Year 1-10) 
    
4 0.2% 486 0% 
Composite (Year 1-15) 22 2% 9,555 3% 149 5.8% 42,152 6% 
Restricted Comp. (Yr 7-10) 1 0% 
 
0% 4 0.2% 1,340 0% 
Intermediate (year 7 and 8) 71 8% 32,400 9% 120 4.7% 53,944 7% 
Correspondence School* 
    
1 0.0% 7,542 1% 
Secondary (Year 7-10) 
    
2 0.1% 1,845 0% 
Secondary (Year 7-15) 34 4% 26,708 7% 99 3.9% 58,214 8% 
Secondary (Year 9-15) 97 11% 111,908 30% 236 9.3% 207,319 27% 
Secondary (Year 11-15) 
    
2 0.1% 909 0% 
Kura Teina** Composite 1 0% 27 0% 
    
Special School*** 
    
39 1.5% 2,959 0% 
Teen Parent Unit^ 




Grand Total 886 100% 377,127 100% 2,548 100% 766,120 100% 
* A distant education service offering learning programmes for children aged three to five years. An option for children who are unable to attend or have limited access to an 
early childhood services because of isolation, illness, a physical disability or itinerancy.  
**An applicant school accepted into the preparation and assessment process for establishment as a Section 155 Te Aho Matua Kura Kaupapa Māori. It is an off-site satellite 
unit of an existing Kura Kaupapa Māori called a Kura Tuakana. Each Kura Teina is provided with governance, management, mentoring and professional support by a Kura 
Tuakana. Kura Teina's can either be a primary or a composite school. 
***A school providing specialist education or support for students with specific physical, behaviour, sensory or intellectual support needs. 
^A unit, attached to a host secondary school, providing educational programmes for teenagers who are pregnant or who have prime responsibility for their children's care; and 





Appendix 3 Calculation of home zone decile rank 
For the estimate of zone decile,meshblocks with no children are removed, as in the calculation of 
school decile, households from meshblocks with no school aged children were not included. 
Across the sample of 17,335 populated meshblocks in the four metropolitan areas of the study, 
86 had no children in 2006 leaving 17,360 meshblocks eligible to be spatially matched to 
geographies using GIS. Upon linking census data to geogrpahies, the sample was matched at 
15,952 meshblocks for the final sample used in this portion of the analysis.  
Household Income: As per the Ministry of Education criteria for calculating income, all 
households in meshblocks containing children with income in the bottom 20% nationally are 
calculated for each home zone. Statistics New Zealand provides annual decile ranks of household 
income for New Zealand, and in the year ending June 30, 2007 the second decile includes 
households earning up to and including $25,799 (Bascand, 2007).  Because meshblock data 
about household income appears in segments, all households that were listed as having 
household income at $30,000 and below in 2006 were tallied for each meshblock.  
Occupation: As per the school decile calculation, the percent of the home zone meshblocks 
populated with children that are employed in skill levels 4 or 5 of the ANZSCO classification. 




Workers, Clerical and Administrative Workers, Sales Workers, Machinery Operators and 
Drivers and Labourers.79 
Household Crowding: The Ministry of Education estimates household crowding as the 
proportion of household members per bedroom which is adjusted for the presence of children. 
Households with children under the age of 10 are allotted one bedroom per two children, while 
all other household members are allotted one bedroom. In order to come close to replicating the 
measure of crowding for home zone meshblocks, data from statistics New Zealand households 
was combined with data from dwellings. Each meshblock’s mean number of usual residents was 
divided by its mean number of bedrooms per dwelling.  
Educational Qualifications: For each meshblock in the home zone the number of habitants with 
no tertiary or school qualifications is calculated.80  By  
Income Support: The proportion of people for each meshblock populated with children who 
received one of the following benefits: Domestic Purposes Benefit, Unemployment Benefit, 
Sickness Benefit, Invalid’s Benefit.  
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Appendix 4  Data Appendix 




School ID Unique number assigned to each institution 
School Name Full name of each institution  
Telephone Telephone number for each institution, including area code 
Fax Facsimile number for each institution, including area code 
Email Email address for appropriate administrative contact for institution 
Principal Current principal at school 
Street Street for location address 
Suburb  Suburb for location address 
City Town or city for location address 
Postal Address 1 P O Box, Private Bag or rural delivery number for postal address 
Postal Address 2 Suburb for Postal Address 
Postal Address 3 Town or city for Postal Address 
Postal Code Postcode used by NZ Post for Postal Address 
School Type Type for each institution 
Definition Definition provides further descriptive information on the type of each 
institution 
Authority Describes the ownership/operation or registration status of each 
educational institution 
Gender of Students School gender i.e. Gender of students that schools cater for 
Territorial Local 
Authority 
The territorial authority area the school is located in.  The territorial 
authority boundaries are defined by Statistics New Zealand. 
Regional Council The regional council area the school is located in.  Regional Council 
boundaries are defined by Statistics New Zealand. 
  
Census Area Unit The census area unit area each school is located in.  Census Area Unit 
boundaries are defined by Statistics New Zealand. 





Ministry of Education Local Office district each institution is located in  
General Electorate General electoral district for the area where an institution is located. Based 
on the electoral boundaries for the 2008 election 
Māori Electorate Māori electoral district for the area where an institution is located. Based 
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on the māori electoral boundaries for the 2008 election. 
Longitude Longitudinal co-ordinate where the institution is located. 
Latitude Latitudinal co-ordinate where the institution is located. 
Decile A schools decile indicated the extent to which the school draws its 
students from the low socioeconomic communities. Decile 1 schools are 
the 10% of schools with the highest proportion of students from the low 
socioeconomic communities, whereas decile 10 schools are the 10% of 
schools with the lowest proportion of these students. A schools decile does 
not indicate the overall socioeconomic mix of the school.  
School Rolls The most up-to-date roll data available.  The roll information will be older 
















Table II-11 List of schools with no information on home zones  
Home zones by issue and status in final sample 
ID Name Dec
ile 
City Sector Authority Issue Status in analysis 
of boundary 
discontinuity 




State Zone hand-drawn  Included 






No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 








No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 




State Zone hand-drawn  Included 








No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 




State Zone hand-drawn  Included 






No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 






Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 








Zone hand-drawn  Included 











Composite Zone  




Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 




Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 
387 John McGlashan 
College 




Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 






State Zone hand-drawn  Included 






State 3 different 
boundaries defined 
Included 
Composite Zone  




Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 
1192 Dunedin Rudolf 
Steiner School 
7 Dunedin Full Primary State 
Integrated 
No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 




Full Primary State Zone hand-drawn  Included 
1278 Forrest Hill School 9 Aucklan
d 
Contributing State Zone hand-drawn  Included 




Full Primary State 
Integrated 
No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 






No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 




Contributing State Zone hand-drawn  Included 




Full Primary State Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 




Full Primary State 
Integrated 
No Zone Map 
Available 
Excluded 




Full Primary State 
Integrated 








9 Dunedin Intermediate State Zone hand-drawn  Included 
4117 Liberton Christian 
School 
8 Otago Full Primary State 
Integrated 
Zone area> = city 
area 
Excluded 












Appendix 5 Metropolitan Area Sample Exclusions  
In the case of one territorial authority- Franklin District (TA 010), meshblocks were members of 
both region 03 and region 02. Only those schools contained in Franklin District  Territorial 
Authority 010 that were a part of Auckland Region (02) were included. This means that the city 
of Pukekohe of Region 02 was included in the analysis, however the town of Tuakau further to 
the south was excluded. Schools between the two areas in some cases hade home zones that 
overlappd both regions. During the matching process of meshblock data between the census and 
spatial boundaries for each of the 13 territorial authorities, it was determined that the 
Christchurch region (TA 060)  included TA (061) in the census data but was spatially 
differientiated into to TA’s (060 and 061). All TA 061 meshblocks (n=111) were removed from 
the final matching of space to data as these areas were outside the 13 Territorial Areas as defined 
although they were included in 2006 meshblocks as belonging to TA 060. 
Two schools with home zones (ID 45 and 1452) were contained in region 03 with the majority of 
their school zones covering the Pukekohe area of region 03. These schools were removed from 
the home zone analysis for consistencey. For non-spatial census data, 18,274 meshblocks were 
identified across the 5 metropolitan areas, of these, 823 had a population of zero in 2006 (of 
which 607 had zero population across 1996, 2001 and 2006). Another 5 meshblocks were 
identified as being islands with population in 2006 of 9 or less and were removed leaving an 
eligible sample of 17,446  populated meshblocks. Of this sample, a further 1,410 meshblocks 




In 33 cases, meshblocks were non-contiguous (the number of duplicates per meshblock ranges 
from 2 to 39 for a total of 206 cases). Of the 33 meshblocks with multiple geographies, 12 had 
no population and were removed (n= 119 geographies). The remaining 21 had a population and 
were examined individually to identify the main geography associated with the non-contiguous 
meshblock set, leading to 66 land parcel deletions for the 21 non-contiguous meshblocks. All 
characteristics attributed to the meshblock were kept in the data for analysis, but only the 
dominant geography in these 21 cases was retained for spatial analysis.  The size of the 
geographies that were removed ranged from a few meters wide to a maximum of 800 meters (in 
one case) averaging 0.06 km
2
. In most cases, the parcels of land that were removed were small 
islands adjacent to the main geography of the meshblock. A complete list of removed 




Appendix 6 BDD Design- Meshblock Duplicates 
 
 










Table II-12 Meshblock duplicates 
Number of Meshblock Duplicates- BDD Analysis 
Count of Duplicated 
Meshblocks 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
0 4,477 11.94 11.94 
1 7,380 19.68 31.61 
2 7,485 19.96 51.57 
3 6,288 16.76 68.33 
4 4,770 12.72 81.05 
5 3,054 8.14 89.19 
6 1,918 5.11 94.31 
7 928 2.47 96.78 
8 738 1.97 98.75 
9 240 0.64 99.39 
10 121 0.32 99.71 
11 96 0.26 99.97 
12 13 0.03 100 









Appendix 7 Home zone Tenure –Sensitivity Analysis 
I estimated each school’s home zone decile rank using the same methodology employed in the 
school student-body decile formula). Each home zone is assigned a decile rank relative to other 
home zones based on the same five decile composition characteristics as employed by the 
Ministry of Education in school decile calculations
82
 (see Appendix 3for more details on the 
calculation of the school zone decile rank). Using the full sample of meshblocks, decile ranks are 
calculated for each of the five indicators (income, education, occupation, household crowding, 
and public assistance) and assigned to each meshblock. For example, if a given meshblock has 
17-percent of its adult population receiving some form of public benefit, the meshblock is 
assigned a public assistance decile rank of 3 which is based on its position relative to all other 
meshblocks across the sample. Once assigned, the five decile ranks associated with the five 
indicators per meshblock are summed and divided by five for a single decile rank for each 
meshblock. As in the case of the school decile formula, only those meshblocks that are populated 
with children are included in the home zone decile calculation. Meshblocks are weighted by the 
number of children and the percentage of area of the meshblock falling inside the zone and then 
aggregated to the home zone level for a final decile estimate. This will provide an opportunity to 
determine whether a school’s student-body composition is in equilibrium with its home zone 
composition. Home zones that have been in place for longer are expected to have school decile 








ranks that reflect the composition of their home zones. In cases where home zones are newer, 
school student body composition is expected to evolve in the direction of school zone 
composition. 
By graphing school decile rank against home zone composition decile as calculated, a baseline 
overview of the relationship is provided (Figure II-14). Difference in homezone decile rank 
compared to school decile rank averages -1.86 with a standard deviation of 1.93. The range is 
from -5.1 to 2.9 between home zones and schools. That is to say, schools are expected to change 
in decile rank based on their catchment area composition by between minus 5.1 and plus 2.9 
deciles over the sample, with time. A scatter of decile differences over school decile indicates 
that low decile schools have school zones with higher decile ranks and the inverse is true in high 
decile schools.  When looking at the relationship between direction of difference in home zone 
rank to school rank and the year the school enacted a home zone, there is no clear pattern 
present. This could indicate that schools are not “out of equilibrium” with their homezone decile 
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Figure II-14 Estimated distance between school decile and home zone decile by school decile 












Appendix 8 BDD Results- School Gender & Decile Grouping Results 
Table II-13 Boundary Discontinuity Design - School Gender Model with City Fixed Effects 
1 is 70-100% inside; 0 is less than 30% inside Gender Model Coed  Girls  Boys  
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.969* (-2.14) 0.972* (-2.04) 0.528*** (-7.81) 0.780*** (-3.33) 
Number same-sector schools located in MB 0.710*** (-4.24) 0.707*** (-4.29) 0.969 (-0.02) 0.556 (-0.59) 
Sum of scheme seats available to MB (per 100) 1.020*** (5.80) 1.019*** (5.11) 1.016 (1.16) 1.040** (3.16) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-1.47) 0.999 (-1.43) 0.998 (-0.32) 1.003 (0.56) 
Private occupied w/ children (MB perc growth 06-96) 1.299* (2.57) 1.265* (2.18) 3.320* (2.03) 1.105 (0.24) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.013 (0.15) 1.038 (0.39) 0.855 (-0.61) 0.729 (-0.70) 
Percent Unemployed 0.727 (-0.50) 0.765 (-0.42) 30.03 (0.81) 0.00244 (-1.70) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.905 (-0.39) 0.876 (-0.49) 0.166 (-1.31) 5.483 (1.91) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.811 (-1.13) 0.785 (-1.23) 1.043 (0.04) 0.870 (-0.19) 
No partner (percent) 0.316*** (-4.79) 0.317*** (-4.71) 0.167 (-1.25) 0.852 (-0.19) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.430*** (-4.58) 0.420*** (-4.56) 0.532 (-0.72) 0.924 (-0.09) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.845 (-0.51) 0.867 (-0.42) 0.0517* (-2.24) 8.199 (1.03) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.372*** (-3.34) 0.386** (-3.20) 0.0110 (-1.91) 0.294 (-0.33) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.488** (-2.84) 0.506** (-2.63) 0.0634* (-2.54) 0.547 (-0.46) 
Pop Middle Eastern/Latin American/African (percent) 0.148* (-2.25) 0.130* (-2.29) 0.0208 (-1.71) 2.226 (0.13) 
Pop other (percent) 0.800 (-0.65) 0.872 (-0.40) 0.0286* (-2.57) 0.206 (-0.84) 
bot_tot 1.058* (2.06) 1.062* (2.16) 1.214 (1.40) 1.458*** (4.34) 
bot_percmin 1.464 (1.85) 1.405 (1.67) 0.222 (-0.90) 0.0108** (-3.09) 
Wellington 1.080 (0.68) 1.029 (0.26) 6.380* (2.40) 0.752 (-0.68) 
Christchurch 0.711*** (-3.91) 0.705*** (-3.87) 0.267** (-3.09) 1.020 (0.05) 
Dunedin 0.883 (-0.61) 0.886 (-0.55) 0.452*** (-4.07)   
genderofst==Girls School 1.483 (1.46)       
genderofst==Boys School 0.0970*** (-4.50)       
(boys==1)*perc_mov_06 3.645** (2.76)       
(boys==1)*perc_nopart06 5.536* (2.00)       
(boys==1)*bot_tot 1.106* (2.45)       
(boys==1)*bot_percmin 0.0762*** (-3.82)       
(girls==1)*perc_asian 0.135* (-2.54)       
(girls==1)*perc_oth 0.0310*** (-3.79)       
Observations 24006  22007  1082  917  
Pseudo R2 0.031  0.028  0.133  0.096  
N_clust 372  358  8  6  
Exponentiated coefficients; z statistics in parentheses  
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***








Table II-14- Boundary Discontinuity Design - Logistic School Decile Model with City Fixed Effects 
1 is 70-100% inside; 0 is less than 30% inside DecileModel Low Decile  Mid Decile  High Decile 
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.966* (-2.39) 0.987 (-1.00) 0.931** (-2.86) 0.962 (-1.39) 
Number same-sector schools located in MB 0.712*** (-4.23) 0.859 (-0.78) 0.791 (-1.49) 0.655*** (-4.06) 
Sum of scheme seats available to MB (per 100) 1.016*** (6.18) 1.021 (1.84) 1.014*** (3.29) 1.018*** (5.00) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-1.22) 0.998 (-0.92) 0.999 (-0.85) 0.999 (-0.82) 
Private occupied w/ children (MB perc growth 06-96) 1.258* (2.24) 0.852 (-0.55) 0.799 (-1.28) 1.797*** (4.38) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.082 (0.87) 1.273 (1.25) 1.082 (0.56) 0.992 (-0.06) 
Percent Unemployed 0.667 (-0.63) 0.242 (-1.05) 0.835 (-0.15) 0.748 (-0.31) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.357* (-2.41) 2.758 (0.90) 0.178*** (-3.98) 1.202 (0.55) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.785 (-1.29) 0.783 (-0.49) 0.842 (-0.52) 0.731 (-1.18) 
No partner (percent) 0.399*** (-3.84) 0.928 (-0.11) 0.237** (-3.05) 0.412** (-2.76) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.503*** (-3.86) 0.575 (-1.03) 0.995 (-0.02) 0.341*** (-4.60) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.936 (-0.20) 4.597** (3.14) 1.009 (0.01) 0.454 (-1.52) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.550* (-2.01) 2.657** (2.73) 0.195** (-2.85) 0.0182*** (-8.64) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.770 (-0.90) 2.851 (1.48) 0.565 (-1.53) 0.278*** (-4.05) 
Pop Middle Eastern/Latin American/African (percent) 0.179* (-1.97) 3.881 (0.70) 0.115 (-1.62) 0.328 (-0.88) 
Pop other (percent) 0.769 (-0.77) 6.474 (1.49) 0.622 (-0.85) 0.734 (-0.68) 
bot_tot 1.009 (0.33) 1.035 (0.74) 1.030 (0.72) 1.135** (2.60) 
bot_percmin 1.309 (1.34) 0.937 (-0.22) 1.388 (0.87) 1.361 (0.89) 
Wellington 1.052 (0.42) 1.099 (0.32) 1.256 (0.82) 1.009 (0.07) 
Christchurch 0.680*** (-4.60) 1.267 (1.06) 0.552*** (-3.90) 0.687*** (-3.37) 
Dunedin 0.880 (-0.65) 0.622 (-1.73) 0.448*** (-3.37) 1.118 (0.50) 
low_dec 0.849 (-1.34)       
high_dec 0.445* (-2.35)       
(high_dec==1)*perc_coll06 3.157* (2.08)       
(high_dec==1)*perc_pac 0.0262*** (-6.71)       
(high_dec==1)*perc_asian 0.373** (-2.79)       
(high_dec==1)*bot_tot 1.129* (2.41)       
Observations 24006  3068  7502  13436  
Pseudo R2 0.037  0.014  0.030  0.053  
N_clust 372  53  99  220  




Appendix 9 BDD Sensitivity Analysis 
Table II-15 Boundary Discontinuity Design - Sensitivity Analysis- Metro Models 
 IN2  IN  GLM  
main       
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.967* (-2.26) 0.953 (-1.94) 0.969* (-2.34) 
# same-sector schools located in MB 0.716*** (-4.15) 0.750* (-2.54) 0.724*** (-4.33) 
Sum scheme seats available (per 100) 1.017*** (6.65) 1.046*** (8.75) 1.017*** (7.18) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-1.41) 0.999 (-1.26) 0.999 (-1.60) 
Private w/kids (MB %growth 06-96) 1.293* (2.49) 1.257 (1.60) 1.267* (2.47) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.028 (0.31) 1.128 (1.01) 1.033 (0.39) 
Percent Unemployed 0.667 (-0.63) 0.236 (-1.76) 0.615 (-0.81) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.615 (-1.85) 0.407* (-2.37) 0.628 (-1.89) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.956 (-0.23) 0.929 (-0.26) 0.954 (-0.25) 
No partner (percent) 0.347*** (-4.58) 0.358** (-3.19) 0.378*** (-4.46) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.457*** (-4.44) 0.417*** (-3.70) 0.492*** (-4.27) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.749 (-0.88) 1.124 (0.28) 0.765 (-0.86) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.332*** (-3.69) 0.381** (-2.67) 0.366*** (-3.55) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.452** (-3.16) 0.655 (-1.33) 0.478** (-3.11) 
Pop MELAA (percent) 0.135* (-2.35) 0.229 (-1.23) 0.160* (-2.28) 
Pop other (percent) 0.685 (-1.12) 0.459 (-1.69) 0.717 (-1.06) 
bot_tot 1.062* (2.36) 0.991 (-0.28) 1.052* (2.12) 
bot_percmin 1.513* (2.07) 1.543* (1.99) 1.456* (2.04) 
Wellington 1.931* (2.29) 1.887* (1.96) 1.853* (2.27) 
Christchurch 0.694*** (-4.31) 0.825 (-1.63) 0.721*** (-4.15) 
Dunedin 0.366*** (-4.81) 0.493** (-2.88) 0.418*** (-4.47) 
(Dunedin==1)*perc_coll06 124.7*** (5.09) 243.8*** (5.30) 74.28*** (4.65) 
(Wellington==1)*perc_bluea06 0.236** (-2.58) 0.455 (-1.16) 0.260* (-2.57) 
(Dunedin==1)*perc_pac 0.0345* (-2.40) 0.689 (-0.20) 0.0509* (-2.28) 
Observations 24006  12892  24916  
Pseudo R2 0.031  0.063    
AIC 32275.8  16753.4  32368.0  
BIC 32478.0  16940.1  32571.1  
N_clust 372  368  372  




Table II-16 Boundary Discontinuity Design - Sensitivity Analysis- Sector Models 
 IN2  IN  GLM  
main       
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.952* (-2.40) 0.927* (-2.22) 0.954* (-2.52) 
Number same-sector schools located in MB 0.785** (-3.01) 0.785* (-2.19) 0.788** (-3.20) 
Sum of scheme seats available to MB (per 100) 1.016*** (4.19) 1.067*** (7.67) 1.017*** (4.69) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-0.87) 0.998 (-1.42) 0.999 (-1.10) 
Private occupied w/ children (MB %growth 06-96) 1.310** (2.61) 1.256 (1.58) 1.285** (2.62) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.015 (0.17) 1.080 (0.65) 1.017 (0.21) 
Percent Unemployed 0.731 (-0.50) 0.253 (-1.65) 0.672 (-0.67) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.762 (-1.05) 0.393* (-2.50) 0.751 (-1.18) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.804 (-1.18) 0.884 (-0.49) 0.813 (-1.19) 
No partner (percent) 0.284*** (-5.19) 0.259*** (-4.05) 0.309*** (-5.17) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.448*** (-4.55) 0.388*** (-4.04) 0.485*** (-4.37) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.904 (-0.30) 1.589 (1.07) 0.917 (-0.28) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.306*** (-4.13) 0.337** (-3.14) 0.336*** (-4.04) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.525* (-2.54) 0.851 (-0.49) 0.551* (-2.47) 
Pop MELAA(percent) 0.123* (-2.48) 0.305 (-1.00) 0.147* (-2.41) 
Pop other (percent) 0.680 (-1.13) 0.490 (-1.53) 0.719 (-1.04) 
bot_tot 1.056 (1.79) 1.036 (0.95) 1.049 (1.66) 
bot_percmin 1.433 (1.62) 1.496 (1.75) 1.385 (1.60) 
Wellington 1.075 (0.68) 1.411** (2.81) 1.074 (0.70) 
Christchurch 0.700*** (-4.13) 0.752* (-2.41) 0.722*** (-4.11) 
Dunedin 0.842 (-0.91) 1.413 (1.59) 0.881 (-0.72) 
secondary 1.435* (2.17) 0.801 (-0.99) 1.376* (2.03) 
intermediate 1.578*** (5.82) 1.722*** (5.75) 1.557*** (6.08) 
composite 1.451*** (3.42) 2.042*** (3.41) 1.414** (3.29) 
(composite==1)*perc_pac 11.48** (3.19) 25.20* (2.52) 9.930*** (3.30) 
(secondary==1)*perc_asian 0.394* (-2.05) 0.192** (-2.59) 0.396* (-2.16) 
Observations 24006  12892  24916  
Pseudo R2 0.036  0.077    
AIC 32127.3  16498.5  32218.2  
BIC 32345.6  16700.0  32437.5  
N_clust 372  368  372  




Table II-17 Boundary Discontinuity Design - Sensitivity Analysis- Gender Models 
 IN2  IN  GLM  
main       
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.969* (-2.14) 0.956 (-1.86) 0.971* (-2.22) 
Number same-sector schools located in MB 0.710*** (-4.24) 0.745** (-2.61) 0.718*** (-4.43) 
Sum of scheme seats available to MB (per 100) 1.020*** (5.80) 1.053*** (7.28) 1.020*** (6.06) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-1.47) 0.998 (-1.49) 0.999 (-1.65) 
Private occupied w/ children (% growth 06-96) 1.299* (2.57) 1.264 (1.64) 1.271* (2.54) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.013 (0.15) 1.134 (1.07) 1.019 (0.22) 
Percent Unemployed 0.727 (-0.50) 0.281 (-1.55) 0.669 (-0.68) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.905 (-0.39) 0.614 (-1.34) 0.892 (-0.47) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.811 (-1.13) 0.831 (-0.71) 0.817 (-1.16) 
No partner (percent) 0.316*** (-4.79) 0.330*** (-3.41) 0.349*** (-4.66) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.430*** (-4.58) 0.424*** (-3.47) 0.465*** (-4.43) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.845 (-0.51) 1.371 (0.74) 0.851 (-0.52) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.372*** (-3.34) 0.442* (-2.28) 0.407** (-3.20) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.488** (-2.84) 0.718 (-1.04) 0.513** (-2.81) 
Pop MELAA(percent) 0.148* (-2.25) 0.324 (-0.94) 0.172* (-2.19) 
Pop other (percent) 0.800 (-0.65) 0.517 (-1.40) 0.830 (-0.58) 
bot_tot 1.058* (2.06) 0.989 (-0.35) 1.049 (1.85) 
bot_percmin 1.464 (1.85) 1.427 (1.61) 1.409 (1.81) 
Wellington 1.080 (0.68) 1.373** (2.69) 1.076 (0.68) 
Christchurch 0.711*** (-3.91) 0.869 (-1.16) 0.737*** (-3.75) 
Dunedin 0.883 (-0.61) 1.452 (1.58) 0.921 (-0.44) 
Girls School 1.483 (1.46) 1.221 (0.61) 1.458 (1.30) 
Boys School 0.0970*** (-4.50) 0.046*** (-4.32) 0.109*** (-4.58) 
(boys==1)*perc_mov_06 3.645** (2.76) 1.598 (0.50) 3.581** (2.79) 
(boys==1)*perc_nopart06 5.536* (2.00) 16.88 (1.51) 4.405 (1.82) 
(boys==1)*bot_tot 1.106* (2.45) 1.149 (1.53) 1.102* (2.46) 
(boys==1)*bot_percmin 0.0762*** (-3.82) 0.0658 (-1.54) 0.102*** (-3.57) 
(girls==1)*perc_asian 0.135* (-2.54) 0.0681** (-2.62) 0.150* (-2.48) 
(girls==1)*perc_oth 0.0310*** (-3.79) 0.117 (-1.46) 0.041*** (-3.32) 
Observations 24006  12892  24916  
Pseudo R2 0.031  0.066    
AIC 32280.9  16713.1  32371.6  
BIC 32523.5  16937.0  32615.3  
N_clust 372  368  372  





Table II-18 Boundary Discontinuity Design - Sensitivity Analysis- Decile Models 
 IN2  IN  GLM  
main       
Distance from MB to school (km) 0.966* (-2.39) 0.951* (-2.04) 0.968* (-2.48) 
Number same-sector schools in MB 0.712*** (-4.23) 0.749* (-2.57) 0.721*** (-4.38) 
Sum of scheme seats availabl (per 100) 1.016*** (6.18) 1.045*** (8.70) 1.016*** (6.70) 
Pop u19 (2006) 0.999 (-1.22) 0.999 (-1.29) 0.999 (-1.45) 
Priv. Occ  kids (MB % growth 06-96) 1.258* (2.24) 1.213 (1.36) 1.233* (2.21) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 1.082 (0.87) 1.224 (1.69) 1.082 (0.94) 
Percent Unemployed 0.667 (-0.63) 0.230 (-1.79) 0.612 (-0.82) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.357* (-2.41) 0.154** (-2.79) 0.369* (-2.38) 
Blue collar workers 2006 (percent) 0.785 (-1.29) 0.837 (-0.67) 0.789 (-1.35) 
No partner (percent) 0.399*** (-3.84) 0.446* (-2.47) 0.435*** (-3.70) 
Movers (%) (in res less than 5 yrs) 0.503*** (-3.86) 0.467** (-3.18) 0.540*** (-3.70) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) 0.936 (-0.20) 1.482 (0.92) 0.933 (-0.23) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) 0.550* (-2.01) 0.634 (-1.16) 0.585 (-1.91) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.770 (-0.90) 1.245 (0.56) 0.790 (-0.86) 
Pop MELAA(percent) 0.179* (-1.97) 0.351 (-0.86) 0.208 (-1.91) 
Pop other (percent) 0.769 (-0.77) 0.509 (-1.47) 0.808 (-0.67) 
bot_tot 1.009 (0.33) 0.972 (-0.72) 1.004 (0.14) 
bot_percmin 1.309 (1.34) 1.328 (1.24) 1.263 (1.25) 
Wellington 1.052 (0.42) 1.351* (2.35) 1.052 (0.45) 
Christchurch 0.680*** (-4.60) 0.825 (-1.64) 0.705*** (-4.44) 
Dunedin 0.880 (-0.65) 1.445 (1.63) 0.917 (-0.47) 
low_dec 0.849 (-1.34) 0.819 (-1.12) 0.869 (-1.18) 
high_dec 0.445* (-2.35) 0.598 (-1.26) 0.470* (-2.32) 
(high_dec==1)*perc_coll06 3.157* (2.08) 5.453* (2.16) 2.997* (2.07) 
(high_dec==1)*perc_pac 0.026*** (-6.71) 0.021*** (-6.11) 0.029*** (-7.11) 
(high_dec==1)*perc_asian 0.373** (-2.79) 0.332* (-2.25) 0.391** (-2.80) 
(high_dec==1)*bot_tot 1.129* (2.41) 1.070 (1.12) 1.121* (2.38) 
Observations 24006  12892  24916  
Pseudo R2 0.037  0.070    
AIC 32092.7  16641.9  32185.3  
BIC 32319.1  16850.9  32412.8  
N_clust 372  368  372  








Figure II-16 Forest Plot NZ Dep Score 2006, Secondary Schools 





Overall  (I-squared = 88.9%, p = 0.000)
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Appendix 12  Household Choice Distributions by City 




Auckland Wellington Christchurch Dunedin Total 
0 805 3 0 0 808 
1 1,527 478 0 0 2,005 
2 2,079 765 172 0 3,016 
3 1,991 601 546 0 3,138 
4 1,512 566 511 0 2,589 
5 857 683 415 386 2,341 
6 363 332 367 422 1,484 
7 142 56 286 276 760 
8 45 9 191 179 424 
9 8 1 128 13 150 
10 5 1 77 10 93 
11 1 0 37 0 38 
12 0 0 23 0 23 
13 0 0 7 0 7 
14 0 0 3 0 3 
15 0 0 1 0 1 
      
Total 9,335 3,495 2,764 1,286 16,880 
Choice Set [0,11] [0,10] [2,15] [5,10] [0,15] 










Appendix 13 Primary Sector Predicted Probabilities (Choice) 
Table II-20 Predicted Probabilities of School Choice for Primary School (All Cities) 
 Auckland Wellington Christchurch Dunedin 
Pred0 0.242*** 0.443***   
 (0.00517) (0.0116)   
Pred1 0.518*** 0.467*** 0.0933*** 0.642*** 
 (0.00625) (0.00689) (0.00613) (0.0198) 
Pred2 0.204*** 0.0874*** 0.344*** 0.337*** 
 (0.00200) (0.000778) (0.0152) (0.00523) 
Pred3 0.0338*** 0.00227*** 0.312*** 0.0200*** 
 (0.000358) (0.000218) (0.00987) (0.000533) 
Pred4 0.00159*** 0.000386 0.165*** 0.000614 
 (0.0000723) (0.000238) (0.00549) (0.000547) 
Pred5 0.000116  0.0621***  
 (0.0000754)  (0.00248)  
Pred6   0.0200***  
   (0.000808)  
Pred7   0.00283***  
   (0.000101)  
Pred8   0.0000845  
   (0.000104)  
Observations 7208 2151 2054 651 





Figure II-17 Predicted Probabilities for School Choice Sets-Primary Sector by City 
 
Table II-21 Predicted Probabilities of School Choice for Secondary School (All Cities) 
 Auckland Wellington Christchurch Dunedin 
Pred0 0.201*** 0.000648*** 0.181***  
 (0.00495) (0.000194) (0.00982)  
Pred1 0.509*** 0.130*** 0.356***  
 (0.00702) (0.0169) (0.0145)  
Pred2 0.256*** 0.557*** 0.426***  
 (0.00207) (0.0191) (0.00441)  
Pred3 0.0304*** 0.293*** 0.0313*** 0.356*** 
 (0.000513) (0.00293) (0.000919) (0.0208) 
Pred4 0.00435*** 0.0177*** 0.00510*** 0.637*** 
 (0.0000450) (0.000226) (0.000182) (0.00322) 
Pred5 0.0000663 0.00101*** 0.000669*** 0.00690* 
 (0.0000464) (0.000000256) (0.00000877) (0.00292) 
Pred6  0.000000141 0.0000109  
  (0.000000280) (0.00000912)  
N 7208 2151 2054 651 
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Table II-22Predicted probabilities for school choice: Setting racial composition predictors to fixed values 
 

















Pr(y=0x): 0.1399 [ 0.1306,0.1492] 0.3287 [0.245,0.412] 0.1358  [0.1277, 0.1438] 0.376 [0.3103, 0.4433] 
Pr(y=1x): 0.5112 [ 0.4986,0.5237] 0.5187 [0.5107,0.5267] 0.5083  [0.4957, 0.5210] 0.4992  [0.4922, 0.5061] 
Pr(y=2x): 0.2866 [ 0.2818,0.2914] 0.1377 [0.1362,0.1391] 0.2912  [0.2863, 0.2962] 0.1134  [0.1123, 0.1145] 
Pr(y=3x): 0.0534 [ 0.0523,0.0546] 0.0136 [0.0134,0.0138] 0.0553  [0.0541, 0.0565] 0.0098  [0.0097, 0.0099] 
Pr(y=4x): 0.0075 [ 0.0073,0.0078] 0.0012 [0.0011,0.0012] 0.0079  [0.0076, 0.0082] 0.0008  [0.0007, 0.0008] 
Pr(y=5x): 0.0012 [ 0.0011,0.0012] 0.0001 [0.0001,0.0001] 0.0012  [0.0012, 0.0013] 0.0001  [0.0001, 0.0001] 
Pr(y=6x): 0.0002 [ 0.0002,0.0002] 0 [0.0000,0.0000] 0.0002  [0.0002, 0.0002] 0.0000  [0.0000, 0.0000] 
Pr(y=7x): 0 [ 0.0000,0.0000] 0 [0.0000,0.0000] 0.0000  [0.0000, 0.0000] 0.0000  [0.0000, 0.0000] 
Pr(y=8x): 0 [-0.0000,0.0000] 0 [-0.0000,0.0000] 0.0000 [-0.0000,0.0000] 0.0000  [-0.000, 0.0000] 
SECONDARY SECTOR 
Pr(y=0x): 0.077 [0.0712, 0.0843] 0.671 [0.5906, 0.7514] 0.1079  0.1007, 0.1151] 0.1738 [0.1313,0.2163] 
Pr(y=1x): 0.3695  [0.3564, 0.3826] 0.287 [0.2843, 0.2902] 0.4120  0.3988, 0.4252] 0.4625 [0.4500,0.4749] 
Pr(y=2x): 0.4091  [0.4009, 0.4173] 0.041 [0.0399, 0.0403] 0.3738  0.3671, 0.3804] 0.3025 [0.2982,0.3069] 
Pr(y=3x): 0.1207  [0.1181, 0.1232] 0.001 [0.0016, 0.0017] 0.0915  0.0898, 0.0933] 0.0545 [0.0536,0.0554] 
Pr(y=4x): 0.0221  [0.0218, 0.0224] 0.001 [0.0001, 0.0001] 0.0142  0.0141, 0.0144] 0.0065 [0.0064,0.0065] 
Pr(y=5x): 0.0010  [0.0010, 0.0010] 0.000 [0.0000, 0.0000] 0.0005  0.0005, 0.0005] 0.0002 [0.0002,0.0002] 









Appendix 14 Household Choice Model-Ordered Logit  
Table II-23 Household Choice Model-Ordered Logit All Sectors 
 All  Primary  Intermediate Secondary Composite 
main           
Pop density within 2km radius (1,000's) 0.132*** (7.23) 0.315*** (9.29) 2.192*** (28.29) 0.004 (0.12) 6.267*** (8.67) 
Pop u19 (2006) (10's) 0.085*** (9.29) 0.188*** (9.75) 0.122** (3.00) 0.058*** (3.73) 0.208 (0.90) 
Pop u19 (MB percent change 10yr) 0.038*** (4.26) 0.080*** (4.93) 0.115** (2.97) 0.028 (1.84) -0.351* (-2.36) 
Median family income 2006 (log) 0.213*** (14.44) 0.325*** (11.35) 0.414*** (6.04) 0.281*** (10.17) 0.209 (0.88) 
Percent Unemployed -0.018* (-2.05) -0.023 (-1.24) -0.117** (-2.66) -0.015 (-0.92) 0.201 (1.41) 
Blue collar workers (percent) -0.070*** (-6.17) -0.101*** (-4.41) -0.200*** (-3.73) -0.065** (-3.07) 0.040 (0.24) 
Edu-college or higher (percent) 0.208*** (16.10) 0.111*** (4.40) -0.134* (-2.22) 0.559*** (21.39) 2.037*** (8.38) 
Owner-occupied households (percent) -0.140*** (-10.20) -0.077** (-2.81) -0.027 (-0.42) -0.344*** (-14.00) -0.251 (-1.14) 
Bedrooms (mean) 0.045*** (4.63) 0.081*** (4.22) -0.033 (-0.73) 0.070*** (3.85) 0.308 (1.85) 
Movers (percent) (in res less than 5 yrs) -0.017 (-1.74) 0.024 (1.26) -0.256*** (-5.77) 0.008 (0.45) -0.249 (-1.68) 
No-Partner(percent) 0.048*** (4.70) 0.023 (1.13) 0.337*** (7.14) 0.158*** (8.42) 0.629*** (4.08) 
Pop  Māori  (percent) -0.172*** (-15.36) -0.100*** (-4.67) -0.411*** (-7.12) -0.294*** (-14.36) 0.049 (0.21) 
Pop Pacifica (percent) -0.097*** (-6.96) -0.228*** (-7.81) -0.362*** (-5.03) -0.064* (-2.43) 3.608*** (11.28) 
Pop Asian (percent) 0.116*** (10.11) -0.031 (-1.36) 0.627*** (11.60) 0.184*** (8.80) -0.032 (-0.12) 
Pop MELAA (percent) -0.025** (-2.90) -0.108*** (-6.26) -0.102* (-2.57) 0.034* (2.21) -0.682*** (-3.61) 
Pop other (percent) -0.043*** (-4.07) -0.004 (-0.18) -0.076 (-1.58) -0.096*** (-4.90) -0.539*** (-3.72) 
Religion none (percent) -0.071*** (-6.85) -0.239*** (-11.70) -0.256*** (-5.35) -0.050* (-2.51) -0.302 (-1.83) 
Wellington 0.248*** (18.41) -0.127*** (-4.60) 1.180*** (19.16) 0.728*** (30.18) -7.538*** (-11.39) 
Christchurch 0.693*** (44.94) 1.377*** (46.80) 1.091*** (18.15) 0.290*** (11.34) 15.578*** (18.07) 
Dunedin 0.581*** (55.61) 0.345*** (17.32) 0.582*** (12.91) 1.086*** (56.18) 10.635*** (19.41) 
Sum open schools within 2km radius^ -0.035* (-1.98) -0.064 (-1.78) -0.332*** (-3.72) 0.367*** (10.45) 2.718*** (11.70) 
Sum school enrollments (non-scheme) (100's)^ 0.098*** (6.13) -0.271*** (-7.65) -0.865*** (-9.10) -0.424*** (-11.78) -4.480*** (-17.86) 
Observations 12064  12064  12064  12064  12064  
r2_mf 0.161  0.200  0.177  0.205  0.749  
r2_mfadj 0.160  0.198  0.174  0.203  0.744  
Standardized beta coefficients; z statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 




Probit vs. Logit Predicted values 
 
Figure II-19 Scatter plot of predicted values (Household Choice Logit vs Probit) 
 
 
Table II-24 Model Fit - Ordered Probit vs. Ordered Logit Household Choice 
 probit  logit  
Observations 12064  12064  
r2_mf 0.162  0.161  
r2_mfadj 0.160  0.160  
r2_ml 0.495  0.494  





















Appendix 15 School Performance Indicators 
 
Table II-25 School Leavers Technical Notes 
Dimension Technical Notes 
  
Year: Beginning March The year in which students left compulsory school beginning 1 March to end of 
February the following year.  If "Year: Beginning March" is not included as a 
column or row filter, it is important to select it as a "report filter" so results are 
limited to a single year otherwise, the student numbers will automatically be 
summed across all years. 
Qualification: Level 2 Groups the school leavers highest attainment into two categories "NCEA Level 2 or 
above" or "Below Level 2". Includes students who achieved a equivalent non-
NCEA equivalent such as Accelerated Christian Education, International 




University entrance standard is considered the minimum requirements for entry into 
university. To reach university entrance standard a student must gain a level 3 or 
above qualification OR the NZQA university entrance award. Includes students 
who achieved a equivalent non-NCEA equivalent such as Accelerated Christian 












Table II-26 Schools with missing performance data 
Schools Missing Either National Standards or NCEA Completion Data, 2013 
School 
ID 












1618 3 Christchurch Composite (Year 
1-15) 
67.6 62.2 68.5 65.9 
1670 3 Wellington Composite (Year 
1-15) 
67.6 62.2 73.6 65.9 
1143 8 Wellington Composite (Year 
1-15) 
81.9 76.0 76.6 79.9 
3278 3 Christchurch Contributing 62.2 80.3 65.9 
3833 3 Dunedin Contributing 62.2 80.3 65.9 
3728 1 Dunedin Contributing 50.8 81.5 56.4 
3810 2 Dunedin Contributing 57.8 81.5 63.0 
3846 4 Dunedin Contributing 66.3 83.3 69.7 
3813 10 Dunedin Contributing 81.7 83.3 85.4 
3722 2 Dunedin Contributing 57.8 83.3 63.0 
3750 7 Dunedin Contributing 74.9 84.6 78.4 
3027 2 Wellington Contributing 57.8 87.4 63.0 
1355 1 Auckland Contributing 50.8 87.4 56.4 
1474 1 Auckland Contributing 50.8 68.5 56.4 
520 1 Christchurch Contributing 50.8 81.5 56.4 
1271 2 Auckland Contributing 57.8 68.5 63.0 
1356 2 Auckland Contributing 57.8 66.5 63.0 
3486 2 Christchurch Contributing 57.8 83.3 63.0 
3726 2 Dunedin Contributing 57.8 66.5 63.0 
3350 3 Christchurch Contributing 62.2 59.7 65.9 
1281 4 Auckland Contributing 66.3 59.7 69.7 
1495 5 Auckland Contributing 68.2 59.7 71.8 
3395 6 Christchurch Contributing 72.1 66.5 76.2 
3036 6 Wellington Contributing 72.1 66.5 76.2 
1465 7 Auckland Contributing 74.9 66.5 78.4 
3306 7 Christchurch Contributing 74.9 66.5 78.4 
1328 8 Auckland Contributing 76.0 68.5 79.9 
1463 8 Auckland Contributing 76.0 68.5 79.9 
1540 8 Auckland Contributing 76.0 68.5 79.9 
3596 9 Christchurch Contributing 77.7 68.5 81.8 
1220 10 Auckland Contributing 81.7 68.5 85.4 




2351 3 Dunedin Full Primary 62.2 73.6 65.9 
1192 7 Dunedin Full Primary 74.9 73.6 78.4 
4206 3 Auckland Full Primary 62.2 76.6 65.9 
526 2 Dunedin Full Primary 57.8 76.6 63.0 
3860 8 Dunedin Full Primary 76.0 80.3 79.9 
2917 2 Wellington Full Primary 57.8 84.6 63.0 
4229 1 Auckland Full Primary 50.8 84.6 56.4 
1151 1 Auckland Full Primary 50.8 84.6 56.4 
4205 1 Auckland Full Primary 50.8 84.6 56.4 
1619 2 Auckland Full Primary 57.8 87.4 63.0 
1347 2 Auckland Full Primary 57.8 59.7 63.0 
3311 2 Christchurch Full Primary 57.8 68.5 63.0 
3288 2 Christchurch Full Primary 57.8 66.5 63.0 
1420 3 Auckland Full Primary 62.2 68.5 65.9 
4207 3 Auckland Full Primary 62.2 68.5 65.9 
3104 3 Auckland Full Primary 62.2 73.6 65.9 
1593 3 Auckland Full Primary 62.2 87.4 65.9 
3452 3 Christchurch Full Primary 62.2 59.7 65.9 
1511 4 Auckland Full Primary 66.3 59.7 69.7 
3344 4 Christchurch Full Primary 66.3 80.3 69.7 
3408 4 Christchurch Full Primary 66.3 81.5 69.7 
1584 5 Auckland Full Primary 68.2 83.3 71.8 
3102 5 Auckland Full Primary 68.2 87.4 71.8 
1344 6 Auckland Full Primary 72.1 87.4 76.2 
1425 9 Auckland Full Primary 77.7 87.4 81.8 
3434 9 Christchurch Full Primary 77.7 84.6 81.8 
2950 9 Wellington Full Primary 77.7 73.6 81.8 
1174 9 Wellington Full Primary 77.7 80.3 81.8 
2816 10 Wellington Full Primary 81.7 83.3 85.4 
1527 1 Auckland Intermediate 50.8 87.4 56.4 
3763 3 Dunedin Intermediate 62.2 66.5 65.9 
3414 2 Christchurch Intermediate 57.8 83.3 63.0 
1238 3 Auckland Intermediate 62.2 68.5 65.9 
3298 3 Christchurch Intermediate 62.2 87.4 65.9 
3427 4 Christchurch Intermediate 66.3 84.6 69.7 
1225 10 Auckland Intermediate 81.7 84.6 85.4 
1250 1 Auckland Restricted Comp 
(Yr 7-10) 
56.1    
556 1 Auckland Secondary (Year 
7-15) 




341 6 Christchurch Composite (Year 
1-15) 
74.1 83.5 91.2 85.3 
82 7 Christchurch Composite (Year 
1-15) 
80.1 79.9 85.8 86.8 
1189 8 Wellington Composite (Year 
1-15) 
81.9 69.1 83.9 82.3 
6948 10 Auckland Secondary (Year 
7-15) 
91.2 76.2 80.3 68.5 
553 10 Auckland Secondary (Year 
7-15) 
91.2 70.7 77.8 76.1 
 
 
Table II-27 National Standards and NCEA Performance by School Decile, 2013 
Average NCEA and National Standards by School Decile, 2013 
Decile Write2013 Read2013 Math2013 NCEA2_above 
1 50.8 59.7           56.4  56.08747 
2 57.8 66.5           63.0  60.77321 
3 62.2 68.5           65.9  67.6217 
4 66.3 73.6           69.7  67.81691 
5 68.2 76.6           71.8  74.11184 
6 72.1 80.3           76.2  74.06555 
7 74.9 81.5           78.4  80.11956 
8 76.0 83.3           79.9  81.90562 
9 77.7 84.6           81.8  88.58877 




















Primary SOS <= 
.75  
Households with 




Secondary SOS <= 
.75  
Households with 




 M SD M SD d M SD M SD d 
Pop06*** 129.78 77.0 109.4 65.05 -0.27 128.6 78.26 124.3 73.91 -0.06 
Pop u19 (2006)*** 40.89 26.8 31.34 23.61 -0.36 44.37 29.84 36.81 24.77 -0.29 
Pop u19 (2006) (%)*** 0.29 0.09 0.26 0.09 -0.38 0.32 0.10 0.27 0.09 -0.48 
Median Fam Inc 2006*** $64,071 20,765 77,261 20,151 0.64 $55,338 18,196 71,045 20,755 0.78 
Perc hh below 20th percentile***           0.36 0.15 0.34 0.16 -0.14 0.39 0.15 0.34 0.15 -0.34 
Public assistance %*** 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.07 -0.45 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.08 -0.73 
% Unemployed*** 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.19 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.23 
Blue collar workers (%)*** 0.43 0.18 0.36 0.17 -0.37 0.47 0.19 0.39 0.17 -0.44 
Edu- no qualifications (%)*** 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.09 -0.71 0.27 0.10 0.16 0.10 -1.11 
Owner-occupied hh’s(%)*** 0.60 0.22 0.64 0.22 0.19 0.57 0.24 0.62 0.21 0.26 
Ownership 5-yr % change* -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.13 
Private occ w/child(%)*** 0.64 0.17 0.57 0.18 -0.43 0.67 0.17 0.61 0.17 -0.35 
Crowding (persons per bedroom)*** 0.96 0.24 0.87 0.18 -0.39 1.01 0.29 0.92 0.20 -0.39 
Movers (%) (in res less than 5 yrs)*** 0.54 0.15 0.56 0.15 0.14 0.52 0.15 0.55 0.15 0.20 
Not-Partnered (%)** 0.38 0.11 0.38 0.14 0.04 0.38 0.11 0.38 0.12 -0.04 
Pop EU (%)*** 0.61 0.22 0.75 0.13 0.70 0.57 0.26 0.67 0.18 0.45 
Pop  Māori  (%)*** 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.06 -0.53 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.08 -0.80 
Pop Pacifica (%)*** 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.05 -0.56 0.19 0.25 0.07 0.12 -0.72 
Pop Asian (%)*** 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.12 -0.28 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.39 
Pop MELAA(%)* 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.17 








Religion none (%)*** 0.31 0.12 0.38 0.10 0.56 0.29 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.47 
Obs 16,880          
*** Denote significance levels for secondary sector only. Primary sector significance levels are almost identical, except in the case of  Owner 
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Appendix 18 Ballot Rules & International Students  
Examples of School-level balloting notificationss 
“The board has determined that up to 20 places may be available. The exact number of places 




“The Board has determined that there will be 25 spaces available for out of zone students starting 
school in terms 1 and 2 of 2016. Note: this is an estimate only and the exact number of places 
will depend on the number of applications received from students who live within the school’s 
home zone.”84 
“The board has determined that 18 places are likely to be available for out of zone students next 
year. The exact number of places will depend on the number of applications received from 
students who live within the school’s home zone.”85 
“Approximately 40 places are likely to be available for out of zone students this year.  The exact 
number of places will depend on the number of applications received from students who live 
within the school’s home zone.”86 










“The Board has determined the number of places likely to be available for out of zonestudents 
next year.  This is approximately 20 at Year 7, ten at Year 8, two at Year 9, two at Year 10, two 
at Year 11, five at Year 12 and ten at Year 13.The exact number of places will depend on the 
number of applications received from students who live within the school’s home zone.”87 
“A number of places are likely to be available for out of zone students during the year. The 
exact number of places will depend on the number of applications received from students who 
live within the school's home zone.”88 
“Notification of ballot results is within a week of the actual ballot. The exact number of places 



















Table II-29 Presence of International Students in Schools (2009) 











1 93 34052 12 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 
2 86 28892 111 0.21% 0.22% 0.12% 
3 79 26244 92 0.24% 0.23% 0.27% 
4 63 27127 340 0.49% 0.32% 0.80% 
5 60 23624 286 0.70% 0.66% 0.79% 
6 78 33758 514 0.89% 0.66% 1.31% 
7 72 28122 470 1.01% 1.11% 0.86% 
8 94 42317 804 0.94% 0.80% 1.06% 
9 108 55912 1452 1.53% 1.09% 1.82% 
10 153 74783 1528 0.98% 0.83% 1.05% 
Grand 
Total 
886 374831 5609 0.74% 0.53% 1.03% 
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School Decile 
School International Student Population 
n= 886 Schools 
No Scheme Scheme 
